


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20 March 1985

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS



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20 March 1985

EAST EUROPE REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

METHODS OF EAST BLOC ESPIONAGE AGENTS REVEALED

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 4 Jan 85 pp 13-14

[Article by Johann Freudenreich: "Girls and Prize Puzzles as Bait; How East Bloc Secret Services Recruit Agents; SZ Interview with Criminal Investigations Director Hermann Ziegenaus"]

[Text] What are the most common methods with which East Bloc secret services are now enticing agents at home and abroad? We spoke about this with the top spy hunter in the provincial criminal investigation department [CID] in Munich, CID Executive Director Hermann Ziegenaus. Since 1980, his office has on a yearly average checked out around 400 tips in its operations area and conducted 80 investigations, approximately 60 of which went on to the Federal Court or the Bavarian Supreme Court.

The following services-offered advertisement appeared in a Munich newspaper: "Engineer with secure position seeks a change." The ad was answered on the stationery of a Berlin engineering firm. It invited the engineer to an interview, explaining that the plane ticket would be paid by the company whether or not an agreement was reached. The letter was mailed in West Berlin. The engineer bought a round-trip ticket. It was not until he was at Tegel Airport in West Berlin that he found out that the address he was looking for was in the eastern part of the city.

He was not about to forfeit the 448 marks for the flight. After some hesitation, he drove to the appointed street. Naturally, it was not an engineering firm but a branch of the GDR Ministry for State Security, known as the "MfS." Here he was told that all he had to do was remain in his present position. There would be a monthly payment of several thousand marks if he supplied certain information in his professional field. A matter of no danger whatever, they claimed. He was persuaded.

Go to the Authorities

CID Director Ziegenaus describes actual cases that have occurred--cases concerning espionage agents who have been exposed. The above-mentioned

engineer later had to pay dearly--a prison term of several years--for agreeing to the East Berlin proposal. Ziegenaus states, however, that one can get off without any criminal charges if one promptly reveals himself to the authorities in the West. To be sure, the CID at the provincial level is obligated by the "principle of legality" to initiate criminal proceedings and to turn the case over to the state prosecuting attorney. Under certain conditions, however, the court can reduce the punishment or dismiss it altogether. If one goes to the Bavarian Office for the Protection of the Constitution at 51 Neuhauser Street instead of to the police, one can under certain conditions be spared any kind of legal involvement. This is because the constitutional protection process can apply the so-called opportunity principle and keep its informant out of the investigation altogether.

Selection of the Winners

Eighty percent of all spy cases within the purview of the provincial CID have to do with GDR agents. One of the East Berlin secret service's favorite solicitation methods is to play the fairy godmother, even in the West. Easily solved prize puzzles are placed, for instance, in military specialty journals under the name of some West Berlin company. Winners are not drawn from the tumbler but chosen by the Ministry for State Security on the basis of rank, location, the soldier's assignment and other aspects of interest to the secret service, e.g., whether the participant has relatives in the East.

A third favorite method is for GDR agents to collect material in the FRG on interesting people--scientists, engineers, employees in weapons factories, etc.--who are in temporary financial straits. The GDR agents appear as a friend offering help, only later making it clear what they expect in return.

Adventure at the Health Resort

Western travelers to the GDR and above all to the CSSR's Karlsbad-Marianbad-Franzensbad resort triangle are often entrapped by female agents of the secret services working there. In certain elegant hotels there are always ladies whose company and friendship are easily available for travelers from the West who are sufficiently interesting from the secret service point of view. There are also rooms in these hotels equipped with bugging devices and hidden cameras.

Not infrequently over the past several years, the fear of wifely wrath has enabled the GDR and CSSR secret services to send back Western travelers as useful agents. According to Ziegenaus it is indeed often the spouses with their sharp intuition who come to the assistance of the authorities in such cases. More than a few agents are exposed through the jealousy of their wives.

Telepathic offers Services

"Naturally a large portion of the tips we receive are rubbish," said Ziegenaus. Since each case must be investigated as thoroughly as possible, his officials waste a lot of time with investigations prompted by unfounded accusations. As is the case with any police authority, the provincial CID and especially its espionage division are regularly visited by psychopaths. One faithful client was a Russian exile who was afraid of being kidnapped by the Soviets. Since there indeed were cases of this sort in Munich (in 1958 a then 90-year-old Czarist general became a kidnap victim) the case was taken seriously. At one time during an interrogation, however, the Russian underwent a schizophrenic change and did a complete turn-around. He said that he was actually telepathic and was at that moment listening in on a conversation between President Reagan and one of his advisors. If he were paid 1 million marks a month he would turn his telepathic powers on East Berlin and the Kremlin and render any other form of counterespionage redundant.

Contact up to Arrest

The most important Soviet spy exposed in the past several years in the Munich area was Manfred Rotsch. He came to the FRG in 1954. Now 60 years old, the former department head at the MBB [Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm] arms factory confessed that 30 years ago while living in the GDR he had drunk too much at his birthday party and confided to a colleague that he wanted to leave for the West. He [the colleague] in turn confided to Rotsch that he was a Soviet agent. Rotsch claimed he was subsequently forced to go to the West on a spy mission. He confessed that he was in contact with Soviet agents up to the time of his arrest. He maintains that he gave them only worthless information, technical data such as were available even in his company's advertising prospectus. Threats were made that things would go badly for his relatives in the GDR if he defected. The tip that led to his exposure came from the French secret service. The investigation was conducted by the Federal CID.

9992

CSO: 2300/272

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

STATISTICS ON EASTERN SLOVAKIA

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 5 Feb 85 p 3

[Article: "Yesterday and Today"]

[Text] In 1945 eastern Slovakia participated in the republic's industrial output by less than 1 percent, whereas now its participation is sevenfold [more]. The volume of industrial output increased more than 70-fold. After the liberation there were about 20,000 people working in industry, today their number is tenfold [higher]. Roughly 24,000 people work in the East Slovakia Iron Works in Kosice alone.

In comparison with the situation in 1945, there is only one-third as many people working in agriculture now, but their output is more than threefold [higher].

More than 90 percent of all production facilities were built in the framework of industrialization and development of Slovakia. In the seat of the kraj alone more than 40 new industrial plants and enterprises were constructed.

Eighty percent of almost 400,000 new apartments were built to suit a high standard of dwelling, while the number of two-bedroom and larger apartments surpasses the average of both Slovakia and the CSSR. Today the typical adobe cottages with thatched roofs in east Slovak villages are just a much-frequented tourist attraction.

In 1945 there were 183 physicians working in the kraj. The ratio was 1 physician to approximately 5,000 inhabitants. Nowadays up to 5,000 physicians care for the health of the people, the ratio being 285 inhabitants to a physician. There are more than 400 enterprise doctors in the kraj, as well as 250 enterprise and cooperative health centers and out-patients departments.

After the liberation in Kosice, for example, there was not one facility to take care of the children of working mothers. Today there are 77 day-care centers looking after 3,100 children. Before the liberation one secondary school covered 50,000 inhabitants, today it covers 5,000 inhabitants in average. The number of secondary vocational schools has surpassed 70. Before there was no university in the kraj. Today there are about 15,000 students

attending 3 universities and 2 branches. This is seven times more than in all of Slovakia before the liberation. The kraj schools have educated over 27,000 graduate specialists for the needs of the society.

In all larger communities there have been built culture centers which serve in the pursuit of all sorts of performing arts activities. A total of 3,200 different ensembles comprise more than 200 groups of citizens of Hungarian nationality, and there is almost the same number of ensembles of Ukrainian inhabitants.

In the kraj there are four fine arts galleries--something unknown before. Kosice has become the city of the International Biennial of Drawing in Socialist Countries. Roughly 300 permanent movie houses offer about 70,000 performances per year to over 6 million viewers. Twenty museums with over 70 exhibitions are visited by approximately 2 million patrons annually.

Municipal historic preserves have been decreed in centers of history such as Kosice, Presov, Levoca and Bardejov. Two national parks have been established to protect the natural system in some areas, as well as several protected landscape regions, many protected territories and natural formations.

Practically all communities have their own sports facilities. A total of 950 physical training associations are active in the kraj, with over 4,000 different departments and various kinds of sports, gymnastics and tourism.

9910

CSO: 2400/267

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

EMIGRATION APPLICANTS STILL PERSECUTED, DELAYED

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 19-20 Jan 85 p 4

[Article by Albert Hinze, of the East Berlin editorial staff, datelined Berlin/GDR 18 Jan 85: "A Waiting Line of Unknown Length"]

[Text] The embassy refugees of Prague, Warsaw, Budapest and Bucharest found little sympathy in the GDR. With that in mind, the East Berlin attorney Wolfgang Vogel was right. In the past he had always treaded softly when complicated problems reflecting the inner-German relationship affected individuals. As early as October 1984, when the calamities had reached a climax, Vogel candidly pointed to the "annoyance and indignation" among the population.

To be sure, people in the GDR do no longer think the same way as they did 4 or 5 years ago when, above all, even the critical intelligentsia almost disdainfully disapproved of attempts to leave the state. At that time the argument was spread that labor and the intelligentsia should remain in their native country to improve the tendentiously positive socialist conditions rather than move "egoistically" outside the state. Now this argument is heard only on occasion--mostly as a reminiscence. Of course, even those GDR citizens who want to leave the country legally cannot expect unconditional enthusiasm or solidarity; nevertheless, they can expect some sympathy. On the other hand, there is no sympathy for those who use force trying to extract advantages for themselves by circumventing the long waiting line. The patient maintenance of discipline in waiting lines of all kinds has more or less become an accepted procedure in the GDR.

Of course, the waiting line of those who have applied for an emigration permit does not correspond to a waiting line in front of a "vitamin center" where bananas or oranges are available, in which case one can more or less survey the length of the line and the available goods. This is not the case when it comes to emigration permits. An application of this nature is far removed from the organization of "a thousand little things" (Honecker) that are in short supply in the GDR. Even West Germans who want to emigrate have difficulties. Essentially they are personal-psychological problems and the uncertainty whether they will be permitted to enter as permanent residents in Australia or New Zealand. Aside from that, however, the West German does not encounter any interference, which is not at all the case when a GDR citizen wants to emigrate.

This GDR citizen submits his application to the lower state organs, which is the council of the county, the city or the city district, Department of the Interior, and as a rule his application is rejected by return mail. Of course the application can be resubmitted, even for the third or fourth time--such persistence, however, results in unpleasant consequences. Whoever has a security-relevant or ideologically sensitive job (the threshold is low), will most likely lose it; if he is lucky he will get a job as an aide. Unavoidable are oppressive "cadre talks," the goal of which is the withdrawal of the application.

At any rate, the next thing is a ban on contacts with the West, by letter, telephone or even in person. The affected person will no longer receive visitors from the West. And often his colleagues at work, as well as his neighbors and relatives will withdraw from him. It may go as far as breaking up the most intimate family relationships. Young people face relegation from high school or college. As a matter of principle, resettlement at a later date--which was possible until the end of the 1970's--is now out of the question. The loss of social privileges is another thing that has to be taken into consideration.

It does not seem to matter much what the legal reasons are for emigration applications. It became known that the GDR assumed several international obligations and that it may be advisable to refer to them. Among them are the UN Charter, several UN resolutions, the International Pact on civil and political rights, the Final Acts of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. But according to socialist opinion, these documents are only declarations of intent or they contain so many restrictive clauses and stipulations that the GDR authorities can use to extricate themselves.

The basic right to develop one's personality, which can be used to justify one's request for being released from German citizenship in the FRG, does not exist in the GDR constitution. The only viable legal instrument that can be used is the agreement on bringing families together which was honored by the GDR in 1983 when the CSCE Act was signed in Madrid. But when one looks at the GDR norms more closely, one realizes that it concerns primarily a regulation which prevents emigration.

As a result it is not only difficult to be sure what the legal prerequisites are, but there is also total uncertainty when it comes to the administrative procedure. On the average it takes 3 years; but the length of time may range from a few weeks to 60 months. No specific reasons are given for granting or rejecting applications. Only formal decisions are issued. Attempts at trying to figure out the criteria of the decisions are in vain. One cannot even guess what they might be. The Inner-German Ministry in Bonn has not been able either to answer the question whether there might be regional quotas, although attempts have been made to analyze past and current practices. Last but not least, it is not known how long the waiting list is at the present time. Figures that are mentioned vacillate between 100,000 and 500,000 applications. Last year slightly more than 33,000 GDR citizens left their state legally for the FRG. During the preceding years the number was somewhere between close to 8,000 and barely above 11,000 people. When it comes to the future, one can only guess how things are going to develop, over here as well as over there.

HUNGARY

WRITERS ANSWER QUESTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Editor Juhasz Poses Question

Budapest UJ IRAS in Hungarian No 24, Dec 84 p 3

[Letter by Ference Juhasz: "Nation and Identity"]

[Text] My Dear Friends:

Two words and concepts which we hear almost daily today are nation and identity. Newspapers, journals, radio and television are instruments for disseminating news and yearning for consciousness and our conditions are such that the two separate and interconnected concepts--nation and identity--are discussed or written about almost daily. Let us study this. What is the reality, what is the truth? Today charges, accusations, question marks pile up on one another, and there is hardly any wise certainty about this! What is the nation? What is the identity of a nation? What was it centuries ago, at the time of the birth of the nation, or what does it mean today, in 1984? Will you give me an answer from your heart today, in 1984? When was the nation a nation and when was that? When and why was the practice and theoretical essence of our national existence subordinated to class interests? When in Hungarian history did the nation have self-identity? What is this self-identity? Is it a true moral and social value in this tangled age? What do classes reflect in these two concepts? How useful is the nation as subject and concept today, in 1984? And so much else besides! Will you answer me if I ask? I am asking as your friend, as one who believes in you. I would like to fill the December issue of our journal with your answers. I feel that all my friends who are asked this should dig their trowels into their own research areas and study the material removed from the heart of an age of research and turn the microscope of awareness on the material and say what they see in it, how they see its structure, the essence and meaning of the material.

Soter: Our National Identity

Budapest UJ IRAS in Hungarian No 24, Dec 84 pp 8-10

[Article by Istvan Soter: "About Our National Identity"]

[Text] Few peoples have suffered as much for their survival as the Hungarian. Only the Polish people, perhaps, suffered more, having to struggle not with one

tyranny but with three. If the importance of its existence becomes questionable for a people, if it begins to doubt the justice of its survival, it condemns itself to destruction in advance. In the course of its history the Hungarian people has been tossed between an exaggerated, almost distorted, faith in its importance and a feeling of its own superfluous nature. These two extremes appeared in swaggering, self-satisfied nationalism on the one side and in a feeling of inferiority tempting inertia on the other. The nation abandoned itself, did not trust the justification of its existence, did not trust in its abilities. Of course, the feeling of inferiority could be useful too. The mere fact that backward Hungary lived in close contact with a country more civilized than itself, Austria, prompted the best people toward effort and progress. The impetus of the reform age may have derived from the fact that the best people of the country were forced to compare themselves with a developed and flourishing Europe. The journals of Szechenyi complain only on returning from Vienna of the fleas, mosquitoes and flies of Nagycenk. The Hussar captain complained of the mud holes of the Hungarian roads only on seeing the Polish highways.

What is now fashionable to call identity is nothing more than the concept of a right to existence, of identity with ourselves. We cannot say that we can live in peace with ourselves today, that we hold our identity firmly in our hands. Whatever results we achieve in economic and cultural areas, however much we have won international recognition, a sort of twisted guilty conscience and feeling of superfluity build nests for themselves within us. How often have I experienced in my journeys within the Soviet Union that when I inquired about some unknown person, the favorable characterization almost always went like this: "You know, that person is a real Russian!" And then they would list the sympathetic human qualities, which are the same for almost every people. I have never heard someone here praised as a "real Hungarian," or if so it was ambiguously, with cabaret ambiguity, as our father Arpad used to be brought on stage in nylon shirt and cape of leopard skin.

Our national awareness is in crisis, and if in the past we mentioned only the nation instead of the people, today we are insisting only on the term people, as if this people never wanted to become a nation--although it did indeed become one. Bringing the questions of national awareness to the surface arouses the suspicions of some of my historian colleagues, as if the nation were only a threshold of fascism. We have become an uncertain nation, its faith in itself shaken, one which has not tried to cling to its identity, to the justification of its existence, but rather tries to forget such things.

The progressive and creative epochs in Hungarian history have always been strong in their national awareness and identity. Someone should have tried to win over Petofi with the present doubts about nationality! Few Hungarian thinkers have castigated our national faults more mercilessly than Szechenyi and Ady, but would anyone have dared to say to them that there is no need for such a faulty nation? After the dissolute nationalism of World War II no one today would dare to act as Petofi, Arany, Szechenyi and Ady dared and did.

Have we matured somewhat--or have we become valueless and superfluous? This would have been a profane question at times; but today, responding to it, we

must put ourselves to the test. We expect an answer to this question not from those who envy us or wish us ill, but rather from ourselves! Self-knowledge was the goal and task of the best in the great age of Hungarian thinking, in the reform age, and two decades later too. The age between the two world wars returned again and again to the question of the Hungarian character, if sometimes awkwardly. Today we do not dare face these questions, because it would require the passion and sensitivity to truth of a Janos Vajda. Even our best and greatest writers have not dared to undertake the tasks of self-knowledge since the liberation. Cringing uncertainty can only be sicker than the sometimes sick excess of our self-confidence. The only area where we still try to show who we are is sports, but this is far from enough. We no longer dare believe that Bartok was a greater composer than the famous contemporary composers of bigger nations. We do not dare note that Hungarian poetry rivals the English and French poetry in world literature, that our greatest Hungarian novelists would easily compete with the best French and Russian masters of the art of narration.

The greatest and most consistent seeker of Hungarian identity was Janos Arany. He sought not only the identity of one class, the peasantry, but that of the entire nation. Toldi is both popular and knightly, thus an all national character. For Arany the search for identity is both self-knowledge and self-criticism. The faults of Toldi are national faults--self-destructive extreme of passion or heedless playing. Toldi forfeits the happiness of love just as the Gypsies of Nagyida do victory. For Arany the source of identity is history and culture--but popular culture just as much as that of the learned strata. The popular and the old are inseparable unities for Arany. His epics and ballads are great portrayals of character, critical and realistic pictures of national identity. History, unfortunately, does not become part of national awareness as a result of the good offices of however outstanding historians, but rather through the portrayals of poets. The works of Arany and the novels of Jokai became the schools of the historical awareness of the people for a century.

But history cannot contain the entire picture of identity. A Hungarian historian has pointed out that historiography leaves out just those things and circumstances which are generally known. What the historian neglects opens a free area for the imagination of poetry which seizes on details. We do not really know Transylvania from historiography but rather from the works of Zsigmond Kemeny, Jokai and Zsigmond Moricz. Despite his great descriptive strength Moricz does not stand closer to the Transylvanian reality, Kemeny does. Sometimes faulty tradition reflects life more than the chronicles do. There is truth in the statement that in literature--and perhaps in life as well--the detail is more important than the whole.

History is not merely the storehouse of political experiences. If we regard culture as the other great national identity then we must interpret this concept in the broadest sense. We should mean by it not only literature, the arts and the sciences but also popular customs, morals, fashions, taste, occupations, the methods and varieties of work, in a word everything which has made man a creator of civilization. History and culture cannot be separated from one another; culture represents history and history forms culture. Our

national identity is being built anew in the present, but this building rises on the foundation of traditions. Tradition is national identity itself, always supplemented by the new which emerges from tradition.

How can this principle fit in with a social system which wants to break with the past? This breaking intention can be distorted also. Even today there are those who turn against the sins of the past in such a way as to tear down the monuments with pleasure and saw up the old trees into lumber. Ignorance has a part in this, but the revolution cannot justify ignorance and cannot break from that which it is continuing, from a history striving for the liberation of man. At the end of the second decade of this century the poetry of the avant gards, wanting to be revolutionary, wanted to break even with grammar, which gave birth to manneristic and strange works. Attila Jozsef never undertook such a thing. Indeed, linguistically, he returned to the same source as Arany.

I must repeat again and again that our sensitivity toward national identity is in crisis.

We must start a rescue action to save our national identity. As second president of the Academy Szechenyi gave a speech shortly before the freedom fight in which he said that the chief mission of this institution was to preserve and defend the Hungarian language. He said it even though there was no one in Hungary who was more sensitive than he to technology---steam navigation, railroads, river control, bridge building, transportation, etc. He did not ask the Academy for an accounting in regard to the cultivation of the technical or natural sciences even though he knew very well the gigantic significance of these sciences in creating the epoch. But he foresaw a national catastrophe in which the Hungarians might be destroyed. There was something which could maintain this people and keep them together, the language. We are not afraid of a national catastrophe, but we also can see in our language, in our historical awareness, in our culture a guarantee of our survival. We could easily convince ourselves of how much our language has declined since Szechenyi if we turn on the radio or television or leaf through a daily paper or journal. It is true that we are not living in the age of Szechenyi and Arany, but we need not have come so far from the traditions of Szechenyi and Arany.

Demographic problems, suicide statistics, alcoholism, the deterioration of work morality, increased crime---these threaten national catastrophe if we do not become capable of self-respect and of doing more for the reputation of our nation. One nation is proud of the cleanliness of its cities, another of its precise achievements, or of its cultivated art treasures, and so forth. It cannot count as an alibi that we are a small nation, because nations smaller than ours are working and living better than we are. The history of culture proves the disproportionately high rank of small nations. But these nations preserve what we are throwing away. So let us return to the sources of our national identity. Let us guarantee the healthy functioning of national awareness; let us force back the prophets of an erroneous guilty conscience. Our recent past was not only the age of fascism, but also the age of Bartok, Kodaly, Attila Jozsef and Miklos Radnoti.

And yet someone may ask: What is the use or sense of searching for or having our national identity? What can we use it for if we find it? We cannot pin it like a badge on our lapel! The question is justified because the awareness and healthy functioning of our identity must manifest itself in deeds. In everyday deeds or in historical deeds. The age of reform embodied its awareness of identity in the freedom fight. For us work is an arena. Work is also part of culture, indeed it is the foundation of a national culture. It has moral traditions and these have not yet been lost entirely, although they have lost much of their strength. This country has built its capital city many times, has gotten on its feet many times--and this has filled it with just national pride. Not to work just any way, not to relax, not to give up that quality and dignity which permeated our best epochs--this is the practical realization of national identity in the everyday life of our society.

Pach: National Consciousness Today

Budapest UJ IRAS in Hungarian No 24, Dec 84 pp 11-14

[Article by Zsigmond Pal Pach: "Concerning National Consciousness Today"]

[Text] After antecedents which reach far into the past and since the age of the bourgeois transformation and the development of the capitalist order, national consciousness became one of the "reigning ideals" of European history, became a powerful ideological driving factor of social-political movements. From the beginning it was a complex phenomenon with many components, but in its chief line, social progress and rising out of feudal relationships, it constituted one of the ideological foundations of modernization.

The imperialist stage of capitalist development, the first and second world wars and the decades since represented new phases in the history of national consciousness as well. Even earlier it bore in itself various tendencies--a patriotic-democratic trend serving and linked with social progress and a nationalist-chauvinist trend of complacency covering up the class contradictions within the nation and of antipathy and prejudice against other nations, and sometimes these contradictory tendencies were mixed in a unique composition. The formula has become even more complex in recent decades and at present, requiring an even more careful analysis.

Let me refer here to only two factors which are linked with world historical events of the past almost four decades and which can be regarded as turning points in the awareness processes of our age.

During World War II virtually the entire world knew and suffered the crimes and blows of fascist nationalism, the most negative, most aggressive, most inhuman form of nationalism, including the peoples of those countries from which these distorted ideals started their destructive path. As a result of this, after the war, a peculiar awareness duality was produced in more than one European country. On the one hand, the deeply drunk poison of nationalism continued to infect and have an effect, not in a narrow circle and not always undisguised. On the other hand, in the German lands among others--in both German states although in an essentially different political context--a rather strong

reaction was produced in social strata awakening to bitter sobriety from the drugging opium, a surfeit of that ideology which had rained serious suffering on its own nation too, in addition to other peoples, an alarmed turning away from nationalism--indeed, to a certain degree, from the national idea in general. In part just this surfeit and disillusionment in certain western European countries served as a soil for the general questioning of national values, of the nation as a social value category, for the spread of "supranational," cosmopolitan views above nations.

No less important is the other determining factor, which is interdependent with the struggle against fascism. In opposition to the Hitler aggression and conquest, the antifascist resistance and freedom fighters throughout Europe who opposed terror and oppression and took up arms for the liberation of their homelands gave new life to and carried further the traditions, emotions and ideals of national independence, progressive patriotism and noble patriotic ardor and drew faith and strength from them. Similarly, the memory of the home defense struggles and national uprisings of Russian history and the past examples of Russian-Soviet patriotism encouraged the Soviet people when, fulfilling the national task of the present, they not only won back their homeland from the conqueror but also, performing an internationalist mission, they liberated the other peoples of eastern and central Europe from the rule of fascism. The animation of European antifascist, leftist patriotism and of Russian-Soviet patriotism in the years of the life and death struggle against Hitlerism could, with the ending of the war, give new impetus to the strengthening of the progressive currents of national awareness, to democratic patriotism and to the unfolding of a socialist national and internationalist awareness.

In Hungary also the contamination of national awareness was great before and during World War II, and thus action against nationalism, forcing back and overcoming its various forms, was an indispensable and first priority ideological condition for rising out of the catastrophe of war, for the democratic renewal and the socialist transformation.

The progressive forces, the communists, had to fight a two-front struggle in this question from the beginning. On the one hand they had to oppose the fascist distortions of national awareness, its retrograde, nationalist contents, with all the tools and strength of criticism. On the other hand they had to refute the charge of being nationless, had to overcome the slander of anti-patriotism, which the right wing had showered on them without restraint in the quarter century of the counterrevolution. They had to prove with words and deeds that the democratic development after 1945 was bringing an organic continuation--even when it meant a radical break, a discontinuity in comparison with the reactionary past--that there was a continuity with the best traditions of Hungarian history.

The ideological struggle soon started too. A period can be given to its phases and cycles and in no small part its successes and failures can be measured according to how those guiding and participating in the struggle were capable--and, objectively, to what degree it was possible for them--of satisfying together and simultaneously the dual requirement, an organic linking

of homeland and progress, the historic task appearing again and again in the recent centuries of our history, appearing in our day as the uniting of Marxism and Hungarianness, of socialism and national awareness.

The development of national awareness was not smooth or without contradictions in Hungary after the liberation. Here also the opposition to nationalism and the outraged condemnation of its nation destroying effect, resting on profound foundations of principle and morality, sometimes took place from the perspective of a general enlightened humanism or an equally respectable but abstract internationalism. On the other hand--especially after 1948-1949 in a sharpening cold war atmosphere--the criticism of nationalism became increasingly unsophisticated and undifferentiated and the criticism of the bourgeois ideology came to be expressed on the basis of a concept of socialism which did not take into account the hard realities and stumbling blocks of the historical path of socialism. In the area of culture and science also the action against nationalism was burdened by dogmatism and narrowness which measured our historical and cultural inheritance with a miserly measure, darkened and truncated significant historical personalities and processes and unjustifiedly denied national values. Here also all this could have contributed to blunting receptivity to national factors, to a turning from the national ideal as such and to a disputing of its present timeliness. At the other pole, however, and in a crucial way, a reaction appeared. The indicated circumstances--together with other historical and political factors--led to asserting national awareness, to opposing internationalism and casting doubt on internationalist values.

A narrow abstract view appeared also in the fact that for a rather long time we entered into a debate not only primarily but exclusively with Hungarian nationalism and did not note--it was not possible for us to take note of it--the "interference phenomenon" uniquely characterizing the national-nationality question of the Danube region. The fact is that the domestic symptoms cannot be understood or treated in isolation from those beyond our borders, since they have a close mutual effect on one another.

Last but not least, it is also true of the development of national awareness that the progress achieved cannot be regarded as final, valid once and for all, because, for example, some sharper development of the international situation--and there has been no shortage of these in recent decades--could again bring to the surface views which were believed to have disappeared, feelings thought to have abated, doubts thought dispersed.

Actually the thesis of the two-front struggle won a generally understandable formulation in Hungary only in the struggle against the counterrevolution and won a comprehensive application in the process of socialist consolidation--broadly, in regard to all the problematics of guiding society, but also extending to the area of national awareness, so neuralgic ideologically and politically. The productive idea in this regard meant that the political power should put a stop to crested nationalism, and yet give scope for the positive expression of national self-awareness and awareness of identity, to healthy self-realization, to the display of national peculiarities, to the harmonization of national and international points of

view. With the socialist consolidation this scope became broader and broader, with reasoned gradualness but with tenacious consistency. It meant that the cultivators of culture and science were encouraged to turn with principled criticism against the inheritance and new forms of nationalism, but at the same time to deepen and broaden the organic national-historical foundations of the socialist present with careful research and reanalysis, to gradually put alongside the revolutionary, independence and freedomfight traditions--along with them and not in opposition to them!--all the values encouraging and all the noble, useful traditions of the periods of peace, reforms, economic progress, material, technical and intellectual culture. It meant that a path opened in our intellectual public life for comprehensive debates on history, literature, press, particularly in national awareness.

These polemics, periodically renewed in waves, had a positive effect and aided a clarification of concepts and a resolution of knots, even if, by the nature of things, they did not lack nervous, subjectivist overtones.

Apparently we have now entered a new current of the wave of debates. And perhaps I would not be in error if I evaluated the chief current of the "new wave" as positive and forward. A worthy place has been given to forgotten or neglected historical, scientific and artistic values--including those which the historical churches transmitted--actual national peculiarities have been recognized and appreciated, the suspicious careful handling of nationalism in patriotism has been corrected and cultural links have been built with the Hungarians living beyond our borders.

This trend is being strengthened by such comprehensive central themes of historical research as a systematic discovery and processing of our historical and cultural traditions and memories. It is being served by a long list of detailed research projects--including those which are aimed at a full description of the quickening democratic aspirations of the beginning of the 20th century, of the work of Ervin Szabo, Oszkar Jaszi and Zsigmond Kunfi or at a depiction in all its variety of the cultural-ideological life of the 1920's and 1930's. These studies are showing a good bit more broadly and richly than was recognized earlier the intellectual accomplishments of the early Hungarian progressives and the valuable antecedents of our present concept of the nation; nor do they hold aloof from expressing appreciation for such things as, for example, what was contributed to the self-awareness of the nation by such a conservative historian as Gyula Szekfu, who came from so far.

Coinciding with this positive, forward looking trend are those scientific and literary publications which create a link with Hungarians living in neighboring or distant countries and those vernacular language conferences and joint professional meetings which try to create, maintain and protect from neglect our contacts with the Hungarians scattered in so many ways about our round world--with economists, librarians and physicians among others--in the programs of the World Federation of Hungarians.

Not only do sun rays sparkle and pure froth ripple on the crests of these waves, but sand and mud splash up from the dark bed of the river and from the uncared for verges of the banks on this and the other side.

If we take into account the less attractive elements of the new wave of debate--and we can hardly permit ourselves to ignore them--we can observe in them, generally speaking, the reappearance of outworn views which are inclined to raise the concept of the national ideal above history and disregard the frequently proven findings according to which national awareness is not an eternal and unchanging value but rather in itself the product of historical and social development. This is not the place to go into detail about all this.

But we cannot neglect to mention here that real problem which hides--spoken or unspoken--in the statements being made both at home and outside the home. On the basis of what criteria can a community be called a nation, what is the historical relationship of state and nation?

As we know one European theory of nation--beginning with Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes--has given an answer to the question which regards the nation as identical with the state. Another theory--from Wilhelm von Humboldt to Friedrich Meineck--developed in opposition to this conception of the nation-state or political nation the category of the cultural nation, which puts linguistic and cultural criteria in the foreground.

The Marx-Lenin theory of nation did not accept the identification of the nation with the state. It necessarily could not accept it, for according to the Marxist position the state is a product of the development of a class society and the nation in its modern form is a product of the decline of the feudalism and the development of capitalism. The state is an earlier development than the nation, the two were brought into existence by historical processes which are not the same. Thus it is a possible and favorable, but not necessary, event for the state and nation to coincide. In central and eastern Europe, with a population more ethnically mixed and a later development of capitalism than western Europe, the state borders and the national communities did not coincide, and this became one of the sources of serious conflicts in the age of capitalism.

The decisive change brought by 1944-1945, the liberation of the countries of the Danube region, the popular democratic revolution, taking the path of socialism, created radically new historical conditions in central and eastern Europe. The community and cooperation of the countries cultivating socialism came into being. But the abstract internationalist expectation that state borders would be "spiritualized" and lose their importance in the wake of a radical social transformation proved to be an illusion. It became obvious that for an entire long historical period the building of socialism will take place within the framework of national economies and for a long time the state borders will retain their role and significance.

The Marxist theoretical studies of nation and state must openly face the concrete conditions and requirements of the new historical epoch. On the one hand the analysis might be directed at a Marxist development of a nation concept--a "cultural nation"--which is not a political state unity but rather rests on the chief criteria of a linguistic and cultural community. On the other hand it might lead to the elucidation of the homeland content and

concept--"state patriotism"--which attributes political and economic unity to the given state and expresses the awareness of nations and nationalists for the civic community and obligations with equal rights.

Kosary: On Small Nations

Budapest UJ IRAS in Hungarian No 24, Dec 84 pp 15-19

[Article by Domokos Kosary: "A Letter to Ferenc Juhasz About Small Nations"]

[Text] Last year, at a conference in London, one of our Czech historian colleagues from Prague outlined a developmental diagram of the awakening and movements of the small nations of eastern and central Europe since the end of the 18th century. And when, in the course of the debate, I called his attention to the fact that this did not entirely fit the Hungarian development, he said, almost amazed: "But Hungary does not count as one of the small nations." "If only you were right," I answered, "if only history would prove you so!"

This relativity of the pictures we have about one another and about ourselves came to mind when I sat down to try to satisfy your courteous request. What is the nation today? What was it in the past? What is the identity of a nation? These are serious questions which I can answer here only with a letter, in a few pages, where there is no room for regular historical analysis, as a friendly message and--I must say--despite certain reservations. I am not at all sure that it is correct to always begin the thing in this way, from the beginning, in generalities, as if we should not now go further and work on drawing certain concrete lessons and on solving more proximate tasks; I am not sure that it is timely for us to discuss the entire problem in general in the form of a conference, if certain political points of it cannot be silenced with honor or solved here at home by convincing one another.

And in any case, the reader can already learn a lot--thanks to our domestic researchers--about the historical formation and development of the nation from the beginnings to the most recent times. Is it necessary for us to say all this again? That once we erroneously tried to discover "nations" even in the ancient past, without anything else? Or that those who tried to do the opposite and held the nation to be an exclusively modern phenomenon also were unable to grasp the reality? Even in the Middle Ages there was "nationality" which could be regarded as such an historical antecedent; only the loyalty of people was tied primarily to something else--to religion, to feudal relationships or to kindred, local communities. Then this early nationality became primary so that finally the bourgeoisie--or that lacking another social class--made it the basic formula for a new process and value system. But by and large it still belongs among things well known that the historical structure of Europe has various levels, is built up of more developed ("central") and less developed zones or peripheral regions, which developed and changed having a mutual effect on one another. From this one can understand the gradual falling behind of the eastern-central European zone--and Hungary in it--in the 16th and 17th centuries, then its effort to catch up in the 18th and 19th centuries, in response to the challenge of the more developed zones. This

is true of national development also. A number of deficiencies and the slower, unique development of the conditions for modern national development accompanied the social-economic characteristics of late feudalism too (the weakness of industry and the bourgeoisie, rule by a system of nobles, the serf system).

For a considerable time the nobility regarded itself as the "nation," with considerable self-awareness. This feudal nation defended its privileges, including "national" self-determination. In a given case--as in the Rakoczi freedom fight--this could have broader historical significance too. But the nobility defended even more stubbornly other, feudal prerogatives and regarded it as a "national" danger if these latter were threatened. Thus it was, for example, at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, in a period of "feudal nationalism" which supported the wars of the Habsburg power against France and rejected the "foreign"--bourgeois--ideals of freedom, an indication of the fact that in the course of history the "national" was not always necessarily and unambiguously "progressive." More than one tradition of the feudal nation was continued later, in historiography, so that the great turning--the bourgeois-national transformation--took place in Hungary under the leadership of a new, outstanding, liberal generation of the nobility. At this time also we meet with the concept that the nobility always represented the cause of the nation and of freedom, even in earlier centuries. Later on the other hand, at the beginning of the 1950's, when some felt that it was enough to simply reverse the sign of certain old answers in historiography, the broad peasant strata and the serfs became nationalistic, truly, deliberately and unambiguously, while the noble became vacillating, ambiguous or outright traitors, if they did not succeed in definitely going beyond their class limits. Today, fortunately, we are perhaps largely beyond such debates and more and more people are beginning to see that we must pose new questions and seek new answers to them which will better disclose the realities of feudal society. One of these questions is through what experiments, when, and indeed to what extent it was possible to open and transform the narrow feudal nation (or its successor, the bourgeois nation) so that it should be the nation of the entire people. Let me not repeat here all of what a number of us have summarized most recently in the television series Goyalvar Evenings under the title "Ethnics and Politics," which has appeared in print since. We tried there to outline, among other things, the unique versions of the national movements of this zone from the first half of the 19th century--those of peoples with the complete feudal structure, thus with their own nobility, the feudal historical past and apparatus, such as the Hungarians were, and those of others starting without such initial advantages. The strengthening of the new national self-awareness and of the "linguistic nationalism." The positive and negative aspects of the "receiving" Hungarian nation and the questions of--largely natural--assimilation. And then the sharpening of national contradictions in the complex dependence system of multinational Hungary and the Habsburg monarchy, all the way up to the end of World War I when--with an interplay of partly internal and partly external, international political factors--the historical course of the old Hungary came to an end, if not that of the unsolved national problems, of tensions, indeed of the wrangling of local nationalisms, with tooth and claw. But it is time for me to stop, before I go on to say what it is that perhaps I should not say.

We cannot really approach the question of our contemporary national identity with such a distant retrospective. A historian who cannot undertake sociological or social psychology surveys can do with his own tools no more here than indicate those larger processes the effect of which might have been realized in this area. Let us begin with the fact that within a few decades Hungarian society went through changes and shocks which exceed the slow steps of several centuries. All this had to be consciously processed and sorted out, which does not happen overnight. If we begin with a list of the trials and losses beginning with the serious national shock effect of the liquidation of this old country--particularly how this liquidation took place--let us admit that it is rather frightening. It is an historical experience that the wounds which cut into the conditions of national existence, into interests and self-esteem, usually evoke a unique, contradictory process. On the one hand they awaken active, bitter protest and increased emotion, strengthen nationalism, rejecting such facts--we can remember--as the small nation and a country smaller still. On the other hand if all this appears hopeless or even dangerous, it can turn into a broken spirit, even a desire to flee, into faint-heartedness, that such a small fragment of a nation with a "dead-end" history persecuted by bad luck can do anything at all. And of course, in a given case, this can relieve us of the responsibility of seizing the real possibilities and tasks standing before us. The nearer or more distant nationalist phenomena which may occur outside our borders can produce similar inflammatory symptoms to a more limited degree, on a smaller surface of the skin, or perhaps under the skin, either because they create illusions or--more likely--because the effects of nationality discrimination seep irrecoverably through the capillaries of societies. And then we must--because we must--cure here at home, in ourselves, a sickness the pathogenic factors of which can be eliminated only together, with our common strength, if we all recognize that the free development of nationality cultures does not endanger, on the contrary it strengthens the position of the interested states and the security guaranteed by the given international system.

But on the other side, the great social transformation itself and--primarily--the significant, more tranquil development of recent decades brings new impulses, varying in many ways, a new orientation and demands a new adaptation. And since these great processes, even if they were parallel in part, were more inclined to follow one another in time, their social effects are not distributed entirely evenly, but are realized differently according to groups or even generations. We can with justice talk about the unity of the nation, as a whole. But within this not everyone experienced the same thing, heard and learned or did not hear and learn the same thing. So it would not be correct if, for example, we were to try to generalize the concept of older people only (or some of them) and regard this as the "valid" model of identity. Development--hopefully--does not stop, even if a historian might wish it to. And I would hope that the youngest generation--in its own interest--very well prepared, with a healthy, tranquil self-awareness and with a precise knowledge of the possibilities and pitfalls of small countries and small nations, i.e. with a precise knowledge of their own situation, will find itself faced with those tasks which in any case they cannot avoid.

Since the number of small states has increased so greatly in the wide world in recent decades, there is more and more extensive literature dealing with their unique problems, beginning to go back investigating the past as well. The fact that certain special features have characterized the development of small states is no longer disputed, despite all the uncertainty which in general characterizes the attempts directed at a conceptual definition of the quite broad and varied category of "small state." In general the literature classified states as small if they have a population less than 10-15 million people (speaking of states, often confusing them with nations, although they differ from one another in many things). Viewed in this way Hungary in 1971 occupied the 43rd position among the 143 independent states of the world from the top and thus belonged in the upper stratum of small states. A total of 100 were smaller, 16 of these in Europe. But the survey remains uncertain even if we consider other quantitative indexes (area, total national product per capita, developmental level, etc.). A state is relatively large or small not only in general, on a world scale, but rather primarily as measured by its more immediate geographic neighborhood. Belgium is a small state, if we compare it to France, but it is a good bit larger than Luxemburg. The differences between Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, a good bit larger than them (37 million), seem insignificant compared to the size of the Soviet Union.

In addition, the world has small countries which are economically developed and those which are backward, although essentially all of them are characterized by a narrower spectrum of resources, the specialization which derives from this and--primarily--greater dependence on foreign trade. But looked at historically we can probably discover the main difference in the fact that while large states have been given their security primarily by their own (relatively great) internal weight and less by some external factor, the security of small states has depended primarily on external, international factors, on the possibility of supplementing the lack of internal strength. Among the various possible versions (belonging in a larger framework, alliance system, etc.) this was essentially true in the first half of the 19th century even of neutral Switzerland or Belgium, which received from the stronger large powers the role of a dike vis-a-vis France. And if someone looks into it he will find in the Switzerland, Belgium or even Holland of the time, behind the confidence, a feeling of fragility, or--we quote a Dutch author--signs of an "identity crisis."

We do not have room here to pursue from this viewpoint our own history since the beginning of the 19th century. But compared to the truly great powers--deviating from the complimentary opinion of our Czech colleague--we were a small nation even then, of "small numbers" as Szechenyi said, within the greater framework of the Habsburg empire, only in possession of relatively more advantageous positions compared to others, primarily to those even smaller, within the old, larger country, which, however, proved only temporary. At the beginning of the 20th century these positions dwindled, in part became the opposite, and so since then our position has changed on the ladder of small nations. We might indicate with a list of passages how our best political thinkers even in the past century sensed what we might call the "small nation syndrome." And the lesson of 1848 does not contradict the rule which derives from this, that one must avoid in every possible way open conflict with the

superior strength--the Habsburg power. In the ultimate case, if the possible methods are exhausted, national self-defense, assuming with it the risk and sacrifices, was always better than self-abasement, because (in the words of Kossuth) there is a source of strength even in "falling." Even at the time of the Compromise a small nation which was ready to defend its own values had more respect and credibility. In the 1960's, the two most significant Hungarian statesmen, Kossuth in emigration and Deak here at home, both avowed that in this area small states isolated from one another and taking different paths could not hold their ground in a Europe of large power formations. They differed from one another only in regard to the form the organization ensuring this union should take. Kossuth was thinking of a confederation of Danubian peoples, which would require two basic conditions--liquidation of the Habsburg power and reconciliation of the territorial claims of the interested small nations. Deak tried to transform the existing Habsburg monarchy into a defensive construct which would give the necessary external security factor. "A large part of the European powers," he said in December 1867, "have such extensive and powerful forces that Hungary could not survive among them as a separate, self-contained country without a closer alliance providing sure support. Fate has placed our country among great powers any one of which, believing that we stood in the way of its desires or plans, would certainly crush us with its terrible strength if we relied on our own strength." The Compromise of 1867 gave Hungarian politics half a century to try on its own from a position more favorable than ever before to lead off in a favorable direction, if possible, the growing national and social tensions of the multinational country. But the Hungarian ruling classes, forgetting the realities of the conditions, stuck to their absolutism with virtually "great power" chauvinism, at the head of an ever more obsolete structure less and less able to resist the storm. In any case, the new international system which tried to keep the new eastern and central European small states under French influence after World War I in the exceptional and very temporary vacuum produced in the wake of the fall of the German and Czarist Russian empires proved to have a good bit shorter life. But with this also we might close the history of the versions which already count today as the day before yesterday.

The role of small countries or nations has been judged very contradictorily at different times. There were those who--like H. G. Wells at the beginning of this century--saw in them pathetic obstacles to development. Later, in the age of the world wars, others pretended to discover in them the embodiment of human virtues. Shoving aside these extremes, we must weigh the real possibilities, in the interest of clarifying our identity. Small countries are viable too. Because of their economic characteristics and despite their more modest resources they are forced to modernize; perhaps just because of their size they may be more mobile, capable of adapting and experimenting. They have one fundamental natural resource--human talent which can be cultivated, even if they are not otherwise so rich. Very much depends on their internal unity, on their sensitivity to reality, on the extent to which they are able to build an internal sovereignty in themselves, in their social-historical awareness.

Do not take it badly if finally, despite my intention, I have gone beyond the questions posed. I beg you to regard it as a sign of friendly thinking together.

I embrace you with the old love,

Domokos Kosary

I. Berend: National Identity

Budapest UJ IRAS in Hungarian No 24, Dec 84 pp 22-24

[Article by T. Ivan Berend: "Nation and Identity"]

[Text] I would like to begin with a few sentences from the requesting letter: "Two words and concepts, which we hear almost daily today are nation and identity." "Today charges, accusations, question marks pile up on one another, and there is hardly any wise certainty about this!" Naturally within the framework of an answer given to the circular question of UJ IRAS one can seize only a few threads out of this complex web. But these threads, on closer examination, may still contribute to a better understanding.

The phenomenon is striking. What is more, we really do stumble almost daily into various components of the "identity confusion." There are those who feel that building material wellbeing in the long decades of booming business "tied down our attention too much." As if we would have to choose between either material enrichment and the value systems linked with this or higher moral, political and national values opposed to a materialism clinging to the earth. Today, when economic growth has stopped short and living conditions have worsened, a feeling of "value crisis" has strengthened.

And so again we find the abstract socialist principles and moral ideals opposed to practice, ideals of equality opposed to the existence of small property or supplementary activities and the good bit larger incomes deriving from them, the existing social differences and the morality destroying effects of commodity and market relationships. Others feel that the mess of pottage of our economic progress and increased consumption have endangered our national values and obligations. If realistic political insight or simple confusion earlier wrapped important questions with silence, now there is increased sensitivity in connection with old national wounds and the present consequences of them, and defense of the Hungarians and the fate of the minorities appears as one of the chief national causes. If a narrow one-sidedness appeared in our historiography earlier and if we were able to only stammer clumsily and awkwardly about this or that chapter of our past, as someone has said, now we are much more likely (of course, not independent of the earlier error) to try to strengthen our feeling of national security with a more vigorous identification with the historical past. And in this process unique zeal in prettying up the past has become characteristic also. It is as if the evil even in the years of World War II has been forced on us from without. Beautifying memories and making contradictory personalities into almost perfect heroes have become everyday things.

The interruption and stagnation of the economic-social development processes most characteristic of the preceding quarter century, beginning at the turn of

the 1970's and 1980's, has also been linked with the national question, has led to a questioning of our developmental path, asking if we have been on the right path at all, if the troubles are not rooted in the break with and transformation of the earlier processes of our national development which took place at the turn of the 1940's and 1950's, asking if we should take the organic developmental paths of our national history. So some find a contradiction between the present, or the path leading to the present, and the national value principles, and not least of all attribute the confusions in national identity to this.

In the interest of dispersing misunderstandings I would like to hasten to emphasize that to a considerable extent the confusions appearing in public awareness come from the reality medium of our present. They would hardly have developed without having truth content and we must deal with them. Under the heading of a campaign against nationalism, for example, the interpretation of our past in some cases may have hurt national feelings and all this cannot be regarded as completely overcome--it is not infrequently mentioned in debates about textbooks. It has even more important consequences that the well intended basic principle, which we took very seriously, that everyone should sweep before his own door, struggle against his own nationalism and offer proof with his own example, was not always successful. In cases--if everyone does not adhere to this rule!--this must be supplemented, as is done elsewhere too, with a principled debate against nationalisms coming from elsewhere, by calling injustices by name, and this is a task especially filled with responsibility in the case of a people which has minorities living in other countries.

The interrupting-transforming processes of historical development with revolutionary import have really taken place via borrowings--and this is an especially important source of the identity confusions. The model of industrialization, the directive system of central planning which largely disconnects the market, the cooperative transformation of agriculture, the great levelling of society and the political structure linked with all this were transplanted virtually overnight in the place of institutions and structures of a preceding century which we had become accustomed to as the national ones.

But even with an awareness of their truth content it must be stressed that from the viewpoint of the development of people and nation we cannot lay our foundations on a defense of the value of abstract national principles or principles which simply existed in earlier historical periods and thus are regarded as traditional. Despite their reality content (or even more, because they are more effective) the backward looking salvation of values which derives from identity confusion can lead into the danger zone of unrealistic, irrational solutions.

The path out of the national identity disturbances does not lead backward in the direction of erstwhile structures already surpassed and the nationalism which has been experienced. Within this framework I would like to seize on only one interdependency of this already examined in an earlier article of mine in another context. Namely, is it realistic to talk about a break in the organic processes of national developmental paths in the course of the past third of a century, and to seek solutions by bringing the disturbances into an interdependency with this?

As for the interruption of earlier processes and the transplanting of models which deviate from the previous course of our national history, that is an indisputable fact of the Hungarian history of the period after the liberation. This third of a century has fundamentally turned the river of our national history from its bed. It has turned upside down the village and the structure of the economy, the method of address and the traditional models of consumption. We have used the socialist, Soviet model for the industrial breakthrough and accumulation solutions which have fitted it, we have copied the new socialist system of property relationships. We have adjusted to models which differed from our previous structures, and in more than one element they are unaccustomed still, and sometimes we fidget uncomfortably in them, they pinch here or there, like new shoes.

But let me add, the new accommodation provided by breaking with the earlier processes fits very organically into the sequence of the basic situations of our national history. The accommodation of King Stephen, soon beatified as a saint, transplanted, with a brutal break with the previous historical path of the pagan, tribal, nomad Hungarians, a western, alien economic and social structure and state-political system which the wild pagan Hungarians regarded as so "inorganic" (in the "identity confusion") that they wanted to throw the whole thing into the Danube along with the foreign "ideologist" Bishop Gellert.

The most national 1848 transplanted into Hungarian soil the principles and social-political structures of the French enlightenment and English liberalism in order to find a solution to overcoming the backwardness. Breaking violently with earlier processes and accommodating to the challenge of the developed European world, however, even the capitalism and liberalism taken over seem alien. (Especially when the catching up started in this path falters and is shaken.) In 1920 Gyula Szekfu wrote: "The new forces created new structures which do not have an organic link with slow historical development. So it is understandable that the economy and intellectual culture were built on the broadest foundations similar to the West, but one can observe here and there in the new social building cracks and fissures, signs that heterogeneous forces were at work here simultaneously" Indeed, in the foreword to the first edition of his work titled "Three Generations; The History of a Declining Age", which became an ideological cornerstone of the Horthy age, he added that we must oppose those forces "which cast Hungary out of the current of healthy development" for "the liberal recent past was an age of aberration from which we can rise only with organic work, by building up the real national traditions."

So complaints about a break from the "traditional national path" and attempts to turn back accompanied or followed with the same naturalness and borrowings which served to catch up, to accommodate to the external, European conditions, borrowings which interrupted the internal processes which belonged to the natural course of our history. In part this was an unavoidable reaction, especially in more difficult historical situations, and in part it derived from the objective process that in history, to the extent that the interrupting borrowings constantly recur and there are accommodating adjustments to the more developed, to the same extent the reckless continuities are constantly effective also, and the transplanted new can be lasting only if it can be built

into the living organism of national history, if it does not provide immune reactions, if it becomes "organic," if the medium of historical antecedents and the derived conceptual and behavioral characteristics becomes receptive to it.

It follows from this that our processes of the past third of a century also must be adjusted more fully, more organically into the dense medium of our national history. The new paths deriving from the borrowed model which open in the wake of breaking with the "organic" processes continue to wind between the lines of force of the unleapable continuities. If we undertake to draw the lessons of the clash with reality, undertake corrective changes in our new processes, then even the most daringly new developmental element will adjust fruitfully and organically to the traditional. In few elements was our new developmental path since the liberation so overwhelmingly new as in the villages. For a while it seemed that the cooperative transformation was so alien, inorganic and unacceptable that the masses of the peasants would choose to leave the village forever rather than adapt. The most powerful, most consistent reform process of the past quarter century has adjusted the cooperative suit to the body so as to make the revolution of the village, of agriculture, a natural and successful part of our transformation. A new path has developed from the former artel type cooperative, adjusting to traditions, to Hungarian peasant mentality and aspirations and to the needs of national development, and this has helped an agriculture which has become industrial in nature to catch up to the world level.

So we must consistently follow the reform path of nation building in the economy, in society, in education and in political institutions alike. National policy puts this in the foreground in the long, quiet periods of historical construction, as was shown by the centuries after Stephen or following 1848-1849 (or, in concrete historical reality, following the 1867 Compromise after the defeat).

Obviously we need the interplay of many factors to overcome the national identity confusion. But obviously one of these factors is the reform, affecting the economy, society and politics alike, preserving the new values born from the transplantations, regarding as a start the achievements of a society placed on an industrialized base and moving toward socialism and adjusting to our historical processes to ensure the further organic development of all these things.

Benda: History, National Consciousness

Budapest UJ IRAS in Hungarian No 24, Dec 84 pp 31-34

[Article by Kalman Benda: "Historiography and National Self-Awareness"]

[Text] There lives in every social community, people and nation some sort of idea about its origin and past, about the meaning and purpose of its existence. Religion had an important part in its development, and the farther we go into the past the more mystical these ideas become. From the beginning their significance consisted of the fact that they forged the community into a unit, or at least that part of it which we would call today politically aware.

In the age of antique religions, in the Greek-Roman myths, in the German saga world, or in the shaman faith of the eastern Bulgar-Turk peoples, each people had a unique miraculous origin myth and its own special god. This origin myth and faith in a unique god forged the community into a political unit under some tribal chief or prince of divine origin or chosen by god.

With the universal requirements of Christianity the pagan cult of the different peoples rose higher, the separate gods disappeared, and all the European peoples were children of the same father. As the Apostle Paul said: "There is no difference between Jew and Greek, because each has the same Lord." The Christian peoples were all brothers, for they must build here on earth the Kingdom of God with common work and combined efforts. The most important task of the rulers ordained by God was defending and spreading the faith. From this universal obligation there then developed the sense of mission of some ruling houses which designates the place of the nation within the Christian unity. This belief in a mission, combined with a modified awareness of origin, united the medieval nations.

As an example let us look at the development of French community awareness. Three centuries after conversion to the Christian religion the Emperor Charlemagne announced with conviction: "Our obligation is armed defense of the holy church of Christ against every attack of the infidels." A song from the end of the 9th century also urged the king to battle against the pagan Normans, saying that he was consecrated to God's service even in childhood, that God loves and aids him, because he is an ardent Christian, but also because he is a French king. Then the Song of Roland took a significant step further when it stated that the battle against the "pagan" Moors was the common obligation and even mission of the ruler and of the Frank nation. Simultaneous with this an awareness of and pride in Roman origin strengthened among the French nobility. According to this God entrusted the dignity of the Roman Empire to the "rock solid strength of the faithful Franks" because the "Greeks with their false faith" degenerated from the Latin language and traditions. Then, at the time of the crusades, the idea was expanded to the mission of the knights of the "most Christian king" to defend Christendom. Their mission in the campaigns in the Holy Land stood before them in almost otherworldly light in the chronicles, "Gesta Dei per Fracos", the acts of God, which He performed with the Franks.

Hungarian development followed a similar path. In the chronicles of Anonymous the totemistic faith in origin from the bird Tutul gave way to a deliberate theory of the derivation of the House of Arpad from Attila. In just 100 years, at the end of the 1200's, the legend of dynastic origin was transferred to the Hungarians as a whole. In the chronicles of Master Simon Kezai not only the Arpads are descended from Attila but the Hungarians also from the Huns. But since the Huns were considered identical with the Scythians by the 1400's an awareness of Scythian origin had become general among the nobility. In the beginning only the royal house had an awareness of mission, defense of the Christian community, which Bela IV was first to formulate in a letter to Pope Innocent IV at the time of the Tartar invasion. This becomes a proudly assumed awareness of a collective mission only by the 15th century. As Osvat

Laskai, chief of the Pest monastery of Franciscan monks, said in his sermon about Saint Stephen in 1497: "May God make this strong people, whose blood and bones cover the mountains and valleys of various countries, into a shield against the Turkish sultan, so that by virtue of their courage and worthiness, holy Christianity may enjoy the desired peace."

The unity of the Christian peoples ended with the Reformation, the medieval Hungarian state broke into three pieces. The immeasurable destruction and suffering linked with constant warfare fell on the country and people. But a thesis formulated by the Protestant preachers maintained the relatedness of the Hungarian people---not just the privileged orders---within and without the borders of the country, namely that the Hungarians were the chosen people of God. Did they suffer much from the Turks and Tartars? God punishes whom He loves and the blows fell on Hungary to test and bend to Him His beloved people. As the song of Andras Szekharosi Horvat says:

You are a royal nation, though you are small.
Surely you are dear to God the Father!
You are a son through his Holy Son.
Believe that you have a share of all the glory.

The spread of the counter-reformation gave rough treatment to the faith of the Protestants in the idea of a chosen people, but every sect assumed the special favor of God's care for the Hungarians, proudly citing on one side the list of Hungarian saints and on the other the leaders of the freedom fights, liberators sent from God.

With the slow spread of the enlightenment the distinction of a religious character dispersed, but with it the self-awareness based on faith. On the one hand scientific research began to discover the origin and linguistic relationship of the Hungarians, dispersing the earlier unfounded views; but the awakening and later the strengthening of nationalists fed romantic views which reached broad masses via the schools. A strengthening of union and self-awareness was served by hero worship and romantic recoloring of the national past, with frequent mention of former greatness, which found a way in the poetry of Berzsenyi or Petofi too. And while the linking of social reforms with national awareness broadened and strengthened the concept of community, at the same time nationalism started a process which increasingly narrowed the national frameworks, excluding some and even entire strata.

While the writers and politicians of the reform age frequently viewed our past with hard self-criticism, these views disappeared in the bourgeois period, giving way between the two world wars to virtually unlimited self-praise. It was then that they began to seek in science and literature for who was truly Hungarian, for those immanent, never changing traits which characterize Hungarian thinking and behavior, independent of age and situation. In these ruminations the causes of all our troubles were ideals taken over from foreigners, "the retreat of the eastern Hungarian soul before the West." In these ruminations the Hungarians were the only embodiment and protector of the humane ideal on the eastern perimeter of Europe for a thousand years. Humanism, tolerance toward the beliefs of others, heroism and humanity, and

above all these the love of liberty--in the view of the age this was characteristic of the Hungarians throughout their "glorious history." They wrote, "We were always an aristocratic nation." For us, in a unique way, the bourgeois age brought a second flowering of the life ideal of the nobility, and the noble was identified with the Hungarian. We can read in a popular book of the 1930's: "It is incorrect to view the Hungarian nobility as they were viewed in other countries; they are not a caste within the nation but rather the nation itself, in contrast to those living in the country who did not rise into their sphere, who were not suitable or did not undertake to bear their spirit and mission."

It is understandable that Marxist historiography attacked this distorted concept with angry bitterness; but instead of just criticism and correction it took a position of complete denial. According to this the Hungarian nobility, the lords of the country, were never guided by any ideals, looked only to their material interests, and if they wanted to betrayed the homeland any number of times. It is true that the peasants--whom the nobles regarded as animals--defended their homes if they could, but they had no homeland. So there was no homeland, and there was no nation; this view did not seek what binds together but rather what separates. The privileged classes and the peasant serfs, without any feeling of belonging together, faced each other as enemies in history. With few exceptions the figures of the Hungarian past who had been regarded as great became merely representatives of class interests, and alongside the economic laws man virtually disappeared from history. The Hungarians were universally stamped as fascists for the inhumanities here at home in the years of World War II, the sons were made to hate the fathers and an entire generation was deprived of self-respect.

The school textbooks were written in this spirit in the 1950's, this is what was spread by the newspapers and radio, and even by a large part of the historical works. Only the peasant uprisings and the labor movement received a positive evaluation in the otherwise short-circuited national memory. For the most part their heroes were flaunted in romantic colors, like the noble leaders earlier. And the movements themselves were portrayed in empty space, offering eternal lessons independent of time, space and even reality.

That there was from the beginning a certain feeling of belonging together between Hungarian and Hungarian, that the opposing social classes--as in other countries too--formed together what we call Hungarian history and that there had been a Hungarian nation for long centuries, with form and content changing from era to era--in general this was not mentioned. It was not even mentioned that on the basis of linguistic, cultural and behavioral identity and a common historical past there is a Hungarian nation today too, a part of which, a significant part of which, through no will of its own, lives outside the borders of the country. This view cut short the deep roots of the anguish of national memory and cut off its spreading branches. An entire generation grew up with the view, and we see it with shock today, that they were bound to no community, feeling that they belonged nowhere, assuming responsibility or sacrifice for no one and nothing, living from day to day without goals or ideals.

Today we are beyond the childhood diseases accompanying the great transformation. We see clearly that it is given to no generation to build its own world out of nothing, without antecedents. Our achievements are built on the hard work of a long line of generations which went before us, we only continue what they began--of course, according to our own ideas and possibilities, not infrequently with substantial changes. But we could not start from nothing, we cannot ignore what we have inherited, be it good or bad. The joy and suffering, victories and defeats, mistakes and errors of those who lived before us, whether we will or no, whether we admit it or not, are parts of our lives. Outside of our will we were born into a smaller family and a larger, national community, which forms us and gives us meaning to our existence with its past and present. The land of our birth is made a homeland by the factory chimney signifying today and tomorrow and by the embrace of ruins from the past. Human self-awareness is complete if it embraces the struggles of the ancestors with the work of the present. And just as my individual self-awareness and behavior are formed, strengthened or weakened, by what I know about my immediate ancestors so the communal self-awareness is formed, strengthened or weakened, by what is assumed from the national past. He whose history, feels himself a vagabond in contemporary society, and we cannot expect individual responsibility from one who does not feel his responsibility for the fate of the entire national community in the broad sense.

Does this mean that we should paint the Hungarian past in rosy colors? Not at all. Self-knowledge and self-awareness cannot be built on illusions or false formulas. Falsifying, prettying up or blackening the past from any viewpoint will avenge itself in the present. But real historical vision will aid a recognition of the realities of the present. The ancient Romans knew that "historia est magistra vitae", history is the teacher of life. A person can orient himself in the present who knows the path leading from the past to the present, and historiography aids the recognition of this. But only if it seeks and discloses reality mercilessly, if in addition to the great laws of development it also portrays the active man forming life, if it does not lose sight of the fact that the individual can always realize himself only within a community and that communal being gives strength to individual men.

In the past two decades our historiography has renewed itself significantly, in both attitude and scientific foundations; the remnants of the earlier distorted conception are disappearing. The historian wants to know and describe the reality of the past, if necessary destroying illusions, but always keeping in view the prevailing interests of society, of the national community. He does not want to flatter national self-awareness, but neither does he want to stamp the values of the past into the mud. I feel that our contemporary historiography is increasingly fulfilling its mission--disclosing the great laws of human development and of national development therein, describing the development of the forces which form individual and communal fate, depicting the work of the great personalities who make history and the struggles and suffering of the nameless millions. Doing all this with the objectivity of one who views from without, but with the insight deriving from an internal sympathy.

It appears that the habits of the recent past in our public life and in our school instruction are still too strong to accept the results of a Hungarian historiography which is increasingly finding itself. But the strength of community feeling or, as I might say, of socialist patriotism also depends on how deeply awareness is rooted in the national past.

Katona: People, Nation, Humanity

Budapest UJ IRAS in Hungarian No 24, Dec 84 pp 54, 58

[Article by Imre Katona: "People, Nation, Humanity; From Ethnocentricity to Ethnic Rebirth"]

[Excerpt] For centuries the Hungarians, living under social-national oppression and divided by religion, waged unsuccessful struggles for complete liberty, first "consistently" forgetting about their nationalities and then with a hand offered to them too late. For a long time they pursued the dream of a uniform nation-state with 30 million Hungarians playing the leading role. The Swiss model was not applicable to this region; the idea of federal systems developed by Kossuth and later by the left wing came too late. All this had the cruel consequence that after World War I borders divided the Hungarians. Within the new state framework everything which the Hungarians had done earlier was done to them, and more so; no country proved a better master; their own nationalities problems were no less than before. In obstinate defense of the priority of their own class rule the leaders seeking a more favorable national-nationality solution on the forced economic-political path forced our people into an alliance system after the deserved fall of which the victors again punished the entire people, and they were helped in this by our earlier internal leaders. In proportion to population our losses of people were among the greatest; our borders shrunk again; and despite our economic ruin we had to pay reparations in every respect. We were among the most zealous in avenging war crimes; the expelling of the Germans and the exchange of Hungarian-Slovak populations took place with our partial consent; both could be disapproved of after the fact, even if they took place on the basis of international agreements. The Hungarians who fell outside our borders were defenseless targets for bourgeois-nationalist vengeance with various motives; the socialist forces gained the upper hand only late; the resettlements, the collective war guilt and other reprisals left unavoidable traces in the public awareness of the Hungarian nationalities. Within a rather long time it turned out that even this initial phase of socialism was not putting an end to the disadvantageous discrimination; in more than one place they forgot the warnings of Lenin, who urged not only tolerance but partiality for every people not forming a state, not in the majority; indeed he dreamed of an international union of nationalities. In contrast to this, except for a few good examples, obsolete solutions and forms of awareness survive in our neighborhood because of the delay and various sudden halts; because the state is all-powerful and because of the "holy" principle of non-intervention virtually no outside aid or comfort can be offered. In places the awareness of our nationality masses is being distorted and every form of dissimulation is increasing. Feeling its impotence our nation is beginning to turn against its own history and the only acceptable norms of coexistence. A sick cosmopolitanism will rule; it is fashionable to go

above or outside nationality. And all this in an age when we can witness a real ethnic renaissance as a reaction to the homogenizing trends which are strengthening around the world. The Hungarians know by heart in the area of what unfavorable phenomena we are the "leaders," but a good bit fewer know, for example, that we have settled our nationality problems--only the situation of the Gypsies is unsolved--that Hungarians outside our borders are participating in building the future beyond their numbers and proportions, that of the 3,000 peoples in the world those with Hungarian as the mother tongue are in about the 45th or 50th place, that 20 member states of the United Nations have a smaller population than the Hungarians in Transylvania, etc. Our economy and our society are again open. We can say with some justice that we are experimenting with a new sort of socialist model, no longer against or without asking the people, but with their knowledge and consent. Erroneous and even more erroneous theories proliferate in times of crisis, sometimes awareness feeds back, contradictory trends live side by side, but this form of existence and awareness cannot be maintained, we can with justice hope to find a way out.

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HUNGARY

POPULATION POLICY, DECLINING BIRTH RATES, RISING DEATH RATES

Munich SUEDESTEUROPA in German Vol 33 No 11/12, 1984 pp 641-651

[Article by Dr. Kathrin Sitzler, editorial staff member: "In Herder's Shadow . . . Population Policy in Hungary"]

[Text] "Having children is primarily a private matter. It is up to each woman and each man to decide whether they want to start a family and bring up children. The state and society must not interfere with it. But they must see to it, through good general conditions, that each can freely opt for starting a family when he wants to. Marriage contracts have declined since 1970 by nearly 20 percent, the birthrate has almost been cut in half since 1965. This development has many causes. One of the most significant ones: Someone who opts for children today has to put up with a number of disadvantages. Each child reduces the family's per capita income perceptibly."¹

Those sentences quoted from BY (the Bavarian government's public relations organ, whose main family policy concern, so it says, is to "terminate the families' being worse off in society," for which reason it has presented a "concept on reorganizing family equalization) could as well come from the announcement of Hungary's Council of Ministers on its recent "long-term conception for population policy," ratified on 26 September 1984, or a commentary published on it by the Hungarian press. For MAGYAR HIRLAP, the semi-official government paper, says, for instance, on 6 October 1984: "Population policy must continue to rely on the independent decision of individuals and families, their desire to bring up children. By improving the conditions for it, i.e., by creating favorable prerequisites and conditions for child care and education with a well-balanced distribution of burdens as between the society and the family, the government seeks to bring a direct influence to bear,"² or--as expressed elsewhere--"to return to the individual the freedom of decision on his generative behavior."³

Even the figures given in the Bavarian-FRG account should only have to be adjusted slightly to fit Hungarian circumstances. The nearly 20-percent decline in marriage contracts in the FRG since 1970 conforms to one in Hungary over the same period of slightly over 21 percent. The birthrate was still more dramatic in Hungary than in the FRG; there it was only cut in half since 1965, but in Hungary it was reduced to two thirds since 1975. With the FRG population the Hungarians furthermore have shared the trait since 1981 to have gone through

all phases of the "demographic transition" and entered the degressive phase of population decline. With 2 per thousand, both countries showed identical reduction rates, world peak rates.

Wholly comparable in both countries also is the reduction of the per capita family income for families getting larger. According to the third family report of the FRG government of 1979, in 1973 the per capita income at an increasing number of children declined as follows: While in families with one child it still came to 82 percent of the per capita income of a childless couple, it only came to 60 percent when there were two children and to 57 percent when there were three.⁴ Until 1979 these proportions improved but slightly, to 85 percent with one child, to 70 percent with several children (60 percent in workers families with several children).⁵ Comparative figures for Hungary of 1977 are: In families with two children the per capita income was 62 percent of that of childless families, with three children, only still 50 percent.⁶ Since the monetary transfer benefits in the family field including child education subsidies (maternity leave money) because of the high proportion of pensions and other forms of old-age care (70 percent) only come to 22 percent of the Hungarian budgetary social welfare benefits, the income proportions mentioned continue unabated. With prices rising, wages stagnating and the declining real value of financial social benefits, some of the large families in Hungary, according to the top trade union functionary Laszlo Gal, have reached the "brink of the subsistence minimum or even below it."⁷

Intentions and Failures of the Population Policy Thus Far

According to the objectives of principle in socialist family policy--shaped by ideologically conditioned and traditionally egalitarian ideas--the families' income and standard of living should not differ much because of the size and composition of families. Rather, family policy measures and transfer benefits ought to aim at material equity or at least equalization among variously situated families.⁸ Yet allocating official subsidy measures in such a way that families with children get as much as childless couples is impossible in Hungary under the conditions of the "shortage economy" (kornai) of real socialism. In spite of all the current economic difficulties and the austerity policy in Hungary, however, no family policy cuts in maternity leave and maternity money (child education subsidies) are to be expected--such as those the FRG government issued in May 1983--but rather another extension of these benefits while maintaining the family subsidy (child money) paid since July 1983 even for the first child and an increase in the general child money rates, especially of those for three and four children.

With its family policy benefits, Hungary probably pursues the population policy intention at least to halt the further drop in the birthrate, if not turn around the trend of the birth rate. Yet even in 1981 the Academy of Sciences population policy conference was dubious it would work in that direction. In his basic speech there, Kalman Kulcsar, director of the Sociological Institute of the Academy, suggested the consideration: "These monetary social benefits only slightly ease the material and organizational problems in taking care and educating children. They are more of a nature of social subsidies than of motivators for generative behavior."⁹

The skepticism of scientists and experts whose surveys and propositions have since the mid-1970's increasingly been affecting the government's population and family policy decisions, lately no longer relates only to the long-term effect of particular measures--as even generous financial benefits or the banning or liberalization of abortions--to steer the birth rate, today it already extends to the possibility of principle to bring a direct influence to bear on the population process in its basic factors, particularly as far as fertility development is concerned.

This skepticism is nourished, among other things, by the experience of what ultimately was a failure of Hungary's pro-natal, fertility-centered population policy thus far, which has not succeeded in the last decade, that is since the authoritative Council of Ministers resolution of 1973, despite a now comprehensive overall conception, the differentiated orchestration of complex measures, and considerable material efforts,

1. in increasing fertility to a level that would ensure a long-range population stability;
2. in stopping the dropping trend in the birth rate or avoiding its strong fluctuations, or the echo effect against strong fluctuations in the past--as induced by the population policy of the early 1950's by rigorously banning abortions and, in the late 1960's, by introducing a 3-year maternity leave--by mitigating, for instance, the termination of the 1973 measures and defusing the problems resulting from it for society as for social and economic planning;¹¹
3. in obtaining a broader and more equalized youth base in the age pyramid, i.e. a more favorable age-structure for the population long-term, and this less because of a quantitative improvement of the burden and dependency rate, but rather because of the subsequent problems in the infrastructure and in social psychology (higher investment requirements for public health, increasing proclivity toward conservatism and a diminished innovation capability), that would confront Hungarian society due to the 20-percent proportion of senior citizens anticipated for the year 2000;¹² and
4. in stopping the deterioration of the mortality conditions that started in 1967, especially the rise in the age and gender-specific mortality of males between 40 and 59.

The following table shows the demographic development trends by selected annual dates in birth and mortality statistics, population growth and net reproduction figures.¹³ What seems significant here is the constant drop in the birth rate for 30 years, interrupted temporarily and briefly only in three periods, due to the population policy--1953-55, 1968-69 and 1974-76. The mortality trend was more even all along. Clearly dropping for 15 years, the mortality rate then rose steadily again and reached its highest point since the end of the war in 1983 (1946: 15.0). The reproduction index since 1958 only in the mid-1970's shows values of 1 and more and, thereby, the more protracted population drop tendency, manifesting itself since 1981 in a population decline in absolute figures.¹⁴

Table: Births, Deaths and Fertility Statistics since 1948

Year	Live Births		Deaths		National Population Growth		Net Reproduction in Percent
	Numbers	Percent	Numbers	Percent	Numbers	Percent	
1948	191,907	21.0	105,708	11.6	86,127	9.4	*
1952	185,820	19.6	107,443	11.3	78,377	8.3	1.085
1953	206,926	21.6	112,039	11.7	94,887	9.3	1.202
1954	223,347	23.0	106,670	11.0	116,677	12.0	1.312
1955	210,430	21.4	97,848	10.0	112,582	11.4	1.257
1956	192,810	19.5	104,236	10.5	88,574	9.0	1.154
1960	146,461	14.7	101,525	10.2	44,936	4.5	0.917
1962	130,053	12.9	108,273	10.8	21,780	2.1	0.817
1963	132,335	13.1	99,871	9.9	32,464	3.2	0.832
1966	138,489	13.6	101,943	10.0	36,546	3.6	0.865
1967	148,886	14.6	109,530	10.7	39,356	3.9	0.925
1968	154,419	15.1	115,354	11.2	39,065	3.9	0.952
1969	154,318	15.0	116,659	11.4	37,659	3.6	0.940
1970	151,819	14.7	120,197	11.6	31,622	3.1	0.912
1971	150,640	14.5	123,009	11.9	27,631	2.6	0.891
1972	153,265	14.7	118,991	11.4	34,274	3.3	0.894
1973	156,224	15.0	123,366	11.8	32,858	3.2	0.906
1974	186,288	17.8	125,816	12.0	60,472	5.8	1.069
1975	194,240	18.4	131,102	12.4	63,138	6.0	1.111
1976	185,405	17.5	132,240	12.5	53,165	5.0	1.056
1977	177,574	16.7	132,031	12.4	45,543	4.3	1.021
1978	168,160	15.8	140,121	13.1	28,039	2.7	0.979
1979	160,364	15.0	136,829	12.8	23,535	2.2	0.956
1980	148,810	13.9	145,355	13.6	3,261	0.3	0.909
1981	142,890	13.3	144,757	13.5	-1,867	-0.2	*
1982	133,559	12.5	144,318	13.5	-10,759	-1.0	0.843
1983	127,258	11.9	148,643	13.9	-21,385	-2.0	0.837

*no data

Source: Demografiai Evkonyv 1979, Budapest 1980, p 21, 366; Nepesseges tarsadalomstatistikai zsebkonyv 1983, Budapest 1984, p 153; Statisztikai Havi Kozlemenye 7, 1984, p 11.

The New Conception

The unexpected acceleration and intensification of the demographically unfavorable processes, especially the rapid development of the birth deficit or the dwindling of the population during the last 3 years, now have forced the Hungarian government to move. The Council of Ministers therefore, late in September, ratified a long-term population policy conception and a medium-range plan for measures. With the participation by several departments and under the direction from the national planning office, a commission is now working on the legal regulations and implementing provisions and the schedule for the catalogue of measures.

As shown by the press announcement from the Council of Ministers, the population policy objectives--ensuring simple reproduction, stopping the population drop--have remained unchanged, yet the time horizon in which the implementation of these goals seems possible and realistic has clearly been widened. Along with the long-term tendencies, now also for the first time the "complicated topics of mortality" have been more taken account of in the government conception.¹⁵

So the official announcement says, among other things: "The Council of Ministers deems a long-range and steady activity by the state and society necessary to improve the demographic situation, which would prevent a further drop in the population figure and, furthermore, effect its later stabilization and rise and a population composition more favorable in terms of age-groups. Under a more long-range aspect the birth rate must climb and the mortality rate must go down permanently. A population policy goal of equal rank with getting a more favorable birth rate and facilitating the conditions for child education lies in improving public health and the mortality conditions."¹⁶

After Prof Rudolf Andorka, one of the country's leading population sociologists, had already warned, in a NEPSZABADSAG interview on topical population policy questions in March this year, against "unrealistic wishful thinking or risky impatience" in this area, now the various members of the above mentioned commission on measures untiringly emphasize that the intended change in the demographic situation cannot be brought about even with the new measures from one day to the next. About this, e.g., says Barnabas Barta, deputy chairman of the Central Office for Statistics and chairman of the Demographic Commission of the Academy of Sciences: "At the population's current age-composition and in view of the prevailing situation, no rapid and demonstrative successes are to be expected. The population decline is going to last. But there is hope that by means of the long-range and complex population policy, closely coordinated with the long-range economic and social policy, we will manage to stop the decline in the 1990's and have the population stabilize around a total of 10.5 million."¹⁷

The Most Important Measures

In the package of planned medium-range measures and provisions to be introduced successively as of 1985 two larger complexes can be distinguished:

1. Measures in social security and for more material support for families with children. They include, along with expanded monetary family support and improvements in the social infrastructure and housing allocation, as flanking measures aiming at more compatibility between the family and the job, vacation and working time regulations and part-time employment opportunities for working mothers. Looked at in toto, they are guided not only by the intention of long-term fertility improvement, but they also indicate the intention socially to re-evaluate family work and rather strengthen the family's reproduction capacity in the future than replace it. On this says the Council of Ministers announcement: "In caring for and rearing children, their socialization and age care, the family plays an indispensable role."
2. Health policy measures to improve medical prevention and care for mothers as well as the entire population plus general health protection and welfare.

If Hungary, to maintain its population figure, wants to achieve the needed 230 children per 100 families, measures to raise the birth rate must, first and foremost, start with the families that have children already. In recent years the average family size did not suffice for simple reproduction because for every 100 young couples at this time instead of the number of 230 children necessary the number lies somewhat below 200. For all that, the actual "problem child" of the population policy is less the proportion of childless couples (in 1980: 35 percent of the families), but rather the relatively low and, since 1970, retrogressive percentage of families with three children (in 1980: 4.7 percent).¹⁸

The predominant family model in Hungary today is the family with two children. This can be glimpsed from the way couples that got married in 1966 and 1974 have carried out their family plans and from the desires for children by couples that got married in 1982 and 1983.¹⁹ This model, according to Andorka, also conforms "more or less with the life-style and living conditions in Hungary."²⁰ In contrast to the 1973 population policy resolution, which sought to propagate the model of three children, Andras Klinger, chairman of the main department for population statistics at the Central Statistical Office, thinks today it is "more meaningful in terms of population policy to support family plans than to formulate and propagate abstract family ideas and models."²¹

Through proper material subsidies it should be possible, according to Andorka, to awaken the desire for another child among families that have children already: "If in less than half of today's families with one child a second were to be born, and if in one fourth of the families that have two children today a third child were born, the level of simple reproduction would be obtained."²²

The main form of family equalization through transfer benefits in Hungary is the monthly family subsidy (child money).

The annual total in child money paid out rose from 1973 (Ft 4.5 billion) to 1983 by more than three and a half (Ft 16 billion).²³ This increase is explained by that the number of entitled families in that period rose from circa 790,000 to over 1.3 million, since 1975 the up to then lower rates for families of the co-operative members were made identical with those for workers and employees, the family subsidy since July 1983 has also been granted for the first child up to the age of 6, and the rates were altogether raised six times since 1973, the last times in July 1983 and January 1984. At this time, the following rates are in effect per month:

	Ft 370	total	Ft 370
For one child up to the age of 6 each			
one child with single parent	670		670
two children	670		1,340
two children with single parent	730		1,460
three children	730		2,190
four children	730		2,920
five children	700		3,500
six children	680		4,080
any additional child	680		

The allowance for three children came to circa 47 percent of average monthly wages (1980: 50 percent, 1973: 38 percent), yet it covered only 25 percent of the actual expenditures for the children.²⁵

In line with the sociopolitical objective of more effectively supporting families with three or more children, first the allowances are to be raised for those families--starting as early as in 1985. According to provisional reports from the national planning office, child money is to be progressively graduated in the future throughout, for the time being to be Ft 800 per month for the two oldest children, Ft 870 per child in case of three and four children, Ft 900 per child for families with five children, while for six and more children Ft 920 per child have been proposed. For the coming five-year plan period, furthermore, a dynamic increase of family allowances in the sense of an automatic raise to preserve real values is proposed.²⁶

The recovery of real value also is to be served by the planned raise in maternity subsidies (also called infant endowment subsidies), paid when a child is born and held at Ft 2,500 since 1974. This is not graduated in terms of number of children but made dependent on the evidence for four mandatory examinations during pregnancy. For having undergone at least one examination, Ft 1,000 are paid. This illuminates that these subsidies are based rather on health considerations than on population policy intentions. The original real value of the allowance would come to an amount of Ft 4,000 today. At that level it also would actually again amount to an allowance accruing to the infant endowment, whereas today it merely covers the average costs for the so-called gratuities for physicians and nurses at legally gratuitous deliveries in hospitals.²⁷

Another health policy measure is the announced extension of paid pregnancy leave of 20 weeks by an additional four. These four weeks can be resorted to exclusively before the child is born. This is to counteract in the future the habit many women have to work right up to the time of their delivery, which often jeopardizes pregnancies and has been proven to lead to higher risks of premature births. In connection with the great number of premature births and their effect on the rate of infant mortality of 19 per thousand, high in European terms, which is meant to be reduced to half by the turn of the century, there also is the demand made on the health ministry further to expand the network of facilities for pregnancy care and obstetrics and improve the quality of gynecological and pediatric care.²⁸

The highest importance in all the planned measures is likely to attach to the decision, however, of converting the child subsidy independent of income, as introduced in 1967, into educational money geared to net wages. The child subsidy, paid out thus far in the form of a basic amount that is equal for all who are entitled to it, of Ft 800 per month for the first child, Ft 900 for the second, and Ft 1,000 for the third and each child thereafter, for the time being made possible a 3-year educational leave for all full-time working mothers after their pregnancy leave, with the guarantee attached to return to their old job or an equitable job, with these periods of education counted in at computing their pensions. On 1 May 1982 that measure was broadened. Now part-time working mothers and mothers working at home are also entitled to it. After the child has become 1 year old, fathers also are entitled to that subsidy.

Furthermore it was made possible for the parent who gets the subsidy to accept a part-time job up to 4 hours a day without any subsidy cutback, only that the child has to be at least 18 months old.²⁹

Converting the subsidy into a form of a wage-related percentage, like sick leave money (65 to 75 percent), of educational money mainly takes account of the fact that the previous rates of one fourth to one third of average women's salaries means a sensible loss of earnings and a reduction in the families' standard of living, which makes the mothers return to work--82 percent of those entitled to it resort to the subsidy--after having taken advantage of only two thirds of the leave they are entitled to.

The new rule is going to be introduced next year, first for all working mothers with children below one year of age, after which it is to be extended successively--with entitlements for both parents--to include all children up to 3 years of age. Here then the percentage rates in relation to monthly wages for entitled parents are to go up in terms of number of children, but they are to be reduced when a child for whom educational money is claimed gets older. In any event, the minimum amount of future educational money will be set at a higher rate than today's base subsidy amount. That is to preclude possibly disadvantaging persons entitled--mainly women--working in light wage groups or part-time activities, and for whom between 65 and 75 percent of wages would lie below the current subsidy. The object of the measure, which incidentally also is to include the previously exempt female students, and which over the long haul is supposed to be extended to all mothers, even those that are not working, is to ensure as many children as possible up to the age of 3 of family care and education.

Behind it probably is the realization that educational subsidies--which is likely to apply also to the new educational money--are the cheapest form of taking care of infants,³⁰ for which reason they are not pushing the expansion of infant nurseries much anymore, as well as the population policy intent to make more parents than previously desirous of a second or third child through the guarantee for financially better shoring up the family phase.

To deal with the problems of the increasing mortality, Hungarian public health should have to be reoriented more to an early diagnosis and prevention of heart and circulatory diseases typical of industrial societies, psychosomatic disturbances and addictions. That, however, would impose on it tasks in prevention, psychotherapy, geriatrics and social welfare that it would have trouble dealing with right now when it is so overburdened even in the field of basic medical care.

As far as public opinion on demographic and population policy problems is concerned, this is what one may say in conclusion: The shadow of Herder, who prophesized the Hungarians they would die out soon even 200 years ago, still today often obscures the rationality of discussion in the public media. In circles of social scientists and demographic experts, however, whose role should not be underrated in political deliberations, particularly in the population and social policy field, the view mostly encountered lately rather is: "What must be important and of concern to us is the quality of life, so we will not think only in terms of numbers and indulge the simple belief the Hungarians would be happier, if they only were more numerous."³¹

FOOTNOTES

1. "Blickpunkt Bayern," BY 2, 1984, p 1.
2. Andras Banki, "'Soul' Arithmetic," MAGYAR HIRLAP, 6 October 1984, illustrated supplement.
3. Istvan Hooz, "Family Allowance and Population Policy," KOZGAZDASAGI SZEMLE 12, 1983, pp 1409-1420, here p. 1410.
4. BT printing matter 8/3120, pp 47 ff, 137 ff, quoting Anke Martiny, "Pleading for a More Realistic Family Policy," "Aus Politik und Zeitgeschehen" supplement of DAS PARLAMENT, 19 May 1984, pp 15-27.
5. C. Pust, P. Reichert, A. Wenzel et al, "Frauen in der BRD" [Women in the FRG], Hamburg, 1983, p 128.
6. Hooz, op. cit., p 1410.
7. BUDAPESTER RUNDSCHAU, 8 October 1984.
8. Andras Klinger, "Population--Population Policy and Its Orchestration," TARSADALMI SZEMLE 3, 1981, pp 20-32.
9. MAGYAR HIRLAP, 3 June 1981.
10. Kalman Kulcsar, "The Possibility of Influencing Population Processes," Kulcsar, ed., "A nepesedes es a nepesedespolitika" [Population and Population Policy]; Andras Brody, "Lassulo ido" [Tempo Ritardando], Budapest, 1983, pp 152-155, 161-162.
11. Cf. the especially critical position taken on the population policy government interventions by Agnes Toth, "Let Us Seek Harmony," VALOSAG 8, 1983, pp 57-63.
12. Kalman Szabo, "Population Prognosis for Hungary 1980-2021," DEMOGRAFIA 1, 1980, pp 11-41; cf. FIGYELO, 4 March 1981.
13. Reproduction index which at a value of 1 shows a stationary population = zero growth. Below 1 it indicates a shrinking, above 1 a growing population.
14. For a detailed account of the population trend, the explanatory model for population processes and the factors that trigger them, and for the intentions and explanations for the complex family and population policy measures of 1973, cf. Kathrin Sitzler, "Hungary's Population Development," WISSENSCHAFTLICHER DIENST SUEDEOSTEUROPA 6, 1981, pp 115-122. In the following, only the subsequent measures of the new government conception are therefore to be presented or briefly explained.
15. NEPSZABADSAG, 23 October 1984.

16. MAGYAR HIRLAP, 28 September 1984.
17. NEPSZABADSAG, 23 October 1984.
18. "Nepesseg- es tarsadalomstatistikai zsebkonyv" [Population and Social Statistical Notebook], Budapest, 1984, p 42.
19. MAGYAR NEMZET, 2 June 1979 and 15 April 1984.
20. NEPSZABADSAG, 28 March 1984.
21. MAGYAR NEMZET, 15 April 1984.
22. NEPSZABADSAG, 28 March 1984.
23. MTI WOCHENBULLETIN, 4 October 1984.
24. MAGYAR KOZLONY, 23 January 1984.
25. BUDAPESTER RUNDSCHAU, 8 October 1984.
26. MAGYAR HIRLAP, 16 October 1984.
27. Julia Molnar Venyige and Zsuzsa Orolin, "Socialpolitika es gazdasag" [Social Policy and Economy], Budapest, 1982, p 81.
28. MAGYAR NEMZET, 21 October 1984; MAGYAR HIRLAP, 16 October 1984.
29. A problem-oriented account of the Hungarian educational subsidies and a critical evaluation of their advantages and disadvantages by international comparison as well as from the vantage point of the ones concerned is offered by Gisela Erler, Monika Jaeckel and Juergen Sass, "Muetter zwischen Beruf und Familie" [Mothers Between Job and Family], Munich, 1983, passim, especially pp 20-25, 154-156.
30. Parents whose children are placed in a nursery get per child and nursery spot--computed into monetary amounts--circa Ft 2,000 monthly more in social benefits than recipients of educational subsidies. Maria Parkany, "The Mode of Life, Family Organization--What Is to Be Done?" MAGYAR TUDOMANY 10, 1980, pp 228-235.
31. Zsuzsa Ferge, over Radio Budapest, 17 May 1984, 1705 hours.

5885

CSO: 3620/245

POLAND

RECENT PROVINCIAL DEFENSE COMMITTEE MEETINGS REPORTED

Kielce, Slupsk Committees

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 23 Nov 84 p 5

[Text] The Provincial Defense Committee [WKO] deliberated in Kielce. Among others, representatives of prosecuting, inspection and administration of justice agencies took part in the meeting. The topic of the deliberations was the assessment of the sociopolitical and economic situation, and social discipline. Proposals concerning the further improvement of the activity of prosecuting, inspection and administration of justice agencies were adopted.

On the 22nd of this month, the Provincial Defense Committee in Slupsk discussed the preparations of the Slupsk coastal region for the fall-winter season and familiarized itself with the effects of the provincial committee's activity in combating speculation. Responsible units were obligated to define precisely the programs of cooperation in winter conditions and to work more effectively in eliminating as much as possible the causes of occurring irregularities which promote speculation.

Siedlce, Walbrzych, Ciechanow Committees

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 30 Nov 84 p 2

[Text] The assessment of the state of security and internal order in the region of the cities of Lukow and Wegrow was the topic of the meeting of the Provincial Defense Committee which was held in Siedlce on 29 November.

The Provincial Defense Committee in Walbrzych assessed the sociopolitical situation in the province and took note of the information on applying the principles of specific legal control, which are in force during the period of our emergence from the socioeconomic crisis.

The Provincial Defense Committee in Ciechanow examined the problems of social pathology among youths and ways to combat it.

Plock Defense Committee

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 4 Dec 84 p 2

[Text] A meeting was held of the Provincial Defense Committee in Plock. The state of public safety and order in the province and the results of ideological-upbringing work with youth were discussed. General of Arms Jozef Uzycki, chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army and vice minister of national defense, took part in the meeting.

Ciechanow Defense Committee

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 4 Jan 85 p 5

[Text] At its latest meeting, the Provincial Defense Committee in Ciechanow evaluated the functioning of the telecommunications industry in Ciechanow Province.

Gdansk Defense Committee

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 5-6 Jan 85 p 2

[Text] A meeting was held in Gdansk of the Provincial Defense Committee, during which the implementation of the capital investment tasks for 1984 was assessed. It was determined that the implementation of financial and material tasks in the areas of education and health services proceeded the best. On the other hand, things did not go so well in the area of municipal management.

Jelenia Gora, Krosno Committees

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 10 Jan 85 p 2

[Text] The Provincial Defense Committee deliberated in Jelenia Gora. The effectiveness of the fight against speculation in 1984 was assessed. An increase in the effectiveness of the professional activity of supervising agencies was determined. However, internal supervision in commercial enterprises is not very effective. The Provincial Defense Committee obligated all commercial units to improve and intensify supervisory activity.

The Provincial Defense Committee in Krosno assessed the state of public safety and order in the province. The effectiveness of control-verification activity in selected units of the nonsocialized economy was assessed highly.

Siedlce Defense Committee

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 15 Jan 85 p 5

[Text] The Provincial Defense Committee deliberated in Siedlce. The topic of the meeting were issues pertaining to overcoming the negative effects of winter in the region of the province. The adopted proposals obligate the economic units of the province to improve their activity in the sphere of maintaining

the passability of roads, shortening the time for reloading train cars and the proper functioning of power and heating services. At the same time, the WKO was informed about the appointment of committees in cities and in gminas of the province for matters concerning "Operation Winter." The way in which these committees have performed to date was assessed.

Lomza, Zamosc Committees

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 17 Jan 85 p 5

[Text] A meeting of the Provincial Defense Committee was held in Lomza. The implementation of the more important capital investments of the health services in Lomza Province was discussed. A great deal of time during the deliberations was devoted to the delays in the priority construction of the region--the provincial hospital complex. Delays also occurred at other sites, among others at the construction site of the specialized outpatient clinics complex in Lomza. The WKO pointed out the need for speeding up the completion of the structures of the health services in 1985. The WKO in Zamosc also deliberated on that same day.

Szczecin, Gorzow Wielkopolski Committees

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 21 Jan 85 p 5

[Text] The assessment of housing construction during the past year was the topic of deliberations of the Provincial Defense Committee in Szczecin. The building contractors from Szczecin turned over 5112 new apartments for occupancy last year. This is 13 percent more than in 1983 and it also significantly exceeds the plan tasks for the year. The WKO assessed positively the work of construction enterprises and called attention to good work rhythm, the implementation of tasks and better quality of the finished apartments. At the same time, the need for further improvement in the area of material management in construction enterprises was pointed out.

The implementation of decisions concerning the improvement of the state of safety, order, discipline, and law and order in the region was assessed at the meeting of the WKO in Gorzow Wielkopolski.

Krosno, Katowice Committees

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 24 Jan 85 p 5

[Text] Flood control on the San River was the topic of the meeting of the Krosno Provincial Defense Committee which deliberated in Sanok. The Katowice Provincial Defense Committee deliberated on the 23rd of this month on the assessment of its activity during the past year. It was emphasized that all of its decisions and recommendations were met with active public support. The state of public safety and order in this region was also discussed.

Krakow, Lublin Committees

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 1 Feb 85 p 5

[Text] The Provincial Defense Committee deliberated in Krakow on 31 January under the chairmanship of the mayor of Krakow, Tadeusz Salwa. Activity undertaken in the area of public order and safety during the past year in the province was assessed. Attention was called during the discussion to the still improperly functioning plant system of internal supervision, where cases of the violation of work discipline and the rule about sobriety are treated too liberally.

On that same day, the WKO in Lublin assessed the sociopolitical situation and the state of public safety and order in the region. Further improvement in this area was determined. However, concern was also expressed over the still existing threat of crime.

9853

CSO: 2600/575

POLAND

QUESTIONS RAISED ABOUT MISSING SOLIDARITY FUND

Krakow ZYCIE LITERACKIE in Polish No 5, 3 Feb 85 p 5

[Article by Janusz L. Sobolewski: "Eighty Million Zlotys Worth of Prestige"]

[Text] Trade union affairs are causing less emotion now. That is, unless there is an event smacking of a Hollywood crime drama in the offing.

"Have you got the money?" asked three warmly dressed men and handed over the suitcase.

"In accordance with your wish," the cashier's voice trembled with excitement. "Let me, please. Here is the check," said with a conciliatory smile the youngest of the men, Jozef P., 26 at the time. It followed from his file that he graduated from the school of law at the University of Wroclaw. In 1978, he was hired by the first branch of the NBP [National Bank of Poland] in Wroclaw. In the summer of 1979 he was elected to the enterprise council of trade unions at the NBP. After August 1980 he assumed his responsibilities as the financial representative of the NSZZ Solidarity Lower Silesia Regional Board, which entailed his resignation from the job at the 1st branch of the NBP.

"Thank you, but the money won't fit in the suitcase. Let us go behind the counter now."

"Why is that?"

"We will borrow suitcases. After all, we are talking about 80 million."

The case in the Provincial Court in Wroclaw against Jozef P. accused of, among other things, underground activities between 13 December 1981 and 23 April 1984, which ended in conviction for these activities, established the facts pertaining to the money withdrawn from the bank. Here they are: on 2 December 1981 the NSZZ Solidarity Lower Silesia Regional Board decided to withdraw 80 million zlotys from its bank account. Jozef P. advised the bank manager and an accountant about the intended transaction. On 3 December 1981, Piotr B., deputy chairman of the regional board, Jozef P., its financial representative, and Tomasz S., its treasurer,

withdrew 80 million zlotys from the account at the fifth NBP branch in Wroclaw in accordance with the banking regulations in effect. Due to the large amount of the request, the payment was made outside the teller hall, in accordance with the banking practice, on the basis of a check counter-signed by Jozef P. and Piotr B.

The money was packed into three suitcases, two of which were borrowed from the bank. The suitcases were loaded into the car driven by Tomasz S. The regional board functionaries left together in the direction of the Osobowicki Bridge in Wroclaw. They stopped in the vicinity of the Osobowicki Cemetery. They transferred the suitcases with the money into the car of Stanislaw H., a regional board presidium member, and left in this car in an unknown direction... Upon returning to the regional board building Jozef P. and the regional board cashier Bozena M. conducted the formal receipt and paying out of the sum of 80 million zlotys: "cash received," "cash out"--without depositing the cash at the desk. In that they were successful: to this day, nobody except Jozef P. and several fellow employees knows the location at which the large sum is "secured."

Case No 633/84 came to the docket of the provincial court in Wroclaw on 7 January 1985. The case stands out in the amount of compensation sought. The Commission for Managing Trade Union Property in Warsaw demanded that Jozef P. turn over 80 million zlotys as trade union property. Jozef P. declined. There was enough space in the courtroom for all spectators.

"Please rise. The court is now in session!"

"The plaintiff is represented by... The defendant, Jozef P., appears in person together with his attorney." So was inaugurated the legal battle in which both sides are playing the trump cards leading to victory.

According to order of the chairman of the Council of Ministers No 51 of 13 December 1981 local authorities took over the management of the property of all trade unions. The governor of Wroclaw nominated a trust administrator for the trade union property in the city and province of Wroclaw. Says Jerzy Kus, for 15 years the director of MODKAP [Provincial Center for the Improvement of State Administration Cadres] in Wroclaw: "Perhaps I was appointed a trust administrator because my MODKAP outfit was idle after the imposition of the state of martial law. It was my responsibility to take inventory and account for the trade union property."

Kus took over a spacious 60-room building from the branch trade unions and the NSZZ Solidarity of Lower Silesia. He found the most up-to-date printing equipment, a telex terminal and a radio station measuring up to an independent studio. Recordings of the Solidarity regional board for enterprise public address systems were duplicated there at the professional level. First, Mr Kus took inventory of this property. He took possession of trade union monies in bank accounts amounting to about 20 million zlotys. This much remained. He secured everything (desks, closets and coat hangers) from destruction. He also took care of human issues. The trade unions had 208 salaried employees, some of whom were interned and the remainder

of whom were left without a job. Mr Kus paid support to families while trade union activities were suspended. Technically he operated until June and practically until early 1984. The "inherited" 20 million meanwhile dwindled to 3 million zlotys: money had to be paid for orders in progress and obligations which the NSZZ Solidarity Regional Board did not finalize. For example, service employees had to be paid for a 3-million zloty opera performance ordered by the regional board. Small expenses such as heating fuel for buildings, wages and taxes claimed the remainder. "We found bookkeeping to be in the worst shape," says Jerzy Kus. "The NIK [Supreme Chamber of Control], which conducted an inspection before me, studied the financial conduct of the regional board on the basis of scraps of documents. Irregularities were discovered. Some of the monies transferred to individuals could not be recovered since the beneficiaries had moved abroad. Some people paid back the loans, others declined to do so. Of course, we were aware of the loss of 80 million zlotys, but Jozef P. was in hiding at the time. Therefore neither Jozef P. nor the 80 million were to be found. At the end of 1983 I transferred to Warsaw the inventory of trade union property and wound up my operations. However, I still called upon Jozef P. to return the sum in his possession by my letter of 5 January 1984."

An excerpt from the justification of the verdict of the Provincial Court in Wroclaw on 24 May 1984 convicting Jozef P. for illegal political activity 2 months before the amnesty was declared:

"(...) The former NSZZ Solidarity Lower Silesia Board transformed itself into the Regional Strike Committee, of which the accused P. also became a member. (...) During his activity in the underground, besides the 80 million zlotys withdrawn from the bank account, (...) he had at his disposal considerable sums of money. The origin of these funds could not be determined. They could have been collected as current trade union dues or else from foreign sources, which is suggested by the finding of foreign currency in P.'s apartment. As follows from the evidence submitted in the present case, the accused P. on 6 February 1983 handed over to A.P. 7 million zlotys for the purchase of agricultural real estate of 0.5 hectares (two greenhouses in Wojszyce) from Mr and Mrs M. on behalf of the Regional Strike Committee. Subsequently, the amount of 630,000 zlotys was spent for the purchase of the Fiat 125p passenger vehicle needed for organizational purposes (the state treasury took possession of the above purchases--remark by Janusz L. Sobolewski). The sum of 320,000 zlotys was allocated to Z.P. for operating expenses; the sums of 500,000 zlotys and 350,000 zlotys for operating expenses of the Regional Strike Committee, as well as 100,000 zlotys for the purchase of coke for the greenhouses and 100,000 zlotys for the costs of representation associated with the purchase of the greenhouses; also, support ranging between 20 and 20,000 zlotys to the families of interneers. Besides the above-mentioned expenses, the secured evidence includes receipts for various expenses in propaganda activities, publishing and distribution and the operation of Radio Solidarity. Documented expenses for these purposes after 13 December 1981 add up to the sum of 11 million zlotys. Apart from

the receipts on file and the brief explanations of the accused P. on this issue, there is no proof whatsoever to show that the expenses in the amount of over 11 million zlotys were made out of the 80 million zlotys withdrawn on 3 December 1981. Moreover, it is not known where and how the funds withdrawn were secured against theft, destruction or use other than authorized by the trustees. There is no evidence to show that the money withdrawn was deposited in a place not providing for its due security. It should be recalled that the keeping of trade union cash funds in the amounts exceeding 5,000 zlotys other than in a bank account was by virtue of the law of 1 July 1958 on cash transactions by units of the socialized economy superseded by the law of 25 February 1982 on the banking law, a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to 3,000 zlotys (...) In his testimony the accused maintained that he did not admit to the actions he was accused of, stating that he engaged in activity running counter to the published decree on martial law in accordance with the Statute of the NSZZ Solidarity which was binding on him (...)

"The Provincial Court has come to the conclusion that the amount of 80 million zlotys withdrawn from the bank account on 3 December 1981 is not a part of the charges, since the period of action with which the accused has been charged embraces the time from 13 December 1981 on, whereas the above sum was withdrawn by virtue of a decision of the NSZZ Solidarity Regional Board, which the accused executed due to his responsibilities as the financial representative. Evidence submitted in the case does not show unambiguously that the accused, having at his disposal money for illegal activities, drew it successively from the 80 million zlotys in question. In this reference, the charge in the indictment should be modified."

In other words, the charge "upon previously withdrawing from the bank the sum of 80 million zlotys, wrongfully disbursed it in financing the illegal activities of the Regional Strike Committee" was changed to a statement "the accused is found guilty of (...) disbursing the funds at his disposal in financing the illegal activity of the Regional Strike Committee." It is difficult to fault the ruling of the Provincial Court for bad logic, given the situation in which the court was considering only the political activity of Jozef P.

The Council of Ministers of the PRL decreed by its order of 15 October 1982 that the Commission for Managing Trade Union Property headquartered in Warsaw and set up by this order would manage the property of the former association of trade unions and the then existing trade unions temporarily, i.e., until new trade union structures appeared. Says the chairman of the commission, Piotr Karpiuk: "We have been operating for 2 years, since the commission membership became permanent in late November 1982. We took over the inventories compiled by provincial trust administrators. We are managing trade union property worth 21.5 billion zlotys, of which about 900,000 zlotys is post-Solidarity property."

Both workers' dormitories and office chairs add up to sums going into the billions, as well as active bank accounts and, let us allow for it, claims against certain people. Post-Solidarity property mainly consisted of modern printing and telecommunications equipment. For example, out of the 335 telexes at the disposal of trade unions in our country as many as 287, or 86 percent, were owned by Solidarity.

"We want to be very cool, so that facts rather than emotions matter," says Piotr Karpiuk, who has for years held central positions in the power structure (among others, former first secretary of the PZPR Provincial Committee in Lublin, former deputy minister of labor, wages and social affairs). "We do not want to oppress the former Solidarity. However... Solidarity's bookkeeping was sloppy. This is why it is not easy to settle with. We have taken over everything they had in the inventory. Nonetheless, there were regions where we did not register a single typewriter, though we knew that there indeed were some. Funds circulated illegally. It became a custom to transfer small sums into bank accounts and carry large sums in briefcases."

Documentation in one-third of the Solidarity regions has been restored. In the rest of the regions this is difficult. It is possible to fill some of the gaps and this work is in progress. There are fewer problems with the branch trade unions: 80 percent of their property has been accounted for. A segment of it has not been accounted for due to the lack of precise agreement on the division of property among the federations and unions involved.

A great number of former trade union members are paying debts to credit unions, repaying installments received or loans from the housing fund. From the outstanding debt in the amount of 59.5 million zlotys as much as 55 million was collected by mid-1984. There are some people who would not pay up. About 230,000 zlotys in court-ordered payments was collected from them. There are also opposite cases: in Prezemysl, 2 million zlotys was voluntarily given to the governor.

The amount of funds the commission is missing and has the obligation to secure adds up to 122.5 million zlotys. Included in this are the 80 million of Jozef P.; 3.5 million spent by Solidarity of Warsaw to purchase a house in Naleczow is in the process of being accounted for. Ten million zlotys given for safekeeping by Solidarity of Lower Silesia are kept in Worclaw by Archbishop Henryk Gulbinowicz.

Says Piotr Karpiuk: "We are not pressing the archbishop. This is at the request of provincial authorities, who are settling the matter peacefully. Apparently, they have tentatively agreed to spend these 10 million for a social assistance home of the Association of Brother Albert. Both sides are interested in the project. Meanwhile, we are waiting."

Says Janusz Owczarek, the governor of Wroclaw: "Nothing concrete has been resolved in the matter of the deposit of 10 million zlotys. This is a difficult issue. When I talked to Karpiuk, he wanted the money to be transferred first to the trade union account and then to the account of the Association of Brother Albert. I do not know how the archbishop responded to this. He acknowledged the receipt of 10 million zlotys for safekeeping."

Says Piotr Karpiuk: "There are also other small sums, but we decided to toss in first the large sum of the Lower Silesia Regional Board. We brought suit in the Provincial Court of Wroclaw against Jozef P. seeking the return of 80 million zlotys. The commission's custody of [trade union] property expires at the end of April 1985. All the materials, all matters resolved and unresolved, will be handed over to the National Federation of Trade Unions, the statute of which will be adopted before that time."

Says Janusz Owczarek: "My role was restricted to appointing the trust administrator for the estate. I am not interested in the Jozef P. trial--that is between the court and the commission in Warsaw. I have heard about the statement by Grzegorz P., accused of murdering Father J. Popieluszko, at the Torun trial on 9 January 1985 to the effect that the 80 million as well is in the hands of Archbishop Gulbinowicz. Certainly, Archbishop Gulbinowicz will touch upon this topic at the next working meeting in my office. I think that he would like to."

"Hallo, this is the curia. Vicar General Edward Gorecki speaking."

"Good day."

"Indeed, we have heard about what has been said in Torun. However, this is not a curia matter, but that of the archbishop personally."

"Could we ask for a statement by the archbishop on this issue?"

"It is impossible at the moment. Archbishop Gulbinowicz has gone to Rome. Upon his return, he will definitely make a statement if he so wishes."

Says Adam Grabowski, deputy director of the Department for Religious Denominations of the Provincial Office in Wroclaw: "We have working contacts with the curia; as a department, we participate in the provincial-level meetings of the governor and the archbishop. We are aware of the good will of the archbishop in many irritating matters."

"I move that the defendant Jozef P. be ordered to pay the sum of 80 million zlotys... In accordance with the law, he was under obligation to return the above-mentioned sum to the Commission for Managing Trade Union Property... With regard to the above, the commission is entitled to seek the return of trade union property..."

"The defendant Jozef P. objects to the statement of the plaintiff," reads E. Semiginowska, the judge trying the case, from the plaintiff's response delivered right in the courtroom. "Indeed, on 3 December 1981 the defendant received 80 million zlotys from the treasury of the former Regional Board in execution of the decision of that board... Withdrawing and securing the funds was a duty following from the employment contract... The duty consisted of picking up the funds and depositing them in the indicated safe location due to the uneasy atmosphere in the country at the time. This duty has been fulfilled... The plaintiff does not mention any factual circumstances which would indicate the guilt of the defendant in the sense of article 114 of the Labor Code... For this reason, the suit should be dismissed."

Regardless of that, the defendant brings up the statute of limitations... The trust administrator managing trade union property took notice of the fact on which the claim is based shortly after 13 December 1981 and before the end of 1981 at the latest. Therefore, the 1-year statute of limitations expired on 31 December 1982 by virtue of the provisions of article 291, paragraph 2 of the Labor Code, whereas the suit was filed at the provincial court in Wroclaw on 17 September 1985, i.e., long after the expiration of the statute of limitations. This precludes the opportunity to press the claim, even if it were accepted that the claim was ever legitimate, which the defendant denies...

Legal intricacies of the case over the return of 80 million zlotys can prolong it indefinitely. For example, after the reading of the defendant's response, the commission's attorneys asked for time to prepare their statement. The trial was postponed. It is easy to surmise that the next sessions of the court might end in a similar manner. This is not the place to second-guess the court in interpreting the legal aspect of the issue. Nonetheless, it should be said clearly that the petition of the commission and the response by Jozef P. addressed totally different issues. It seems that the line of defense based on bringing up the provisions of Labor Code does not hold out much promise. First, no one accuses Jozef P. of causing damage to the enterprise addressed by article 114 of the Labor Code, maybe only a lack of responsibility for the property entrusted to an employee addressed by article 124. The statute of limitations is not a simple issue, either. Jozef P. quotes article 291, paragraph 2 of the Labor Code: "Claims by an enterprise for damages caused by an employee through the failure to fulfill or fulfilling his work duties improperly have a statute of limitations of 1 year from the day the enterprise takes notice of the damage caused by an employee but not later than 3 years after it was caused."

"But, not necessarily 1 year..." And is not paragraph 3 of the same article 291 more fitting: "If an employee perpetrates the misappropriation of social property or otherwise causes damage intentionally, the statute of limitations prescribed by the civil code is applied to such a claim for damages." The Civil Code, in turn, mentions a statute of limitations even as long as 10 years.

The court will have to decide whether the sum of 80 million zlotys was or was not at the disposal of the NSZZ Solidarity Lower Silesia Regional Board on 13 December 1981. After all, if it technically were so, despite Jozef P. being in possession of it, then the takeover of the sum by the commission is automatically in accordance with the law effective after 13 December 1981. Says senior legal counsellor to the commission Marian Szwaderski: "Jozef P. did not account for the withdrawn sum of 80 million zlotys either before or after 13 December 1981. He did not submit any documents of that kind. Moreover, according to his official statement the 80 million is still in his custody. That is indicated by Jozef P.'s testimony to the effect that funds for underground activities after 13 December 1981 were drawn not from the 80 million but from the current trade union dues."

This is the crux of the matter. After all, if only Jozef P. had furnished "evidence" that he spent the 80 million in question for whatever purposes of the independent and self-governing trade union, say before 13 December 1981 and for foreign assistance (and it seems he can do it anytime), then the commission would have no grounds for the claim. It would draw up the balance with a zero total and do it with peace of mind. The commission would enter "spent in a certain way" in the row "80 million zlotys." However, Jozef P. stubbornly maintains that he has custody of trade union property, that somewhere, in some cranny, in some dark recess he is hiding a stack of bills and perhaps is waiting for somebody to stumble upon it, spurring the commission into action.

Says Stanislaw Lozinski, director of the Administrative and Economic Department of Lower Silesian Trade Union Federations who manages trade union property in Wroclaw on behalf of the Warsaw commission, for many years the head and secretary of the Wroclaw trade union of transportation and road maintenance workers: "At issue is 80 million zlotys' worth of prestige, union prestige since, after all, this is a union matter and union money. It should get into the hands of trade unionists, should serve them rather than be used against them. This has been known for a very long time, but to this day nothing has been done--this expresses the view which describes the entire commotion in a capsule."

Initially, the commission also took to court Piotr B., the former deputy chairman of the NSZZ Solidarity Regional Board, who removed the money from the bank together with Jozef P. At the outset of the trial, the commission withdrew the claim against Piotr B. as a person not in charge of finances, and mainly due to his ill health, which could prolong the trial. Therefore, Jozef P., who personally transacted business with the cashier of the regional board, must return the 80 million on his own.

It seems that nobody knows where to look for the 80 million. This is a rare occasion for a journalist to stick his nose somewhere... since there are no others. Attention! Here is the address at which Jozef P. is concealing the fortune: Wroclaw, Orzeszkowa street 22/11.

...The fence looms through the twilight, the railing behind the pavement is formidable. The posted sign tells us that this is the Auxiliary Activities Shop! Hey, that's the clue. Perhaps in order to mislead us, it is added in large letters: Repair and Construction Enterprise (of one of the colleagues of Wroclaw). I hop over the fence. It is dark on the other side too. Some materials are stored. No watchman or ferocious dog in sight, and the compound is large. Where do I dig? The ground is frozen, metal parts get in the way. Sweat obscures my vision, and the treasure is closer, closer...

The place is not a figment of my imagination. This is the registered residence of Jozef P. with his 80 million zlotys. It was to this address copied straight from the court files that the Provincial Court in Wroclaw sent him the subpoenas.

P.S. The next session of the Provincial Court in Wroclaw on 28 January 1985 heard impassioned legal polemics between the litigants. The court decided to receive the evidence brought up in the matter and to recess the trial until 11 February.

9761

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POLAND

BRZEZINSKI'S REVISION OF EUROPEAN STATUS QUO DENOUNCED

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 1 Feb 85 p 6

[Article by Zygmunt Broniarek: "Propositions Concerning the Post-Yalta Arrangement"]

[Text] Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former advisor to President Carter on national security issues and currently a professor at Columbia University and a senior advisor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University in Washington, has written an extensive article entitled "The Future of Yalta." The article appeared simultaneously in the West German EUROPA ARCHIV publication of 15 October 84 and the New York quarterly FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Winter 1984). Brzezinski is regarded in the West as one of the most distinguished experts on the problems of Yalta; for this reason, there is an interest in his article in political and academic circles.

Already the first words of his article, "Yalta: the unfinished business," provoke critical thought. Why "unfinished?" It is a fact that the war was still being fought in Europe and in the Far East when the Yalta Conference took place, but if we are talking about Europe, it was clear to everyone that the end of the war and the destruction of Hitlerism were approaching in great strides. The end of the war was within reach; simultaneously, the contours of a completely new power arrangement in Europe were beginning to appear. The turn was as historic and comprehensive as were the events leading up to it. After all, with regard to the scope of the genocide and destruction, the Second World War had no equal in all of mankind's history. It also has no equal if we are talking about the heroism of people who fought against German fascism and Japanese militarism. The victory over these phenomena had to lead to the emergence of a new world whose characteristic feature was the substantial expansion of the socialist system, both in the sense of territory as well as in the sense of its influence on the future of this new world. Ultimately, it was the impact of the fact that the main burden of the war was carried on the shoulders of the world's first socialist state and that it was the armies of this state which liberated the peoples of Europe from Hitlerite occupation. This liberation also included those nations which had fought on Hitler's side.

The Conclusion of a Terrible Time

The Yalta Conference determined the political and military means necessary to achieve victory in Europe, as well as in the Far East, and took the measures aimed at the new political organization of the postwar Europe. Together with the later Potsdam Conference, Yalta made decisions of historic significance. These decisions included the destruction of fascism in Germany, occupation zones, and the Polish border on the Oder and Neisse rivers. With regard to all of this one can view Yalta, along with Potsdam, as finished business. It was the conclusion of a terrible period in European history; it was also a conclusion which raised hopes for a better Europe. Yalta and Potsdam were the summation of the reality which had taken shape in Europe after the war.

This reality also included a new order for Eastern Europe. Here forces emerged and developed which, on the one hand, aimed at the reconstruction of frequently anachronistic social structures and the creation of new structures based on the principle of justice; on the other hand, these forces created new relations of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. It is obvious that these forces enjoyed the sympathy and support of the USSR. Brzezinski reduces this entire issue to Roosevelt's and Churchill's naivete.

He writes: "The myth consists of the fact that the West accepted the division of Europe at Yalta. In actuality, Eastern Europe was already given to Stalin at the conference in Teheran in November-December 1943. At Yalta, U.S. and British leaders had timorous thoughts on the subject with regard to whether they had done well by agreeing to this gift. They then made a final though ineffective attempt to conceptualize some kind of treaties which would ensure a small amount of freedom for Eastern Europe in accordance with Anglo-American hopes for democracy in a Europe treated as a single entity. The westerners were not successful, however, in 'asserting themselves' against the unrelenting nature of the expanding postwar might of the Soviet Union; they were also unsuccessful in the encounter between Stalin's power and the might of a victor because of Western naivete."

I am omitting here Brzezinski's terminology; but it is impossible to avoid it if one wants to quote him literally. When he accuses Roosevelt and Churchill of "naivete," however, he fails to consider two very important points. He fails to consider those forces developing in Eastern Europe and also the situation on the fronts. Teheran took place already after Stalingrad, but before the allied landing in Normandy; everyone could see clearly that it would be the Red Army which would liberate Eastern Europe. During the Yalta Conference, Eastern Europe was already liberated in principle. It was no accident that the section of the Yalta Conference's communique dealing with Poland began with the words: "A new situation has emerged in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army." Roosevelt's and Churchill's defense is not my concern here, but they did not demonstrate naivete in Teheran and Yalta, only a sense of reality.

Five Recommendations

Zbigniew Brzezinski, however, understands the words "unfinished business" differently; he understands them to mean the "unfinished struggle for the future of Europe." He has formulated five recommendations to "finish" it.

It is a measure of the irreversability of the changes which occurred as a result of the Second World War and confirmed at Yalta and Potsdam that Brzezinski does not undermine them at least in one sense. This can be seen in a comparison of his first recommendation with his second. In his first recommendation, he calls upon the West to proclaim "most probably, on the 4th of July 1985" in a "ceremonial declaration" the renouncement of "the legacy of Yalta--the division of Europe." Simultaneously, however, Brzezinski calls upon the West in the essence of his second recommendation to "renew its confirmation of its adherence to the Final Act of the Helsinki Accords." This means that he advocates "an adherence to the existing territorial status quo."

Otherwise, Poland and Czechoslovakia would regard "the renouncement of the legacy of Yalta--the division of Europe" as a threat to their borders and a call for "German unification," something which all Europeans fear. According to Brzezinski, the West should declare that "the objective of removing (curing) the cracks between the East and West in Europe is not the dismantling of any existing state, but the creation of opportunities for every European nation to participate fully in a greatly expanded All-European cooperation."

Here, however, we are really talking about Brzezinski's interpretation of a "greatly expanded All-European cooperation." If his interpretation means an All-European cooperation based on the recognition and acceptance of all postwar realities, i.e., not only of the territorial status quo, but also of the systems prevailing in Eastern Europe, there would not be anything to reject in his article. Thus, the relations between Eastern and Western Europe particularly, but also between East and West generally, were shaped during the period of detente in the 1970's.

Brzezinski, however, has other things on his mind, namely: "the creation, on the one hand, of the greatest number of opportunities for Eastern European participation in All-European bodies," and, on the other hand, we will see something right away... The former refers, e.g., to various kinds of technical organizations in which Eastern Europe is already well represented. If Zbigniew Brzezinski would have restricted himself to this, there would have been no reservations with regard to his argumentation, but he wants to combine this, as he says, with "the peaceful annulment of the legacy of Yalta." He proposes a series of seminars and conferences on the subject of "the future after Yalta's Europe." He maintains: "A special effort should be made to invite Eastern Europeans at every possible opportunity to participate in deliberations which have the objective of hammering out during 1985 a more expanded consensus on how to annul the legacy of Yalta peacefully."

What is Brzezinski really inviting the Eastern Europeans to do? He is inviting them to work together with him, either by mutual agreement or literally, on changes in the political system which would result in the elimination of socialism.

Assistance? To whom?

If anyone had any doubts about this, they are dispelled by Brzezinski himself in his next recommendation. He recommends namely an increase in the assistance being accorded to antisocialist elements which he calls "emancipatory" in the name of characteristic elegance. What is more, he criticizes those Western countries or those Western figures who, according to him, insufficiently support these elements. He criticizes Helmut Schmidt for not resisting the imposition of martial law in Poland, and even for "having approved of it." On the other hand, he praises the French Government for its assistance to the emigres from Solidarity, and Radio France for its propaganda which, as is well known, oscillates around the "level" of Radio Free Europe and sometimes even exceeds it.

At different times, and by various methods, Brzezinski's objective is clear: he wants to erase the systemic changes in postwar Europe, especially those changes which were expressed in the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. With regard to the actual situation, these decisions could not help but be expressed. In other words, he is striving for the elimination of socialism in Eastern Europe; he additionally dreams that these elements which he wants to assist as much as possible would do this with impunity.

What is astounding with regard to this is that by accusing Roosevelt and Churchill of naivete he himself demonstrates naivete without quotation marks, inasmuch as he believes that the process which he defines can be finished by "historic stealth." By omitting the total nonreality of this definition, one can easily show that it does have its "good side." Brzezinski sees that he clearly and simply will not reach his objective.

This "historic stealth" also has (and how!) its military dimension.

Brzezinski proposes a small reduction in the U.S. forces stationed in Western Europe, excluding those in West Berlin, in order to permit Western Europe itself to shoulder a greater military burden. Implicit in this idea is the following: a small reduction in U.S. forces will also reduce "fears of Russia" and thus create conditions for his so-called "All-European" cooperation, the result of which, as Brzezinski promises, will be a change in the political system in the countries of Eastern Europe. We then should ask what form the increased military burden of Western Europe will assume. The answer is almost unbelievable: it would assume the form of an integration of French and West German forces which would lead to the creation of a "Franco-German Army."

It is actually difficult to imagine a more "pacifying" factor than such an army. It is sufficient to compare the forces of the Bundeswehr with the French Army at the present moment, along with the economic potential of both countries, to conclude who would dominate in such an army. And what about French nuclear weapons? Would not a "Franco-German Army" provide the perfect vehicle for the FRG to get its hands on these weapons?

Wait, there is more! After proposing a small reduction in U.S. forces, Brzezinski plans to expand the "strategic defense" of the United States and extend it to Western Europe. The "strategic defense" is nothing more than the "star wars" scheme, in other words, the militarization of outer space. We have a full menu: small reduction in U.S. forces in Europe, the creation of a "Franco-German Army," West German access to French nuclear weapons, and the expansion of the militarization of space over the territory of Western Europe--all of this along with the continued deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in that very Europe; that is something Brzezinski fails to mention.

Thus, this is how the "post-Yalta arrangement" is supposed to look, according to Brzezinski.

12247
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POLAND

PARTY DELIBERATES INTELLIGENTSIA'S STANDING IN SOCIETY

Ideological Commission Meets

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 2-3 Feb 85 pp 1,2

[Article by Jan Ruszczyc: "The Role and Obligations of the Intelligentsia"]

[Text] On 1 February 1985 the PZPR Central Committee Ideological Commission discussed the preparations for the Central Committee's 19th Plenum, which--as had been announced earlier--will focus on the role and place of the intelligentsia in the socialist development of Poland. The meeting was chaired by Jozef Czyrek, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary.

Animated discussion was centered around the political-programmatic and organizationl theses for this plenary meeting which had been presented by Janusz Janicki, director of the PZPR Central Committee Ideological Department and chairman of the newly created interdepartmental task force at the PZPR Central Committee. The discussants in general approved the theses and enriched them with numerous evaluations and proposals. They emphasized the fundamental importance of the topics selected for the 19th Plenum. After discussing problems of the working class and of the the worker-peasant alliance, the Central Committee will focus its attention on the problems of the third major social group: the intelligentsia. This should define--as it was stated--the character of the plenary meeting, which is to delineate the directions of party activity among the intelligentsia and solutions to problems encountered by this group, and is to be addressed to the entire Polish intelligentsia community.

The discussants agreed that the important role of the intelligentsia in solving problems of the socialist fatherland also determines the scale of its patriotic obligations toward the nation and the socialist state. Some expressed the need to bring to the fore tasks which will integrate intelligentsia environments in constructive work for the state. It is necessary to focus on things which unite patriotically thinking Poles regardless of differences among them and to oppose the mood of pessimism and apathy which the internal and external centers of antistate opposition and ideological subversion attempt to foster. The program of the Ninth Party Congress, the line of accord, struggle, and socialist reform, is the basis for such multidirectional offensive activities.

The participants decided that the important task of the 19th Plenum will be to make all intelligentsia groups understand how much their efforts and creativity are needed by the state.

It is necessary--the discussants stated--to upgrade the national pride and self-respect of Polish intelligentsia, and to cultivate more effectively those modern models of behavior that constitute commendable continuation of its patriotic, democratic, and leftist traditions. They also emphasized that it is necessary to utilize more fully in various segments of life in the country the creative accomplishment of the humanist and technical intelligentsia and that the place of employment is an important field for such activity, while the success of such efforts is predicated on greater party and civic activities.

In his summation of this topic, Jozef Czyrek drew attention to the traditional importance of the development of culture, science, and scientific-technical growth--that is, the areas of particular interest to the intelligentsia--in party activity. The coming plenary meeting means a comprehensive approach to these problems on the part of the Central Committee.

The Ideological Commission also discussed the program-organizational agenda of the Second Nationwide Party Ideological Conference which had been presented by Andrzej Czyz, deputy director of the PZPR Central Committee Ideological Department. The participants approved the commission meeting schedule for the first 5 months which had been proposed by Wladyslaw Loranc, director of the PZPR Central Committee ideological Department.

The following participants spoke at the meeting: Jerzy Lazarz, Stanislaw Wronski, Adam Krzysztowski, Tadeusz Jaroszewski, Wlodzimierz Sokorski, Wieslaw Bek, Tadeusz Walichnowski, Zenon Szulc, Julian Kraus, Antoni Kwiatkowski, Stanislaw Knap, Jozef Woloch, Witold Skrabalak, Franciszek Banko, Tadeusz Szacilo, Wladyslaw Fidzinski, Ryszard Kucharski, Norbert Michta, and Zdzislaw Grzelak.

Cultural Ties Expanded

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 30 Jan 85 pp 1,2

[Article by Z. Zaryczny]

[Test] On 29 January 1985 a "Protocol on Cooperation Between the Ministry of Culture and Art of the Polish People's Republic and the USSR Ministry of Culture in 1985" was signed at the Polish Culture Ministry. The integral part of the "Protocol" is the agreement on the organization of the Soviet Culture Days in Poland scheduled for 16-25 April 1985; they will focus on the 40th anniversary of the Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between Poland and the USSR and the 40th anniversary of the victory over fascism. In the presence of Prof Kazimierz Zygulski, minister of culture, the document was signed for the Polish side by Wacław Janas, deputy minister of culture, and for the Soviet side by Georgiy A. Ivanov, deputy minister. The signing ceremony was attended by Prof Witold Nawrocki, director of the

PZPR Central Committee Cultural Department, and representatives of the culture and foreign affairs ministries as well as by members of the Soviet Culture Ministry delegation and representatives of the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw with Vasiliy Savirin, minister plenipotentiary.

Both ministries declared that in 1985 "they will continue efforts to further the development of and improve ties in culture and art with the aim of achieving high quality and increased effectiveness of mutual undertakings." Of particular importance is the intention of both sides to make mutual exchanges and presentations of cultural accomplishments reach the highest possible professional level. This year we will see many outstanding Soviet ensembles and soloists. A significant and representative group will come to Poland for the Soviet Culture Days, 16-25 April 1985, which "will be"--as the "Protocol" stated--"an important event and the crowning achievement of the daily Polish-Soviet cooperation in the cultural field."

First of all, for the first time in 5 years, we will see the Bolshoy Ballet and its rendition of the "Golden Century," composed by Dmitriy Shostakovich and choreographed by Yuriy Grigorovich; its performance will inaugurate the Soviet Culture Days. Also, in April we will see the MKhAT Theater, one of the most famous dramatic theaters in the world, as well as the G. Verlovski Ukrainian Folk Song and Dance Ensemble, the "Khoroshki" Belorussian Dance Ensemble, and the Armenian Chamber Music Orchestra.

The Soviet Culture Days will include the "Soviet Film Days," several large art exhibitions, such as "Soviet Genre Painting" and "Pushkin and World Culture," films and television programs, as well as meetings of artists and cultural leaders with the delegation of Soviet cultural and artist unions.

The increase in frequency and topical scope of direct working contacts, involving hundreds of people in the cultural field from Poland and the Soviet Union, will be perhaps the most characteristic feature of 1985. This is confirmed by the language of the "Protocol," which envisages, among other things, a broad exchange of representatives from cultural institutions cooperating with each other, visits of students from Krakow and Warsaw drama schools in Leningrad and Moscow drama schools, and internships of Polish cultural workers in Soviet institutions. The training scheduled for our House of Culture directors at the Institute for Cadre Improvement in Moscow appears to be very interesting.

The letter and the spirit of the "Protocol" fully fit the present phase of the development of friendly Polish-Soviet relations. Numerous joint agreements between the Polish and Soviet culture ministries constitute an important and very positive contribution to the intensification of these relations and add to them valuable humanist and intellectual perspectives. The envisaged broadening and intensification of contacts, particularly affecting young creators and artists, are proof that the importance of the said perspectives has been recognized.

It should be noted that the framework of the "Protocol" can be transcended, and the calendar of joint events can be supplemented with new ones, if they

are proposed and approved by both sides. This openness is another important feature of the "Protocol," which went into effect on the day of its signing.

During his visit in Warsaw Ivanov paid a visit to Prof Nawrocki at the PZPR Central Committee and to Prof Zygulski at Culture Ministry.

8609

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POLAND

ANNUAL RESULTS OF LAW, ORDER CAMPAIGN PRESENTED

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26-27 Jan 85 p 2

[PAP report: "Greater Results in the Fight Against Crime; Report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Citizens' Militia, Div Gen Jozef Beim"]

[Text] The commander-in-chief of the MO [Citizens' Militia], Div Gen Jozef Beim, informed PAP as to the state of common crime and the results of the fight against it in 1984.

Taking into consideration the overall situation--he said--this past year could be rated, in view of the scale and structure of the threat posed by common crime, as having been moderately good. That is to say, last year saw a further stage in limiting crime's growth rate and saw the introduction of useful changes, all of which heralded a steady if slow improvement in this area.

In 1984, organs of the MO and the prosecutor's office filed 419,820 legal proceedings on account of common criminality. That is 9 percent higher than in the previous year. Crime thus continues at a high level. But in comparison with previous years, its rate of growth has clearly slowed. In 1981, for example, the overall growth in the number of crimes reached 33.7 percent. Tendencies toward the amelioration of the criminal threat made themselves visible in 1983. Last year they gained strength.

In the overall crime picture, useful structural revaluations came about. This phenomenon stems mainly from the increased number of discovered white-collar crimes, which in turn determines the level of overall crime. The broadened measures by which white-collar crimes are disclosed are the expected result of systematic progress being made in the efficacy of police activities. Those measures are also the result of the still occurring phenomena of economic pathology. In 1984, 26.5 percent more criminal proceedings were brought on account of such crimes than had been the case in the previous year. Important results were seen especially in uncovering tax evasion and hidden real income.

I also include among the measures results which were produced by the Citizens' Militia last year a weakened growth rate in the strong increase of

of felonious crimes. We have, to be sure, noted the increased number of proceedings for such crime (5 percent more); but if we return to 1983, it becomes apparent that the increase is now much less (in 1983 the increase reached 10 percent and in 1981 it exceeded 45 percent). The present state of many crime categories has approached the level of the early 1970's.

Two-thirds of all felonies are property-related (this includes robbery, breaking and entering, and theft). The most numerous of these categories is the theft of private property. The decrease noted in criminal proceedings brought to bear for crimes in these categories is 4 percent. The number of burglaries at public places is the same this year as it was last year. We have not achieved similar improvement in break-ins resulting in personal loss, although its rate of growth did abate.

The dynamic of crimes involving physical injury, beating, and homicide also diminished in intensity, but we did note a greater number of such crimes this year than we had in 1983. Murder increased 15 percent and rape about 13 percent.

A certain degree of improvement in highway safety occurred, although the situation is still serious. There were 35,852 accidents with bodily injury reported on public roads. A total of 46,018 people either died or were injured in these accidents and 3,050 of them died at the scene of the accident. In addition, 76,354 other traffic collisions took place. This marks a decline relative to 1983, with the number of accidents 11 percent and the number of victims 13 percent less than in that year.

I would like to announce with pleasure that the efficacy of anticriminal activity has clearly improved. Both in the individual months and over the course of the entire year, there has been a marked, incremental improvement in the detection of criminal perpetrators. This has helped, in effect, to curb the growth rate of crime. Overall, the detectability of crime rose from 71 percent in 1983 to 74.6 percent this past year. But as concerns felonies, this increase was 2.8 percent and reached 67.7 percent--the highest level since 1981. Criminals must therefore reckon with a larger and larger risk of their activities being detected and of themselves being brought to justice.

But it must be noted that crime fighting bore different results in different parts of the country.

The improvement in results of the fight against crime is due, for one, to more capable work on the part of the MO. It is also an effect of the coordinated activities of the Council of Ministers Committee for Law, Public Order and Social Discipline.

But not only does improved efficacy on the part of state agencies, (that is, the prosecutor's office and the MO) determine the results of anticrime measures. Rather, it is the efficient functioning of the entire system which is fighting disregard for the law. One of the main elements of that system is society's help and citizen support for professional agencies.

The signs of improvement in the overall crime picture and the signs of efficacy in the fight against crime constitute a good point of departure for activities arrayed against the mechanisms of social pathology in 1985.

We shall--said the commander-in-chief of the MO--continue to inform the public about these problems in the future.

12512

CSO: 2600/601

POLAND

LEGAL INSIGHTS ON CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL PRESENTED

Warsaw PRAWO I ZYCIE No 52, 29 Dec 84 pp 3,4

[Article by Leszek Garlicki: "The Constitutional Tribunal ante portas"]

[Text] In its formulation of the political directive designed to finalize the work on the statute of the Constitutional Tribunal, the resolution of the 17th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party admits that the near future will probably reveal concretized drafts of this statute, because in the past, despite the lapse of 3 years from the introduction of new tribunals into the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic, nothing was done to carry out the legislative initiative in this field.

If we are to assume that the statute concerning the Constitutional Tribunal will still have approval in the current session of the Sejm, it might be worth considering the textual form of the statute. Namely, the question arises as to which solution, in light of constitutional regulations, would have to fit into the future statute, and in which matters the Constitution leaves some freedom to the legislator.

Article 33a of the Constitution has prejudged five fundamental questions regarding the future Constitutional Tribunal.

First: It introduced the very institution of this tribunal as an independent organ ensconced beyond the fundamental court system. It rejected the idea of entrusting the constitutionality control to the Supreme Court, which was alternatively intimated in the resolution of the Ninth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, delivering it instead, pursuant to the pattern of typical solutions in continental Europe, into the hands of a special organ directly subordinated to the parliament.

Second: The Constitution prejudged the objective scope of activity of the Constitutional Tribunal, incorporating under its control "statutes and other standardizing acts of executive and central government organs."

The primary significance of this action is that the tribunal is convoked to monitor standardizing acts only, hence it cannot decide on individual matters, even if they emanate from the background of actual or alleged

violations of the Constitution. Consequently, should a doubt ever arise about any action, whether or not a regulation designed to form the basis of an individual decision is concordant with the Constitution, and so the pertinent issue might be directed to the Constitutional Tribunal, the tribunal would then be allowed to decide only on such legal questions, and on this basis a specific organ would ultimately decide on the individual matter. What this also means is that the tribunal is not convoked to examine the constitutionality of territorial acts, but its control comprises every standardizing act of executive and central state organs. Hence, a solution delineating the specificity of the tribunal, such as the preclusion of standardizing acts decreed by a certain executive organ or such concerning definite matters, would contravene the Constitution.

Third: The Constitution prejudices the basic and monitoring criteria performed by the tribunal. Ergo, it only examines the constitutional legality of standardizing acts, but it has no authority to scrutinize assessments of expediency or the political rationality of their issue. The basis of an assessment is concordance with the Constitution, in which case, and rightly so, in addition to having a vast interpretation this concept also involves the assessment of concordance with fundamental statutes of standardizing acts (Art. 33a, par. 3). As there is no substantive difference in this case, whenever the Constitution engenders an order to have all inferior ranks agree with a law, discordance of such an act with the law becomes a violation of the Constitution.

Fourth: The constitution prejudices the legal effects of the tribunal's decisions, stating a discordance of the monitored act with either the Constitution or the statute. In this regard, as we know, a differentiation of legal effects was assumed in relation to the type of acts monitored by the tribunal. Hence, to state that a statute, or a decree with the force of a statute according to general principles of interpretation of the Constitution, is unconstitutional does not have the sense of finality, but imposes upon the Sejm a legal obligation to contemplate the given case and express an all-binding opinion. On the other hand, decisions regarding the discordance of unconstitutionality or unlawfulness of other standardizing acts are binding, and the tribunal "applies the means necessary to eliminate such discordance." Hence, the Constitution does not prejudice the scope or character of such means, but requires that they be formed in a way that would enable the tribunal to impose its attitude regarding further effects of questioning a fundamental act.

Fifth: The Constitution predetermines that a tribunal selected by the Sejm will have a membership consisting of lawyers only, and its members will enjoy full independence. Such decisions call for a concretization of the statute which, according to Art. 33a, par. 6, is meant to define the propriety, structure, and actions of the Constitutional Tribunal.

What all this means is that constitutional regulations leave for the statute a relatively broad latitude as to the acceptance of the final vision of the Constitutional Tribunal. In principle, the Constitution defines in its entirety only the scope and criteria of monitoring and, to some

extent, the legal effects. On the other hand, the traditional legislature has much more extensive freedom in defining the method for convoking and structuring an internal tribunal, and also in shaping procedural standardizations. The latter issue in particular appears to be most cogent, as the true meaning and role of the Constitutional Tribunal depend to a great extent on the form of its activity, and particularly on its accessibility. But then, the definition of the procedural shape of activity depends on the general premises of the function of the Constitutional Tribunal.

In any event, it would appear that two of the possible visions of this function would have to be discarded. First and foremost, the Constitutional Tribunal must not be perceived as an organ that performs political arbitration between the remaining state organs and settles disputes about the constitutionality of their operations. Such a concept would be hard to reconcile with the constitutional principles of the parliament's superiority in the system of state organs, and also with the practical significance of the principle of the party's leading role. Political relationships of forces in the framework of a political system and state apparatus do not unfold on the forum of judiciary organs, and for this reason the bestowal of their task on a future Constitutional Tribunal would mean that the art of implementing authority is completely separated from the realities of the socialist system.

For this reason, it would not seem advisable to expand procedures serving to display on the forum of the tribunal some general disputes with a potential or true political character, but prudence would indicate restraint in structuring the action initiative that is carried out separately from concrete phenomena of judicial implementation. The so-called abstract initiative carried out against the background of a general conviction that a given regulation conflicts with the Constitution or other statutes should be confined to the narrow circle of executive state organs (State Council, chairman of the council of ministers, sejm commissions, groups of deputies, Supreme Chamber of Control, prosecutor general), and, perhaps to some social organizations in the scope of their activities.

Next, the Constitutional Tribunal must not be perceived as a specialized body of legal consultation for other state bodies. In this field there are already bodies with much higher degrees of qualification and authority, just to mention the Commission of Legislative Work, in relation to the Sejm and the Legislative Council, and in relation to the prime minister. The gist of legal consultation is the non-binding and abstract character of formulated opinions. Hence, since the Constitution has structured the Constitutional Tribunal as an organ with a juridical (or quasi-juridical) character, the closest action that approaches this character would seem to be that of making final decisions associated with actually existing legal disputes.

So, on the one hand we should try not to endow the tribunal with such attributes as the giving of consulting opinions, and, on the other hand, we should not put before it any yet-to-mature questions for judiciary decisions. For those reasons I would advocate restraint in forming abstract initiatives for monitoring laws or endowing the tribunal with powers of an exclusively

sequential character. Supervision of this sort should deal exclusively with acts that have already become mandatory and causatory of legal effects. Then, only on the background of the actual process of implementing legal acts will it be possible to determine the meaning and social effects of their regulations, and consequently the true tenor thereof. I would oppose, however, a policy of entrusting to the tribunal the power of issuing opinions about drafts of standardizing acts (preventive checks), because such action would be alien to the nature of this organ and, besides, in practice that could be effectively verified by existing and proven institutions.

Since the activity of the Constitutional Tribunal must not be associated with political conduct or arbitration, or even legal consultations, somehow we have to envision a tribunal formed as an organ oriented toward the protection of standardizing jurisprudence against a background of policies bearing the mark of individuality. After all, we know that in the daily routine of implementing legal regulations every asset and flaw of a particular regulation emerges fully before our eyes, and then it is very easy to determine the true meaning of a particular regulation.

This means that against the background of this very routine it would be possible to point out weak spots in existing standardization and raise any doubts about their concordance with standards of a higher order. Of course, while the organs responsible for the general state of law (State Council, prime minister, Sejm commissions) have the duty to carry out this job, other organs implementing routine laws are also involved. In this concept the function of the Constitutional Tribunal and its association with the citizenry would be enhanced; considering that most individual measures affect the citizens, and thus the Constitutional Tribunal would act primarily as a sentinel of individual rights, and from this point of view it would ensure the compatibility of mandatory regulations. Such a unique vision of the Constitutional Tribunal, a tribunal associated with the citizen, but alienated from abstract political disputes, appears to come closest to socialist realities and ideas of government structures.

From this background there emerges a problem of how to structure properly the law of behavioral initiative before the Constitutional Tribunal. The doubts raised earlier about the procedure of prior (preventive) controls, or even checks implemented apart from concrete phenomena in the implementation of the standardizing act, provide support, as I mentioned, for restraint in determining the sphere of subjects authorized to initiate controls on the background of a general assessment of a given regulation. Apart from major government organs and groups of delegates, a law of this type of initiative must not be conferred too liberally.

On the other hand, expansions with some sort of moderation call for the procedure of concrete checks, i.e., checks initiated on the background of a concrete judiciary or administrative case when doubts arise as to whether or not a regulation designed to constitute the basis for a decision agrees with standards of a higher order. It seems that the statute of the Constitutional Tribunal should have the capacity to anticipate the possibility that whenever such doubts occur, an action in individual matters may be

suspended, and the organ deciding the case would address the tribunal with the respective legal question. However, two questions should be noted in the scope of this general conclusion.

On the one hand, I am positive that only the organ pursuing an action in a case (its superior organ) should have the right to file a suit before the Constitutional Tribunal. The premise for such action would be a doubt (either a substantiated or true doubt), or even the conviction that the regulation designed to constitute the basis for a decision contravenes a standard of a higher order.

But then the right to file suit cannot be given directly to the party of the plaintiff, because in such a situation it would be treated as one of the items of judicial tactics, and would expose the tribunal to the unnecessary onus of excessive suits. It seems that the parties in the suit should be granted only the right to indicate to the instrumental organ which regulations actually serve to help decide the case. The possibilities of their application should be decisive, however (and this would also apply to the participation of their advocate in any action brought before the tribunal).

On the other hand, it is important to bear in mind the differences in the type of suit processed before courts and before organs of state administration. Whereas courts as independent organs call for treatment to be applied in such a way that each of those organs would be given independent means of action, administrative organs set up a system with an internal hierarchical structure, and therefore should be treated in a systematized manner. I would vote against giving authority to any administrative organ to direct legal questions to the Constitutional Tribunal whenever a matter of concordance between a defined regulation and the Constitution or a statute comes up in the course of a court action. In particular, organs on the gmina level (and as a rule, also on the provincial level), might make known their doubts to superior administrative organs, and such *modus operandi* would seem to be closer to the principles of internal relations in state administration.

In addition to provincial governors, I would grant the right to file suit before the Constitutional Tribunal only to executive and central or administrative organs that consider a case on the administrative level of the second instance, and then only when a case terminates on the provincial level, and when an administrative decision does not leave room for a judicial complaint. By the same token, all administrative organs, including those in the present legal status, have the obligation to make known to the prime minister any flaws in the legal system which, on the basis of the future status of the Constitutional Tribunal, may become the basis for filing suits of an abstract nature.

When it comes to the authority of courts in this field, we should view it in a different light. This is because every adjudicating division acts as an independent body, and only in this function can the principle of independence be fully realized. Consequently, only adjudicating divisions may be said to have this special cohesion between knowledge about a considered case,

contacts with parties in a suit, and an independent decisive position, which are dictated by objectivity and good sense when doubts are brought up to the Constitutional Tribunal. The proposal might be made accordingly that the statute grant the right of filing suit of a concrete nature to courts understood to be adjudicating teams, and not to bodies acting out of general meetings or in some other like manner. Such a proposal leads to the conclusion that the right to file suit should be inherent in all courts, although, in view of the economics of a court's activity, the attitude might also be taken that such an attribute should only be inherent in courts of the provincial level, the Supreme Administrative Court or the Supreme Court. Since every case must go through one of those courts it will always be possible to direct questionable issues to the Constitutional Tribunal. According to its nature and past achievements, the Supreme Administrative Court might play an instrumental role here.

Another thing that needs to be pointed out is that not all objections regarding the agreement between legal regulations and standards of a higher rank must necessarily lead to action by the adjudicating court with legal questions being brought up to the Constitutional Tribunal. Such action would be necessary if the lower court's doubt arose on the background of a regulation on the level of a statute. However, regarding substatutory regulations, even now courts have the right to refuse their implementation, that is, if a court realizes that such regulations conflict with the statute. This right ensues directly from Article 62 of the Constitution, and the statute or the Constitutional Tribunal can neither restrict nor confirm such right. Ergo, in the future, too, the courts will have the option of refusing the application of a regulation conflicting with the statute, which, against the background of the future statute of the Constitutional Tribunal, may have further consequences in the form of some action filed by an authorized government organ requesting a general decision by the Constitutional Tribunal about the fate of such regulation.

The first drafts of the statute on the Constitutional Tribunal contained a proposal to grant to every citizen the right of advising the tribunal about any instances of conflicts between a regulation and the Constitution or the statute. Originally such action was supposed to be considered by a team of judges of the constitutional tribunal with the option of leaving it in abeyance. This proposal might arouse some doubts, though, regarding its form as a popular action, i.e., granting to every citizen the right to appeal to the tribunal, regardless of his or her own private interest in having the fate of a given regulation resolved. Such a procedure might lead to an overload on the tribunal and, most importantly, steer its activity toward problems that have no great pertinence to practical jurisprudence. True, if we were to assume that the Constitutional Tribunal had the possibility of filing action ex officio, there would, of course, be nothing to prevent a citizen from informing the Constitutional Tribunal about irregularities of the legal system. However, there is no reason to create a situation in which every report becomes the basis for filing a court action.

Nevertheless, it should be worthwhile to stop and consider the institution of the so-called constitutional complaint, which is understood as the means

for a citizen to apply to the Constitutional Tribunal in a situation where an individual case of this citizen was legitimately decided on the basis of a legal regulation conflicting with the statute or the Constitution. Provided that all previous instances have been exhausted, and provided the given time limit has not been overstepped, perhaps, with some objective limitations, a citizen might be granted the right to bring up his complaint to the tribunal, that is, if the questioned decision violated any of the rights or freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. Complaints of this sort might be subjected to a preliminary selection by a team of three judges of the Constitutional Tribunal. In any event, this would seem to be the right way to strengthen constitutional guarantees of civil rights.

In this article I have expanded only on the problem of the future statute of the Constitutional Tribunal. Although, in addition to the questions raised, other very cogent issues remain, such as *modus operandi*, ground rules for action, etc., I do believe that the question of the tribunal's accessibility has an underlying importance in its future place in the system to guarantee legality in the Polish People's Republic.

12650

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POLAND

SUMMARY OF PRON PROPOSALS ON REFORM, DECENTRALIZATION

Warsaw ODRÓDZENIE in Polish No 1, 6 Jan 85 p 6

[Article by Wincenty Lewandowski, vice chairman of the PRON National Council and vice president of the PAX Association Executive Council: "What Next With the Reform?"]

[Excerpts] The "Directions of Economic Reform" passed by the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress contain a demand for the organizational restructuring of the centralized economy by eliminating associations and economic branch ministries for trade and creating one ministry of industry.

Associations, as we know, have been eliminated, and the number of economic ministries has been greatly limited. There is hope connected with these changes that they will preclude a command-distribution method of running the economy. In view of this, has the centralized economy, after almost 3 years in its new form, taken up the functions demanded of it by the reformed/reforming economy?

The Political Center and the Economy

The complexity of the problem of directing the economy in our tradition thus far also arises out of the fact that it is broadly and directly tied to the way authority is discharged and to the way the political center of the state functions. In order for the economy to complete the tasks that the central political structure places before it most efficiently, it must have a definite degree of autonomy and above all methods of management suitable to it and a definite organization.

An unshakeable and necessary function of the political center in relation to the economy is to chart the direction of socioeconomic changes and to make assignments that should be implemented in this area. This means responsibility for the long-range development of the country, for the direction and scale of the desired changes. In this function the political center, which establishes organizational structures to cooperate in the discharge of authority of political powers, and also the Sejm, which is a reflection of this arrangement, cannot be replaced by any other group of institutional structure. Neither by the government, whose goal is the on-going implementation of tasks designated

precisely by the political center, nor even more so by self-management organs, the effectiveness of whose activity is inextricably tied to relatively low levels of economic or social life (enterprise, housing development, local administration), nor finally by groups of experts, specialized organizations, etc., although their opinions should be important factors in ultimate decisions.

The political center's formulation of socioeconomic tasks, whose implementation is entrusted to the government, under the conditions of the working of a reformed economy ought to be carried out without time limitations and a measurable scale for fulfilling these tasks. Quantitative and temporal limits on set tasks are an integral part of economic administration in command-distribution systems. It expresses a lack of trust in all participants of the economic process that if they were not "driven" by strict guidelines, then they would poorly, or at least not fully, utilize the resources at their disposal. In the meantime we know from experience that quite the contrary is true. It is precisely a command system, the limitation of tasks, that is the source of irrationality in the economy, demanding attitudes (requiring resources which are excessive in relation to the task), low efficiency of the agents of production, its low quality, and ultimately also dishonesty in calculating the accomplishment of tasks thus formulated.

An essential role of the political center is the on-going and periodic supervision of the course of economic processes, the evaluation of progress achieved in reaching goals, and the appraisal of how efficiently existing resources are being utilized. The discharging of these functions requires that neither it nor its components be participants in making on-going economic decisions or establishing methods of activity, since then it cooperates in and is co-responsible for these decisions instead of supervising them.

This would require abandoning the practice which occurs widely in the activity of our economic life of coordinating all current decisions made by them but which should be made by suitable independent economic organs with the appropriate structures of the political center. This general coordination of decisions on the part of those formally charged with them is most often the expression of a reluctance to bear responsibility for their actions and often the expression of helplessness and incompetence. On the part of individuals representing the political system, this can be taken as a lack of trust in people or groups who fulfill designated functions in the economy.

The mechanism of coordination also leads to excessive mutual interpenetration of political and administrative structures. The consequence of this can only be a growing absorption of the political center in increasingly minor current affairs, increasingly technical ones (for after all the result of this interpenetration does not lie in economic administration taking up problems of general development). This has to limit its potential to work on behalf of enterprises in the long-term perspective sense. There arises a gap which no other structure is in a position to fill. Our experiences from the past confirm this in a negative sense, and in a positive sense so do recent experiences, when a certain departure of the party from matters of on-going guidance in favor of long-term activities took place. The political center's departure from participation in making detailed decisions opens all its constituent elements to programmed activity and to perceive qualitatively new social processes.

The PRON Proposals

The interest of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth in socioeconomic problems in general and the economic reform in particular is understandable. The documents of the First PRON Congress, the resolution of the National Council in December 1983, do not leave any doubt that the movement declares itself emphatically and consistently in favor of the implementation of the economic reform, seeing in it an essential element of socialist renewal, an effective instrument for our economy to recover balance and economic efficiency, and for the future, a system which lets us avoid a repetition of the breakdowns it has had until now.

With this as the background, I see as one sign of action on behalf of the reform the stance taken by the Presidium of the National Council regarding the proposed changes in the organization of the centralized economy. Its contents arise from the general principles of our country's political system, the underlying conditions for the rational and efficient working of the economy, the optimal division of the functions of political structures, the Sejm and the government in relation to the economy, and also the present instruments of administration.

The Presidium has now recognized it as advisable to return to the proposal for changes in the direction of creating one ministry of industry and two committees functioning within the framework of the government in the place of the economic branch ministries in existence until now. The first would be a planning organ, a center for preparing strategic economic decision, and the second a center for the efficient balancing of the economy, balancing the material flow carried out in its sphere. At the same time, a negative assessment was expressed concerning the tendency toward regeneration of middle management levels.

The government administration center responsible for strategic economic planning could rely on the Planning Commission with certain modifications in its functions (decreasing its responsibility for current problems). The center for current balance of material flow would bring together the ministers who direct functional ministries (finances, prices, wages, international trade, industry, which would also be a functional department in the new system, and banks). The specific organizational forms can vary. The chief concern is for the stable division of assignments, jurisdiction and responsibility among the individuals creating these structures. The duplication of their functions must be avoided, this being a constant source of problems requiring the creation of new coordinating institutions.

The appropriate division of responsibilities and jurisdiction in an economic center thus conceived could insure that its attention would be concentrated on various problems in proportion to their significance to the economy as a whole, making possible a harmonious connection of the political center's guiding principles (transferred to a collection of strategic decisions concerning the development of the economy) with enterprises which insure it current balancing.

The organizational structure of the economic center thus limited in its dimensions can act under the condition that there are mechanisms existing in the

economy which themselves regulate the balance of current sales and production. If the reform is to continue, we must decide on having self-regulating elements with full rights functioning in the economy. Without this, the reform will lose in the practice of economic management.

The absence of self-regulation in the economy threatens the very essence of the economic center's function. It increases the range of necessary intervention by the center into specific matters and gives rise to an unavoidable need for intermediate levels of management organized by trade. The temptation to restore them is based on the fact that as the occasion arises, they increase the power of the center in the area of current control of the economy, although at the same time, as experience has shown, they cause a loss of control over the implementation of strategic decisions, since they transfer unfiltered conflicts to the center arising out of clashing group interests. At the central level, these conflicting interests mutually obstruct one another, making only one decision possible: to give all functioning trades in the economy equal chances and resources. The cause of such a mechanism also lies in the current inability to achieve a restructuring of the economy which would be essential to insure development, to make choices based on the criteria of optimizing results and not on the necessity of reaching a shoddy compromise.

Against the background of this opposition to intermediate management cells, it was also brought to the attention of the Presidium that there undoubtedly exist economic problems for which there are no solutions, neither at the level of the center nor by the individual enterprises. This situation, however, must bring about an intensification of cooperative processes in keeping with their interests, and not tendencies toward mechanical organizational concentration reminiscent of the old large economic organizations and combines. The thing is not to create unified organizational structures but to go in the direction of greater diversity among them, and accommodate to the specific needs of establishments, taking into account above all conditions for economic efficiency based on agreed upon relations of enterprise cooperation.

The moment we are presently experiencing is in many respects essential, perhaps decisive, for the continuing future of the economy and the reform. In the current consciousness of the aggregate of workers, people who manage enterprises, those active in self-management of enterprise work crews, and also the rank and file workers, there exists considerable confusion as to what kind of mechanisms for managing the economy are strengthened in the everyday practice of economic life. A resolute emphasis on guiding and setting this consciousness in order is undoubtedly important.

12635

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POLAND

ECONOMIC RECOVERY CLAIMS DISPUTED IN CENSORED COMMENTARY

Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish No 1, 6 Jan 85 p 8

[Article by Ernest Skalski: "On the Standard of Living in the Years 1982-1984"]

[Text] The economic performance record for the year 1984 has not yet been calculated, but it is already known that it does not differ too much from the record achieved the previous year, which is acknowledged as the beginning of the recovery from the crisis. One of the more important symptoms of this process was the fact that real income in working families, which contain 18 million people, increased by 1 percent.

This is the margin of error, so we can speak rather of low-level stabilization. If further improvement was to have taken place at this rate [----] [Law of 31 July 1981, On the Control of Publications and Shows, Article 2, Point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 99; revised 1983, DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 204)], then around the year 2000 we would have achieved the level of 1980 more or less. If subsequent improvement was to have taken place twice as quickly, this level would have been attained at the beginning of the next decade. For one has to be aware that in 1982, the worse year, real incomes fell 20 percent in comparison with the previous year and somewhat more in comparison with 1980, when the material conditions of the working world became the main cause of the eruption of social discontentment.

Journalists emphasize that the crisis is intensifying our backwardness as a civilization in Europe, which is not standing still. The long duration of the crisis is magnifying this backwardness considerably. But even without foreign comparisons it is having graver consequences than even a bad but short-term economic disaster would have had.

For during the course of the crisis years its effects have been accumulating, even when the lowest point of the crisis was past. The result of malnutrition--the lack of vitamins and protein--continue to be felt [----] [Law of 31 July 1981, On the Control of Publications and Shows, Article 2, Point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 99; revised 1983, DZIENNIK USTAW No 44, Item 204)].

Food deficiencies are not the only cause of this phenomenon. Generally more difficult living conditions that are forcing people to exert greater effort and are increasing stress are connected with the crisis. Moreover, there has been a steady deterioration of environmental conditions.

The chronic nature of the crisis is being reflected not only in the form of disinvestment of permanent assets in the economy, about which rather a great deal is being written. A similar process is taking place in the majority of domestic households. It is more and more difficult to reproduce durable goods both because of their high price and difficulties in purchasing them. Technical equipment breaks down ever more frequently, is repaired at ever higher costs, and works ever more poorly. Clothes and footwear wear out, dwellings are repaired less and less often. This deterioration is occurring gradually, but even if good luck begins one day, it will take a long time to make up for the deficiencies that have arisen up until that moment. Therefore, the insignificant production growth of the majority of commodities still does not signify a recovery from the crisis and is not averting a considerable drop in the standard of living in the future.

Another factor that levels the progress evident in the statistics is the increasingly poorer quality of products. This phenomenon is difficult to calculate, but there are some possibilities for ascertaining its dimensions. The amount of products labeled as quality goods decreased in the years 1980-1983 from 30,480 to 19,373, and their share in the quantity of products covered by this qualification decreased from 25.3 to 15.8 percent in this period, with the NIK [Supreme Chamber of Control] maintaining that the qualifying criteria actually had been reduced.

According to PIH [State Trade Inspectorate] data, 67 percent of economic chemistry products, 63 percent of textiles, 55 percent of furniture, 32 percent of footwear, 30 percent of dairy products, 21 percent of baked goods, and 18 percent of meat products were of inadequate quality in 1983.

With haphazard studies it is difficult to investigate changes taking place from year to year, but it is known that customer complaints acknowledged by trade increased 32 percent in 1983 compared with 1982, and the quantity of goods returned by foreign customers because of poor quality, by 75 percent.

If poor quality were considered in the prices of products, it could be shown that not an increase but a drop had taken place in basic economic indicators, and especially in real incomes.

The method of selecting goods and services for a basket of prices, which is a basic calculation of living costs, is an essential issue. Debates on what and how much to take into account in a basket of prices have gone on always and everywhere. It was also official prices that always were taken into account there, and not those that were actually paid. Automobiles

(which should be there, for more than one-fourth of domestic households already own them) are included in the basket of prices at the state and not the exchange price, gasoline only at 50 and not 150 zlotys, Polish televisions and freezers without the graft amounting to several tens of thousands of zlotys, etc. It is not even taken into account that frequent toothpaste shortages force Poles to buy a foreign brand, ten times more expensive, or to stop brushing. And here we touch on other matters. Such neglect, for example, causes a need for more frequent use of dental services. A poorly paid and depreciating health service functions worse and worse (for example, the lack of dentists' drill bits), and private services become expensive. That is only one example of the many symptoms of the drop in the standard of living that statistics cannot take into consideration, just like longer lines, more difficult attempts to purchase anything, and greater fatigue and stress.

For the sake of fairness it must be acknowledged that there also exist factors ungrasped by the statistics which are improving the position of particular individuals: a couple of gardening beds, a couple of little trees, a few chickens and rabbits, secretly rendered services, one side of which has a few pennies, and the other--something done, unofficial trade. All signs of economic activity are improving the general situation to some degree and are socially desirable. But in Poland tolerated, undesirable, or illegal actions are treated as a minor issue.

The difficulties of the crisis are not affecting everyone equally. The attention of mass media and many institutions is concentrated mainly on those who are getting along comparatively well, on the assumption that they are "feeding" on the crisis rather than trying to remedy it with their economic activity. But from the social point of view the groups whom the crisis affects especially deeply are much more important. Among others, these are families raising children and receiving grants that are an essential part of their incomes. Nominal wages increase, prices rise, but grants remain unchanged. Thus, for example, the minimum educational grant with compensation constituted 24 percent of the average wage in 1982, 20 percent in 1983, and--probably--16 percent in 1984. The share of family grants is decreasing similarly.

Workers outside the sphere of material production (or in the so-called budget-financed sphere) have been harmed, with significant exceptions, of course. In 1983 emoluments in the sphere of material production were 5 percent higher than the average and in the budget-financed sphere 20 percent lower. Here no indicators show improvement, and all of them show further deterioration. In the production sphere, and especially in large establishments, there is a possibility of additional allowances for a social and residential fund that now and then yield significant sums. The social benefits there are better and cheaper, nearly free, and the closed "controlled sale," the counterpart of the old "yellow curtains," that is used in many establishments has special significance at the present time. It is prohibited but used.

It does not appear that differentiation resulted in essential improvement of the market situation, if we consider the poorer quality of production with its small quantitative growth. But the disintegration of nearly all services is intensifying, which signifies the deterioration of the standard of services and the further reduction of the quality of life and the social output of work.

As always, in some measure by definition, annuitants and pensioners have been harmed, despite many actions taken to improve their situation. This is a significant problem when one considers that 5 million people reside in families living exclusively on a pension or annuity. Per capita incomes are an average of 20 percent lower in these families than in working families. It is estimated that in 1983 there was a decline in real incomes for more than half of pensioners, even those counted according to the official basket and without taking qualitative deficiencies into account.

The next elimination of the old portfolio occurred based on wages from the first half of 1982, and in the meantime they have already increased by 80 percent. Minimum annuities and pensions also have been established at a fixed level. The next revalorization is to occur only in 1986, and meanwhile the soothing influence of the arrears paid out to pensioners will end in part.

International poverty standards take as the poverty level per capita incomes below two-thirds of average incomes. In 1982, 17 percent or 3 million people in working families and 18 percent or 1.2 million in families of annuitants and pensioners did not exceed this threshold--5,000 zlotys per capita. In 1983 this threshold already amounted to 6,000 zlotys, but it was not exceeded by 21 percent or 3.8 million people in working families and 38 percent or 2 million people in families of pensioners and annuitants. Consequently, the sphere of poverty was broadened in a very short time that was otherwise recognized as a period of improvement.

In this group, in working families in 1982, consumption of meat and meat products and animal fats was 10 to 15 percent lower than average, and consumption of fish, fruit, and their byproducts 20 percent lower than average.

Regardless of this process, voices praising the excessive protectiveness of the state, the excessive growth of custodial functions, etc., are stronger and stronger. Expenditures for social benefits, or pensions, annuities, grants, stipends, protection of health, and education, represent on the average about 25 percent of the national income in the CEMA countries. In Poland they amounted to 23.5 percent in 1981, 22.4 percent in 1982, and an estimated 21.8 percent in 1983. If one considers the already mentioned more rapid growth of nominal wages, this share of expenditures will continue to decrease. Then the restriction of "overgrowth" will follow automatically. It is worth adding here that an essential portion of these expenditures--for social security--totaled 284 billion zlotys in 1983, whereas state budget revenues from charges for social security amounted to 255.5 billion zlotys, or nearly as much.

It is remarkable that the standard of living during the crisis period has been higher than changes in real incomes would indicate. It fell to a lesser extent than these incomes and is rising to a greater extent. In working families real incomes increased by 1 percent from 1982 to 1983 and consumption rose by 5 percent, whereas in the families of pensioners and annuitants real incomes fell in this period by 2 percent and consumption rose by 1 percent. Of course, the statistical growth of consumption, just like the growth of real incomes, should be corrected for the coefficient of the quality of consumed products and for the more realistic contents of items in the basket of prices, but the difference is evident even with this correction.

This means that current incomes do not cover the costs of current, yet considerably reduced, consumption. Credits, private loans, donations mostly from the countryside to the city, and use of savings may be a supplemental source of income. Only the last item can be controlled somehow. The sum of savings account deposits at the PKO [General Savings Bank] increased from 399 billion zlotys to 838 billion zlotys in the years 1980-1983, it is true, but the value of this sum decreased, and most important, its ratio in relation to annual personal incomes decreased from 21.4 to 16.2 percent. The greatest drop occurred in 1982, as a reaction to the enormous rise in prices, but the decrease is continuing.

This way savings have to run out. Sources of money to cover the costs of consumption other than incomes also are limited. One can predict that this partial shock absorber of the effects of the crisis will stop operating and will make the situation even more difficult.

[----] [Law of 31 July 1981, On the Control of Publications and Shows, Article 2, Point 1, DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 99; revised 1983, DZIENNIK USTAW No 44, Item 204)]. Some essential changes are necessary.

8729

CSO: 2600/560

POLAND

NEW POLISH HELICOPTER DESIGNATED FOR WESTERN MARKETS

Warsaw SKRZYDLATA POLSKA in Polish No 52-53, 23-30 Dec 84 p 3

[Article by Boguslaw Witkowski: "PZL's Kania, New Polish Design"]

[Text] In a relatively short time a group of designers at the PZL-Swidnik Transportation Equipment Plant has developed a new helicopter designated for the Western market. The helicopter goes by two names: PZL-Kania and PZL-Kitty Hawk. The chief designer is Mgr Engineer Stanislaw Markisz, and the test pilot is Engineer Zbigniew Debski.


The PZL-Kania is a light multipurpose 9-10-place helicopter, powered by the famous American Allison 250-C20B engine. The helicopter has a regular fuselage of semimonocoque construction with a tailboom with a circular cross-section. The design provides exceptional safety and is resistant to overloading and impact. The doors are located on both sides of the cockpit. There is also a wide third door on the left side of the fuselage to facilitate access for passengers and cargo.

The two engines have been built in over the fuselage. As standard equipment the powerplant has automatic synchronization and stabilization of torque, with the possibility of emergency control by hand. The rotor system includes a three-bladed rotor with a fully articulated hub and a two-bladed rear pusher rotor. Both the blades of the main rotor and those of the rear rotor are equipped with electric deicing equipment.

Longitudinal, lateral steering, and overall pitch, helped along with three hydraulic amplifiers. In planning the helicopter the designers tried to introduce many modern technical and technological solutions to give it a longer useful life, to broaden its applications, to make it easier to use, and so on. An example is the design of the blades of the main rotor, the tail rotor, and horizontal stabilizer, which are made entirely out of glass fibers and epoxy resins. Compared to metal construction, the composite construction of the blades vastly improves the helicopter's performance, reduces service requirements, and extends its life.

Specifications

Rotor diameter	14.56 meters
Auxiliary rotor diameter	2.70 meters
Length with turning rotor	17.35 meters
Fuselage dimensions:	
Length with cockpit	4.07 meters
Maximum width	1.50 meters
Maximum height	1.62 meters
Fuselage cubic space	7.76 cubic meters
Baggage compartment space	0.45 cubic meters
Empty weight	2,000 kilograms
Normal gross weight	3,350 kilograms
Maximum allowable gross weight (utility weight)	3,550 kilograms
Max fuselage payload	1,200 kilograms
Maximum external load	300 kilograms [? illeg]
Maximum cruise speed MSL	210 kilometers/hour
Economy cruise speed MSL	190 kilometers/hour
Maximum climb at takeoff power MSL	7.93 meters/second
Maximum climb at cruise MSL	5.90 meters/second
Range with 30 minutes fuel reserve	402 kilometers
Range with auxiliary tanks & 30 min reserve	710 kilometers
Hover ceiling without ground effect	1,000 meters
Service ceiling	4,000 meters



It is possible to configure and modify the helicopter in a number of ways (standard passenger variation, passenger configuration with greater comfort, transport configuration for carrying cargo in the fuselage or as external load, several agricultural configurations, medical variations: ambulance, resuscitation and many others), and this is simple, does not take much time, and can be done under field conditions, owing to the typical joints built into the helicopter design.

It is anticipated that the PZL-Kania will become a flying workhorse, owing to its great efficiency and economy of use. For ease of ground handling, the helicopter has a tricycle landing gear, with pneumatic brakes making it possible to land and take off under practically any local conditions.

Destined for Western markets, the PZL-Kania helicopter will have a wide range of Insco International instruments for powerplant control and piloting, as well as King Radio nav aids and automatic control devices, which will more than suffice for safety of flight day and night.

The PZL-Kania should be well received on the markets for which it is designated.

10790

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POLAND

WALESA, GDANSK CHURCH ASSAILED FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Walesa's Support for West

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 19-20 Jan 85 p 7

[Article by Wlodzimierz Zralek: "The Theater of the Actor from Gdansk"]

[Text] The following considerations could actually be referred to the column in which we ordinarily print theatrical reviews. This is because the subject is someone who has the clearest ambitions to be an actor and says of himself: "I must pretend more and more to be a blockhead in order to be tolerated. I must play the fool in order to conserve my strength...."

Lech Walesa came forward with this confession in an interview granted to the French newspaper LA CROIX. If the interested party himself considers at least some of his remarks as deliberate acting, what kind of a review is deserved?

It is possible to quote many utterances of L. Walesa in which he falls into the role he has designated for himself, naturally with exaggeration. For example, who could see the future Nobel Peace Prize laureate in the role of a speaker who, during the mass meeting in the Krakow Lenin Steelworks in July 1981, proposed strikes, in a wonderful way trying to have everyone pay any amount of money in the banks, and all applicants get an automobile without any payments?

However, there are also statements which prove that their author knows what he is saying and what he wants. Among other things, this refers to his expectations from the West, which was one of the subjects in the LA CROIX interview referred to. Here is part of the conversation.

"It seems that you are appealing somewhat bitterly to the Western world. Do you think that its solidarity with you is beginning to weaken somewhat, or that you can demand something from it?"

"Solidarity needs this help from the West more and more to strengthen us and support us in our daily battle...."

This quoted statement is an expression of the consistency with which L. Walesa presents his "political thought" on this level. He has always associated all of his hopes with the West and, if he sometimes evaluates its activities critically, it is only because it has not become definitively (from his point of view) involved in interfering in the internal affairs of Poland. As early as December 1980, he stated in an interview for the American UPI: "Some day you will wake up and see that it is too late for a logical solution. The West is not on the right track. You make too many concessions and some day it will be too late...."

A clear identification of the interests of the movement he directed with the interests of the Western states winds inexorably through L. Walesa's comments. Here is part of an interview for the West German weekly DER SPIEGEL of June 1981.

"We would only like to know what Lech Walesa considers most important."

"The most important for us or for you?"

"Either one."

"For us the most important thing is not to lose our battle. This is the same for us and for the West. If we do not win, then you lose too. I am always asking myself whether you in the West can understand this...."

When both parties, whose interests have run so concurrently, have finally lost, L. Walesa will have been the decisive spokesman for the reservations of reaction for a long period of time. After declaring himself to be a "partial American," in Gdansk in August 1983 he welcomed Senator Christopher Dodd who, according to a report from the VOICE OF AMERICA, held the following conversation with American journalists.

"Mr Dodd, what did Walesa say to you on the matter of economic sanctions?"

"'If the United States or our allies were to annul them now,' said Mr Walesa, 'it would be sending the wrong political signal...'"

The renewed and consistent expectations from the West were accompanied by statements no longer of sympathy but rather of fondness, directed mainly to the United States. It is worth quoting at least part of an interview of August 1984 for the American CBS television network.

"If you could speak directly to the American people and government, what would you ask us to do?"

"First of all for Poland to become like America...."

How this fascination of the "partial American" from Gdansk is reconciled with his claims that he has nothing, absolutely nothing, against the socialist system of Poland is a mystery in L. Walesa's game. At any rate, the role adopted by him includes the declaration noted, among others, in May 1984 by the VOICE OF AMERICA, regretting that "in the period of the past 40 years Poland has been deprived of private enterprise and private initiative." Somewhat earlier he had announced a programmed declaration appraising the state of the Polish economy and proposing, along with many other considerations, some which might particularly be called labor and trade considerations.

"It would not be a bad thing if many of the workers in the socialized sector, often with the highest education and meeting setbacks in their hopes and ambitions, began to open private shops...."

These are parts of the program which Lech Walesa would like to introduce into the dialog in which he has apparently wanted to participate so much, with the idea presented as follows in the LA CROIX interview mentioned earlier.

"It is still too early to solve all of the problems, to reverse everything. If we are to find a concrete solution to our problems, we must be aware of the fact that we do not have any chance of winning over force. We must wait for a more propitious moment...."

Speaking of himself, L. Walesa says that sometimes he takes himself seriously, while sometimes he plays the fool. However, more and more spectators sense that both of these roles are played with the idea of the same epilog.

Political Enmity of Church

Warsaw ARGUMENTY in Polish No 2, 13 Jan 85 p 15

[From the column "Polish Provincial Notes", prepared by (M. M.)]

[Text] "Let us offer each other the sign of peace." These words do not come from a poster promoting national understanding. Nor do they come from a government brochure nor any address of a representative of the government.

These words should be known by every practicing Catholic. After all, these are the words used to end the divine services in Polish. No one who has heard these words from the priest can claim that he did not understand them. And still people come out of church and snatch stones from the pavement to throw them. They do this on anniversaries. But there are people who try not to permit tempers to calm down, and there are some who have been filled with extreme hatred for years. On Sunday on the square in front of the Church of St Brigette in Gdansk, tempers boiled up again. We all know why it is precisely in front of this church, in front of this church again.

Those who are kept alive in memory were laborers and dockyard workers. Who are the ones in front of the church? Whose interests are they supporting? For what reasons are they demonstrating for foreign television? What kind of sign are they offering their neighbor? Peace? What kind? For whom? Only for those who think as they do? What has this in common with the knowledge they should be taking from the church? (from WIECZOR WYBRZEZA, No 248)

* * *

The prospects for the 14 December anniversary reveal deep reflection. Unfortunately, this year the solemnity of the anniversary was forcibly repudiated in a way both deliberate and cynical. It is typical that this moral stimulus, and not for the first time, had its origin in the shrine of St Brigette. Allusions to homilies delivered here, activities from the divine service, spectacles to meet the needs of the ready mass of correspondents from the West bustling about the gate of the rectory, all of these things prove that we must deny any illusions about the intentions of the actions of the pastor of this parish.

The anniversary, which we approach with deep reflection and meditation, shows that the parish priest was willing to use his position of authority to further his intentions, the conversion of the shrine into a sanctuary promoting inspiration and political conventicles on the part of the people who gather here from the entire country to express their antisocialist phobias. (from GLOS WYBRZEZA, No 299)

The Gdansk church dedicated to St Brigette has long ceased to fulfill a role exclusively for believers. Crowds of people come here for various reasons, and not only for the needs of the heart and for religious contemplation. Large throngs always behave simply as crowds, regardless of the place and the surroundings. And a crowd is governed by different laws, and impulsively reacts in a different way to words which are dropped, especially when they contain many ambiguities and allusions. Last Sunday reinforced this conviction. After all, the Mass was attended by people who are uncompromising in their determination to battle with authority at any price, those who long ago lost the confidence and support of the people, and who are more and more isolated in their fanaticism and hatred. The facts are that, after leaving St Brigette's Church, the people frequently forget the sense of the words national understanding and the need for unity and brotherhood in these days of difficulty for us Poles. It is very bad when the people leave the church with "fire in their eyes." It is very bad that they hate, despite the principle of love of neighbor. (from DZIENNIK BALTYCKI, No 297)

6806

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POLAND

CHURCH ACCUSED OF PRACTICING IDEOLOGICAL 'IMPERIALISM'

Warsaw ARGUMENTY in Polish No 2, 13 Jan 85 p 5

[Article by Zbigniew Stachowski: "Papacy, Church, World: From Soup to Nuts"]

[Text] The incessant competition among various concepts, systems, ideologies, and social visions claiming to offer the world optimal solutions has always existed, and really nobody should be surprised at this. After all, especially, utopian concepts with lofty idealism usually quickly lose their advocates and disciples unless attempts are made to modify them, when in the long run any real practical measure of human life is overlooked in them.

One of the techniques for insuring that just such conceptions of ideology endure is the mechanism of appropriating and then accommodating the most attractive elements of competitive concepts, doctrines, or ideologies. This measure is used on a broad scale by the Catholic Church, which not only took great chunks of content from human thought of a previous age prior to the foundation of Christianity, treating the world as though everything were an original Christian idea, but also has been continuing to act the same way over the past nearly 2,000 years. It has subjected and continues to try to subject to Christian reinterpretation each sphere of human life, and every value, regardless of whether there are reasons for doing so or not.

In this way it has gathered unto itself human customs and manners, human longings and dreams, the creation of human genius, and the world of intimate human life. Cultural imperialism here is simply unfettered and insatiable. The church admits to all and everything, especially whatever may further its power, mainly the world of values, a classic example of which is the category of work, social equality, dignity, humanism, anthropocentrism, and the like. Even atheism has been called (not by the church, it is true, but for the time being only by theologians) a value with a nature cataractal to church doctrine.

Usually the appropriation process begins with seemingly minor, unimportant proposals, like the one published in GOSC NIEDZIELNY (No 50, 1984), that besides religious observances of a more or less active and current nature, there is the whole gamut of modern lay customs related to family life that have significant general human value, such as dedicating separate days to mother, child, women, grandmother, grandfather, and so on. GOSC NIEDZIELNY suggests that there is probably nothing to prevent a religious emphasis

being placed on days which represent feastsdays of people close to us and, what is more, for example to encourage prayers not only for our own mothers or children but also for mothers in particularly difficult circumstances or for orphans or abandoned children. And again the examples can be duplicated, but we are interested only in pointing out the broader issue, that is, the creation of a new tradition to which each reality has the right and to bring it into the storehouse of national culture.

In other words, from soup to nuts, but it is not exactly this that we are talking about, because this is still not appropriation but only a proposal to inculcate then appropriation plan. It is only indicating the target, the goal of cultural expansion to which the Catholic inculturation machinery is being directed.

The rich reality manifest in various forms of the Catholic dialogue usually aimed at "looking over the terrain" provides us with more concrete examples. The most glaring proof of theological appropriation probably unparalleled in the history of the past millenium is the recent attempt to finalize the adoption -- with concepts entirely different from idealistic ones -- of the ideas for building a future society of social equality and justice, because it concerns a concept formulated by Paul VI and now being given new content and value by John Paul II, the so-called concept of "civilization of love," whose bright light is already somehow visible, according to the pope.

This current doctrinal novelty of the church, made concrete by creating ad hoc hypotheses, up till now has never really had the opportunity of gaining a priority in the ideology of Catholicism, because the incarnate life of all humanity has never been subject of church interest. There has been particularly little interest in the vision of a future society of justice and equality, when only the framework of this concept was developed outside of Catholicism, when it was only an idea. The situation underwent a drastic change the moment when the idea began to materialize not only in one country but throughout the world. Then the church started to sound the alarm.

To be precise it should be mentioned that various factions of Christianity (for example, Waldensians, Abigensians, Czech Brothers, Anabaptists, Adventists, Mormons, Jehova's Witnesses, and others) were not strangers to the idea of the kingdom of God on earth lasting even 1,000 years, and the idea is known as "milleniarism" or "chiliasm." Nonetheless, the concept of the kingdom of social justice on earth based on John's Apocalypse and the Gospel of Matthew (16:27), where it talks about the sudden parousia of Christ, was rejected by the Catholic Church as dangerous to its mundane interests.

At present the church has diametrically modified its previous stand, stating in the words of John Paul II that the realization of the kingdom of justice is possible, and it even goes further to announce the necessity of building it, which the Russian proletariat started to do in October 1917, and the church is all of a sudden calling it "the civilization of love."

After initially making the allegedly new idea its own the church carefully began to popularize and interpret it. Here the church has a particularly important role in Poland, for many reasons, partly because it has been stated that Polish Catholicism is inaugurating the Slavic era of Christianity, that one of the church's long-awaited national steps is being taken, that for the universal church the Polish character [of it] is becoming a "sign of the times," that Vistula Catholicism is a bridge between East and West, that an evangelical revolution is taking place right in Poland, and so on.

The program of this new all-encompassing civilization of the future, which is to insure heaven on earth, is based, among other things, on two fundamental values of Catholic ethics, that is, love and justice, and there is the assumption that only the church can offer the modern world a universal, optimal moral code, that the height of morality today has been achieved solely and exclusively by this ecclesial institution. The identification of one human being's love for another with love of God is a condition sine qua non of this successive utopian vision in the history of mankind. As the advocates of this concept state, it is not possible for a person to love another authentically without loving God and vice versa. This love and none other is to be the path to the goal, to this civilization first for God and only afterwards for people.

Because the church, however, is witness to the fact that despite the intent, there has been no conceptualization here of any explosive to morally revolutionize the world. On the contrary, analogies to other concepts here are striking and obvious. Therefore it was decided, especially in the Polish situation, to make an "epistemological break," because on the one hand they said that although the "civilization of love" is a theological, that is, idealistic, vision, this is not pure idealism but evangelical idealism, but on the other hand it is said that the "civilization of love" is not a system but ultimately the relationships of personal interaction. The civilization of love can never be reduced to ideology. Every system tends to this. "Ideology will defend the idea at all costs," Bishop A. Nossol states in TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY No 47, 1984. "Unfortunately sometimes this is at the cost of the human individual. We save the idea to save the system. For the ideology, the system, what counts is not somebody but something, and in the final event what counts is always the victory of ideas, the victory of the system."

This sudden defense of the human being and the aversion to ideology in essence is not explained here by anything but consequences which are very bitter for the church, although surely the intention was quite different. After all it was not just once or 100 times or 1,000 times that the church has sacrificed the human individual -- and continues to do so -- for its own ideology, its own system, but the technique employed of accusing others, of showing that hell and evil are different at their roots, shows the real intentions of the "civilization of love," which can be either "love" for the elect or hatred for the damned.

It is worthwhile to devote more time and attention in the future to this than has been done in the past, for several reasons at least, despite the fact that this utopian vision is a concept in statu nascendi, that the moral dimension is confused with the social dimension, and that it never gets put into practice, never passes the unsurmountable barrier.

The first reason is that the advocates of this vision consider the previous concepts to be "weak and ineffective, because they depend on human understanding, will, and mentality" (CHRZESCIJAN W SWIECIE, No 123, 1983, p 16), which implicitly gives a preference for its own sort of irrationality, among other things. Second, the church's promotion of utopian social visions and its portraying them as the only alternative for the world in the short term can pull the society away from programs which are realistic rather than heavenly. Third, the church has taken an exceptionally dynamic step into the realm of appropriation, which may cause some disorientation or even the temporary renouncement of the lay world of values. Fourth and last, because for the moment there is no complete Marxist interpretation of the visions and tendencies mentioned above within the church, there is starting to be a higher information noise level, to which a person without a decided world view is particularly susceptible.

In closing this reflection it is worthwhile to ask a question of everyone who is interested in the church's neoirrationalist sociomoral concept at the end of the 20th Century: Is the church's utopian love to be a love for man, for God, or for the church, because in loving man alone one runs into conflict with the church, and in loving the church, that is, the structure of rule and authority, one runs into conflict with man, while in loving God one runs into conflict with both man and the institution. This is but one of the paradoxes which one faces in the attempt to turn social practice into theological theory!

10790

CSO: 2600/531

POLAND

LEGISLATION ON CULTURAL, ARTISTIC ACTIVITIES ENACTED

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 16 Jan 85 p 6

[Article by Adam Ferenc: "New Law on Artistic Institutions"]

[Text] On 28 December 1984 the Sejm enacted a law on artistic institutions. It is an important element in settling the legal status of culture. This process was initiated by the law on the National Culture Council and the Culture Development Fund. The laws on the people's councils also contain regulations (a new division of competence in the area of culture management) and, above all, on the dissemination of culture and the rights and duties of the culture-dissemination workers. The first of these laws established the general mechanisms of financing in this field, which apply also to laws on the dissemination of culture and to laws on artistic institutions.

Thus far, the institutions based their legal existence on the provisions of the law governing state enterprises. This law treated the institutions as public-service enterprises. The initial phase of the implementation of this law indicated early on that the activities of artistic institutions, when placed on a par with product and service enterprises, encountered serious difficulties. They stemmed mainly from their separate and peculiar character. The tasks and goals of these institutions were not consistent with the standard rules which governed state enterprises. Without going into details, it is sufficient to say that the main goal of the production and service enterprises is the achievement of economic results, while the results of artistic institutions lie in the field of a sociopolitical superstructure and are based on shaping public awareness of culture and the arts, within the broad meaning of these concepts.

It should be noted that the difficulties connected with including these institutions in state enterprises did not suddenly appear in practice. It had been expected that they could not realistically function under this legal basis. It is not surprising, therefore, that even before the law on state enterprises had been in effect one year, the Sejm's Culture and Arts Commission, in Opinion No 8 dated 5 July 1982, decided that "the Ministry of Culture and Art should immediately begin work on a government draft law on artistic institutions."

The broad creative circles also took the same position. The establishment, for these artistic institutions, of appropriate legal, organizational and financial forms was one of the basic conditions for giving the theater and other institutions the strength that they needed if they were to have an influence on educating the recipients of culture and on shaping the national culture.

Separate Status

The law on artistic institutions ensures them a separate, and it may even be said, a special legal status. The application of its provisions should in practice have a favorable effect on both the organization and the operations of these institutions, and it should also raise their public prestige. The final form of this law is the result of discussions and even disputes which took place during meetings of the pertinent Sejm commissions and subcommissions, attended by representatives of the government, artistic unions, the trade union (Federation of Culture and Art Employees' Trade Unions) and other interested institutions and organizations. Certain issues provoked a sharp and many-sided discussion. These included the scope of the culture and art minister's interference in the establishment, registration and deletion (from the register) of artistic institutions, their liquidation, the status and rights of the parent agency in relation to the arts-program council, and the legal status of the persons employed in these institutions. The opinions of the National Arts Council, the Sejm's Specialist Team, and many other institutions and individuals were taken into consideration. Deputy Bogdan Gawronski, in his speech in the Sejm on 28 December 1984, said that the approval or at least the understanding of the decisions embodied in the draft law submitted to the Sejm by the members of the working commission and its future implementors, was achieved "thanks to the open minds of those who took part in this work, particularly the representatives of the government, the creative societies, and the trade unions."

Differentiated Models

A discussion of the more important decisions embodied in the law should begin with the statement of their goal in the preamble, which is "to fully meet the cultural needs of society and the development of culture and art consistent with the goals of the socialist system of the Polish People's Republic." The principle of the primary social function of the artistic institutions ensues from this definition.

The law regulates the activities of theaters and philharmonic societies, operas and operettas, symphonic and chamber orchestras, song and dance groups, and choral groups. Its provisions also cover other state organizations whose exclusive or main task is to organize professional stage and recreational activities. Independent of this, the minister of culture and art, by issuing a directive, may at his own initiative or at the request of interested institutions, extend the provisions of the law, totally or in part, to other organizations of the public sector, as well as to trade unions and other social organizations which conduct artistic activity.

Giving them a great deal of independence in artistic and financial matters makes it possible for many different models of these institutions to function, depending on their artistic resources, technical equipment, and the environment in which and for which the given institution is to operate. The law does not provide for a workers' self-management in these institutions because experience has shown that the powers which constitute workforce self-management cannot be reconciled with the peculiar functioning of artistic institutions. However, a consulting-advisory body is provided--an arts-program council appointed by the managing director. It includes elected representatives of the arts group in an amount not exceeding half the total number of the council members, appointed representatives of other employees, and representatives of social and political organizations, creative societies (artists), and trade unions, functioning in a given institution. The council reserves the right to express its opinion on matters important to the functioning and development of the institution. This gives it a democratic influence on the decisions of the managing (artistic) director. Persons outside the artistic institution may also be invited to attend the council meetings, for example, representatives of such organized groups as "Pro Simfonica" from Poznan and the Theater Culture Society from Gdansk. This also serves to make the decisionmaking process more democratic.

The Moment of Registration

The basis for establishing an artistic institution is the resolution of the provincial people's council and the decision of the founding entity, who is the provincial governor. The exception is those artistic institutions which are of special importance to national culture and art, which are established by the Minister of Culture and Art (the parent office). Artistic institutions may be joint, combined or separate. The law also specifies the conditions which the institution must fulfill in order to warrant its establishment. These include the social need for their establishment, the existence of a group of persons with the appropriate professional qualifications, and the assurance, by the founding body, that the material, technical and organizational conditions necessary to conduct artistic activity at the correct level are available. Despite the decentralization of artistic activity, the law guarantees that the state will correctly exercise its patronage in the field of culture by giving the Minister of Culture and Art the authority to define the main courses of the program activities of these institutions. In addition, it ensures this minister influence on decisions as to establishment or liquidation of institutions and appointment or dismissal of managing and artistic directors.

The institutions referred to obtain legal status at the time they are entered into the register of artistic institutions maintained by the Minister of Culture and Art. The law provides that entry and deletion from the register can be refused (for clearly specified reasons) and also that those institutions which do not fulfill their legal tasks or those specified in their certificate of establishment, can be liquidated. The artistic institution operates on the basis of a statute established by the managing director after obtaining the opinion of the arts-program council, affirmed by the founding agency. This agency also has the duty of ensuring that the artistic institution has the

indispensable materials and funds. It also exercises supervision over the artistic institution, and in particular, makes periodic inspections and evaluations of its activities. It may also issue binding instructions on correcting ascertained shortcomings and deficiencies.

The Director and Finances

On the assumption that the artistic and program decisions in an artistic institution are made by the managing director, who as a rule is also the artistic director, the law endows him with a special position. He is responsible for all of the institution's activities and also for making sure that the members of the group and the employed persons have good conditions in which to work and develop artistically. It is possible for an artistic director to be appointed in addition to a managing director. In such case, his duties are to develop an ideological and artistic program, a repertory--on which he reports to the managing director. The parent body appoints the managing director and the artistic director.

In striving to guarantee stability to the workers' groups in the artistic institutions, the provisions of the law state that the main legal basis for employment is a work agreement and that the employees now in state public-service enterprises are now, by law, employees of artistic institutions.

Although the law defines the fundamental principles for financing these institutions, the details are covered in a Council of Ministers decree. According to deputy Bogdan Gawronski's announcement at the 28 December 1984 Sejm meeting, the draft of such a decree and other executive acts has been prepared. The new financing system in artistic institutions contains provisions which conform with the general directions of economic reform and which take into account the special character of these institutions in their differentiated forms. The law provides that the services of these institutions be made widely available to the public, and that the fixing of prices of admissions and other fees be done with this in mind. This means that the legislature has recognized that the activities of artistic institutions, where management is concerned, cannot be based strictly on the criterion of profit. It is provided that where costs of activities exceed revenues, additional financing will come from the Cultural Development Fund, which is the basic source of financing for cultural activities.

9295

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ROMANIA

WRITER MUSES ON DICTATORSHIPS, LITERATURE, HISTORY

Rise and Fall of 'Ala' Described

Cluj-Napoca TRIBUNA in Romanian 17 Jan 85 p 5

[Article by Augustin Buzura: "Blocnotes--Pseudojournal XVI"]

[Text] Although it would be natural, it was not the exclamation of Guise--Comme il est long! [How long it is']--before the corpse of his victim, Admiral Coligny, discovered by chance in an old notebook, which reminded me of R. but, paradoxically these endless, paralyzing snowstorms which do not cease. In the beginning he had called himself the Messenger, and later--the Representative, and then, at the very end during the time that I knew him--Ala, just Ala. Just like in magic no one would say his name lest he might appear! No one knew where he had come from to this relatively peaceful valley and how long he would remain; in any case, at the beginning, his image as a confused man, awkward, tortured by the most unusual question aroused sympathy and more than a little irony. In those years of the tormenting decade, when the problem of literacy presented itself, the teacher was of the opinion that R was the only illiterate person in the village but he was not able to verify this since R spoke and, especially, asked questions and did not have time to write. Later, after it appeared to him that he had learned all he should, R abruptly changed his attitude: he became arrogant, unrestrained and irritable. He began to act badly toward those who had been his friends and, as a result, throughout the entire valley, people felt the need to take revenge; anyone who did not satisfy his whims, which were very many, could expect the most bizarre punishment; transporting gravel by cart to places which could not be easily reached by foot. He demanded that the respective persons appear before him at times of day which were impossible for people in the region, for example at 2200 and 2600 hours; if they came earlier he did not receive them and if they were late he fined them. Gradually the questions were replaced by abusive names and threats; the charge that he was not well-received, the complaint that they had not put enough cheese in the pie--his principal weakness outside of women and plum brandy--and the threat that none of his words would be in vain and he blamed them for things for which they were not responsible. Some of the people survived by paying him court, others by avoiding him, and others, the majority, by dreaming of harsh revenge. However, he did not care: "Now I am dreaming that I am Jehova and with this I believe that you have understood what I meant!" he concluded his texts.

One day R was found frozen to death on the bank of the river. He had fallen, drunk, from the bridge and had been dragged by the waters, under the ice and then thrown out. A great number of people had gathered around him but nobody dared to touch him or to speak; it seemed that no one could believe that R, the great and powerful R was no longer living! Later, someone broke out into strange, uncontrolled laughter, but in a short time the person was silenced by the sturdy palm of a woman: "Do not laugh, cowards! You could have done this yourselves!" At that time I did not understand exactly what the woman meant and I did not pay attention to the reactions of the people; I was just hypnotized by his dry, pale face, by the small, stunted body of an immature child. "Gentlemen, how small he is!" I repeated, completely incapable of understanding that his strength rested in the fear of others, in the fear of those around him. Since then, I have often thought about this R and I have tried to reconstruct him on the basis of people's recollections. I realized that after a certain period of time nothing could be hidden or forgotten. Why did he do what he did? Pavese believed that an inferiority complex "also called ambition" was the basis for all sins. Possibly this is not the case for all. Perhaps some people have a faulty relationship with time; they do not have a concept of its passage, they do not know what the past and future mean and others--have an absence of memory or an inability to learn from the experience of others. Perhaps it is also a question of culture. But all these things are known. I remembered R only because it is snowing and because the cold and ice make me think of two of my characters "aroused" by R: Gheorghe Radu and Socoliuc.

'Pedagogues' Confuse Journalism and Literature

Cluj-Napoca TRIBUNA in Romanian 24 Jan 85 p 10

[Article by Augustin Buzura: "Blocnotes--Pseudojournal XVII"]

[Text] The old dogmatism, so harmful to our culture, has been analyzed in every detail so that today we see a clear picture of what happened. We know the parameters and depths, the momentary effects and the long-term effects, its real image and masks behind which it has been hidden and can still hide. Thus, it is an old chapter, one which is well-known and has been put back on the shelf where it belongs, a road which no serious writer would ever take. But, despite all this, there are still some texts--unimportant to be sure--which are reminiscent of this dogmatism. A. Tome is gone--and today people are rejoicing because of her, which did not happen while she was alive--but the mentality which arose in regard to Eminescu has not disappeared completely. Some colleagues, critics and prose writers--and, paradoxically, even some people who used to oppose her strongly--have become, like doctors treating infections, contaminated by the various obsessions and manners of this period, agents of the malady with which they have been confronted. Other colleagues, ignoring the sad lesson, are paving, with new words, the old and convenient road of yesterday and are practicing the very same thing which they are combatting in theory. Thus, periodically, they feel the need to take an inventory of "themes": which "themes" seem to them to be more important, which "themes" have been "illustrated" properly by "our prose writers," which "themes" have been neglected or

ignored and, certainly, the ones to which we should be directing our attention. And always--after covering themselves with the most sacred words which a real man writes or pronounces very few times in his life out of respect--messages are given to the readers, to the workers. They speak in their name or in the name of other "commandments" which only they know. Periodically, they make a general appeal, they note those present and those absent, they give grades, and, inevitably, they monitor the conclusions and tasks. Why do X, Y and Z fail to treat a certain "theme?" Why do they ignore it?

Today--just like yesterday--these "pedagogues of the new school" are confusing journalism and literature, assigning to the latter that which belongs to the press and to journalism. To be present at all the successes and failures of your fellow-men, to be alongside them in the midst of their trials is an obligation of honor for every writer who respects his tools. To be present at the barricades of the spirit, to struggle against aggressive ignorance, against blustering and greedy mediocrity, against inertia and ineptitude, to impose, at any price, the real ideas of the age, the innovative ideas, to place hope and confidence in the power of man to be regenerated and elevated and to make man raise his eyes to the heavens--these are the requirements which enter into the alphabet of the profession. But for those whom we mentioned at the beginning, for those who have given up being themselves, being present means to publicize and illustrate various regulations, laws, the needs of the moment, passing occurrences, etc. Just like in school: today we will sing this song and tomorrow, another song, etc. The most important things are the moment, the superficial aspects, the immediate effect, appearances and not essence, changes in depth, the new truth (good or not so good), the eternal-human whose knowledge and presentation require special efforts and time, very much time. Unfortunately, there have been writers who have permitted themselves to be persuaded by such false demands, just as there are still some people today who do not see beyond the limits of their own office. There was a story about a novelist who completed his novel about the importance and necessity of fees at the very moment that they were abolished. And there are other such examples. Both from yesterday and today. I have some of them before my eyes, in the library: the tragedy of not choosing your road yourself, of not discovering in time the true purposes of literature. Or, even more seriously, the tragedy of ignoring them with full knowledge, out of convenience, laziness, fear or the need for monetary or administrative advantages, for the moment. Indeed, on another level, to betray your vocation, to put your talent, inasmuch as you have it, in the service of those whose clock stopped in another age, or in the service of some old ideas, invalidated by history, seems to me to be the same, in the final analysis, as betraying the collective to which you belong, the country. And such errors are very expensive. If a drop of intellectual blood cannot be removed by anything, at any time, as has been said many times, abdication from an obligation is no less serious. Therefore, regardless of the themes which might seem to be important to one person or another, the writer has his theme, his obsession. He has the obligation to write what he feels that he must write, at any price: the truth about his times and about the people among whom he lives. But about people and the times, it must be the truth, not something produced by the imagination of the futurologists of the moment. It must not be about the country of those who subscribe each day to jingoistic tirades, but about our country, the country of our being, about the vital, true and holy country which wants

deeds and can live only by deeds, by work and by awareness, the country about which no one and nothing can be mistaken. Since in each reality we write and re-write the same book, we return to the same obsessions, we try to climb on the rock which is closest to the top of the mountain, in a terribly rapid and complicated period of time. Can there be any more noble theme than Man (and man!)?

Therefore, each time I read an "inventory" of a circulation clerk dealing with literature, I look around, in the library stacks and ask: what themes would have seemed to be important to some people during the time that Dostoevski was writing "Demonii" (The Demons)? What "themes" were "pressing" in the sad years when Blaga, Arghezi, Voiculescu, Preda, etc., wrote what we know? Anyway, while Preda was writing "Morometii" (The Moromets), and even a year after the publication of the famous novel, the "theme" of fees and contracts had not lost its "timeliness" and it was still very "pressing"!

Perhaps someday a man with humor will be found, one who will take inventory of "emergencies" of this type, like various flies during plowing. Because naivete, foolishness, emptiness, ignorance, primitive aggressiveness, etc., when they are complete, have the right to immortality or, as Baconsky said, to be monuments. Some people have written scores of books and the world has forgotten them; time did not need them. While La Palice assured himself of eternity with two lines:

A quarter of an hour before his death
He was still alive!

Dictatorships 'Make Life Impossible'

Cluj-Napoca TRIBUNA in Romanian 31 Jan 85 p 2

[Article by Augustin Buzura: "Blocnotes--Pseudojournal XVIII"]

[Text] I am reading the new "Supplex Libellus Valachorum" (Petition of the Wallachians) an extraordinary book of a great historian, of a great conscience--the adjectives are perfectly appropriate here--from the family of the masters of the Transylvanian School, Academician David Prodan. The book bears the name of the most important political document in Transylvania during the XVIIIth century, but, in reality, it is a real history of our national awareness, a fresco of the virtues of the Romanians, "Yesterday and the Day Before Yesterday," a book about the real saints of our history who, putting the interests of their people above everything else, could struggle and die for them. Through the prism of their deeds, their painful suffering and their faith sanctified by blood, one can better see what it means to make history and to live in history. This book--just like all the other books of Professor David Prodan--written in a splendid Romanian language, is also a model for considering history: impassionately, without useless passions, only in the light of the documents and of respect for the truth.

I had the privilege of meeting this distinguished contemporary rather late, after I had read some of his books and after his dedicated research work had become legend. I knew that he did not give interviews, that he does not divide his work into fragments, and that he is not concerned about petty frivolous things. Fascinated by his objectivity, I would have liked to ask him what he thinks about the history which he lived, about the history which does not enter directly into the range of his research, but now, after I have read the new "Supplex" ... I am beginning to guess the response although I still believe that I will be the lucky journalist who will obtain the text. Because I do not know where I got the impression that historians have an advantage over other mortals since they have the answers to the questions which writers are always asking them...!

And, since I was speaking about history, soon it will be the 40th anniversary of the defeat of fascism, and, almost involuntarily, I remember this, grouping on the table the books about this sinister "parenthesis in the history of mankind," because there are a number of things which should not be forgotten, a number of details which outline its profile more clearly. I imagine that, after so many years, many people might allow themselves to be attracted to the comical aspect of a dictatorship, because those monsters who build their monument by themselves, from the statues of those who preceded them in history, are ridiculous. In the book by Max Gallo "Mussolini's Italy," published in Romania 15 years ago, this aspect is stressed abundantly. The speeches of the person who imagined himself to be Julius Caesar and Napoleon at the same time can appear today in various anthologies of human stupidity, just like the rules of life, just like its eternal dialogue with history, just like his life as an operetta Caesar, just like the verses, of which Max Gallo presents only a few:

Let us love bread, /the heart of the home, the fragrance of the table,/ the joy of the house,/. Let us respect bread, Let us honor bread,/ Let us not waste the bread of Italy.

But beyond their humorous side, behind the words--which are pathetic, comical, and absurd--there are the deeds, that is, hundreds of thousands of people dead in the world and millions and millions of people mutilated psychologically and growing up crippled. Eugenio d'Ors says that there are two ways to kill: "one described by the verb to kill; the other, which is understood by the delicate euphemism: 'to make life impossible'. This is a type of slow and obscure assassination which a multitude of invisible accomplices carry out. It is an auto-da-fé, without hoods and without flames, performed by an inquisition without a judge and without a sentence..." And this "euphemism": to make life impossible, is the most sinister part of such a dictatorship.

Max Gallo quotes the statement of the public prosecutor in regard to the accused Antonio Gramsci: "We must prevent this brain from functioning for a period of 20 years. "And he reproduces a fragment of a letter from this refined Sardinian intellectual written to his wife from prison: "The limits of my freedom have been restricted to the inner life and my will has become only the will to resist." To understand all which these sentences contain means to understand only a part

of the sinister picture of a dictatorship which feeds on rudimentary, anti-human political thought. This is what Mussolini said: "The people should be well-surrounded and kept in uniform, from morning to evening, and you have to beat them, beat them," Or: "The people are whores who prefer the strongest man." Some, in brown, black, and green, acted this way, even though they did not have the sincerity of Il Duce. Certainly, as has been said so many times, dictatorships are parentheses in the life of a people. But what horrible imprints are left by such parentheses!

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YUGOSLAVIA

SLOVENIAN YOUTH WEEKLY RIDICULES PLANNED LIBERATION PARADE

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23-24 Feb 85 p 6

[Excerpts] One confiscated issue and three or four issues withdrawn from the press of the weekly MLADINA, organ of the Slovenian Socialist Youth League (SSO), in the last 6 months are only a small part of the life of the editors of this publication; this was brought out at the 22 February meeting of the Center for Information, Research and Publication within the Slovenian SSR republic conference. The occasion for the special meeting of the center...pertains to the No 7, 21 February 1985 issue of MLADINA in which 6 pages are devoted to the decision to hold a military parade on 9 May in Belgrade to mark the 40th anniversary of the liberation from fascism.

The authors, signed and unsigned, in four articles and one photo report speak in an ironic and slanderous fashion about the idea to hold the parade, the method of issuing the decision, and in general the suitability of the parade in our country.

Thus, among other things, Janez Jansa (he is a former youth functionary who because of extremist and unacceptable views about our army was not reelected to the republic youth presidium at the last election conference and who was penalized as an LC member previously because of this) [his views] in the article "Answer to the Delegate Question--The Parade," writes that the "anniversary of the liberation is certainly a holiday which in this or that way is being commemorated by every people and every state. Experience shows that the larger the organized event the more backward is the nation culturally and economically. In question is the way and form of celebration.... Of most concern is the fact that no one wants to discuss the arguments against the parade. This of course confirms the feeling that the decision was made when it was first proposed and that the collective high command did nothing except to applaud and confirm the proposal."

Adding to this opinion is the following proclamation by a peace group in the SSO republic conference: "Since we think that the parade in any case is not a private matter of certain individuals but is also a general Yugoslav matter, it is good that we express doubt in the way in which decision [on it] are being prepared and realized."

An unsigned article titled "Parade" tries to suggest to MLADINA readers the reasons which led the proposers to organize the parade. It cites the need to show the world our power, to present our military industry, to indicate to the political opposition which has recently raised its head that things will no longer go on like that, to make peace movements impossible, or to popularize military training schools. With irony which is in poor taste the photo report...says that "it is symbolic that this year the president of the first workers council died [Ante Gabelic], so he will not be on the honorary rostrum."

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- END -